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'My informant's summary gave me the clue to the 
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search for either two buttons to press, one labelled 
'Tame European' and the other 'Cargo Deity'.'
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INTRODUCTION
The results of the 1992 national elections in Papua 
New Guinea, produced a curious outcome in the Madang 
Province. Two Europeans were elected to represent the 
people of the Province, one in an open electorate and 
the other as the regional member. Nor was this 
European representation an isolated incident in the 
Madang Province. On the Rai coast, for the same 
elections, two European planters had been approached by- 
electors who asked them to stand in that seat. Of even 
more interest, however, was the fact that the two 
Europeans who chose to stand were not the only 
outsiders to secure a seat in the national parliament 
representing the people of Madang. Two highlanders 
were also elected, one at the time of the general 
election and the other shortly thereafter in a 
by-election. These results clearly raise the guestion 
as to why the electors in four of the seven seats in 
the Madang Province should prefer to be represented by 
outsiders to the province rather than by local people.
It could be argued that the many Madang people 
exhibit such clan and tribal jealousies that they 
prefer a person of non-Madang origin to go to the 
national assembly on their behalf rather than see a 
local rival gain office. However, such an argument
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begs the question for even it were true, it does not 
explain why such behaviour should occur in the Madang 
province. Moreover, it does not explain why this 
behaviour appears to have been consistent. An 
examination of the national election results since 
1968, reveals that the results of the 1992 election are 
not unique, and the people of the Madang province have 
frequently elected outsiders to represent them.
This thesis contends that part of the answer to 
this behaviour lies in the colonial history of the 
province. While the colonial history of the various 
areas of Papua New Guinea have some features in common, 
nevertheless there are also vast differences.
Obviously, the colonial experiences of Papua, the New 
Guinea highlands and the New Guinea islands must be 
differ from each other because their history is 
different because each area was affected by different 
administrations over differing periods of time.
However, these differences must also be true of smaller 
areas as well, and although, for example the colonial 
history of the people of the New Guinea islands may, in 
some ways be similar to that of the people of the north 
coast because they were controlled by the same 
administrations, they are certainly not identical.
Thus it follows that if the colonial history of a 
particular area differs from that of another district, 
then the effect of the colonizing process on the people 
of that district must also differ.
Madang had a colonial history which lasted for 
eighty years and was influenced by a total of seven 
administrations. They were: The German New Guinea
Company, the Imperial German Administration, the 
Australian Military Administration (ANMEF), the 
Australian Administration of the Mandated Territory, 
the Japanese Military Administration, the Australian 
New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU) and the 
Australian Administration of the Trustee Territory.
Peter Lawrence, who spent some thirty years 
studying the people of the southern Madang district 
said of the colonial process:
A century of contact on the north-east 
coastline had seen the growth of two 
distinct institutions: on one hand,
western modernization, the complex of 
economic, political and educational 
development by Europeans, and, on the 
other, the cargo movement, the 
people's own response to colonial rule 
(quoted in Lawrence 1971:168).
While this is a succinct summation of colonization in 
the Madang district, Lawrence's view, however, needs 
some modification. The development of the western 
institutions was inconsistent and haphazard. Moreover, 
the implementation of colonial policy, far from being 
uniform was often ad hoc and capricious. Indeed, 
had the various administrations purposely designed
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their policies to create confusion among the local 
people, they could hardly have succeeded better.
While it is true that part of the response of the 
people to the muddle of European policy and 
institutions was the manifestation of cargo movements, 
nevertheless, it can be shown that that was not the 
only response. Rather, there were a variety of 
responses to the changing situations in which the 
Madang people found themselves. To understand the 
responses of the people of Madang to the effects of 
colonization it is necessary to examine critically the 
colonial policies of the various administrations and 
assess their impact on the people of the region 
An attempt to write a history of the Madang 
colonial experience, presents some problems. First, 
the Madang province is not a natural geographical or 
political entity, so although one can speak of the 
province as a unit, there are, in fact enormous 
geographical and cultural differences within the 
area. Indeed, it could be argued that it is pointless 
to write of the area at all because Madang as a unit 
has no real meaning. However, it is a political unit 
now and this surely justifies an investigation into its 
colonial past.
Second, the information derived from the colonizers 
on their colonial policy is often limited because much 
material was lost during the Second World War.
Moreover, the official reports were often biased
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because of the audience for whom they were written, and 
this is especially true of the reports written for the 
League of Nations and the United Nations. Nevertheless, 
enough information exists to be able to paint a fairly 
comprehensive picture of the colonial policies which 
were enforced by the various regimes on the people of 
the district.
Third, information regarding the effect of the 
colonial policies on the villagers is extremely limited 
in its breadth. Administrative field officers wrote 
reports, of varying quality. Some were critical and 
analytical while others were insensitive and 
unobservant. Missionaries, although often in a better 
position to observe the effect of colonization on their 
flock, where frequently not made privy to the real 
attitudes of the people with whom they came into 
contact. Anthropologists, especially Romola McSwain, 
Louise Morauta and Peter Lawrence are extremely useful 
as a source of determining the effect of colonization 
on some of the people of the region. However, as is 
the nature of anthropology, their studies, although 
detailed, are only of & limited areas.
Although it could be argued that the use of oral 
testimonies would have been a useful adjunct to written 
evidence, they have not been used because it was felt 
that the passage of time made the reliability of such 
information sometimes questionable. This decision, 
however, did not prevent my seeking the opinions of
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several people, such as John Middleton, Angmai Bilas 
and John Hickey who were involved in the development of 
the Madang district, although any information they 
supplied was only used if it could be corroborated 
through other sources.
In spite of these limitations, this thesis will 
attempt to examine colonial policy and assess its 
impact on the people of the Madang district in order to 
achieve a greater understanding of the colonization 
process in that district and hence it^present 
implications for these people.
7 .
CHAPTER ONE
THE GERMAN COLONY
The Germans first came to the north coast of New 
Guinea in 1885. Although they came into contact with 
relatively few people on the coastal fringes of the 
area, the effect they had on these people was hardly 
insignificant. In the vanguard of the German presence 
was the German New Guinea Company, whose only 
interest in the country was economic, and whose 
behaviour was rapacious and violent. The German 
Imperial administration, which replaced the New 
Guinea Company, was more enlightened, but commercial 
interests remained paramount and their colonial 
policy was designed accordingly. Paternalism 
replaced rapacity, but the policies imposed on the 
people of the Madang district disregarded traditional 
culture and set a pattern which other colonists would 
repeat for the next eighty years. The third influence 
for change was the German missionaries, whose 
activities undermined the culture and challenged the 
ideas of the villagers.
The Madang region is situated on the north coast 
of Papua New Guinea. The area is very rugged, with 
only the coastal plain and the Ramu valley having 
flat land. There are numerous mountain ranges within 
the region, comprising the Adelbert Range to the
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north, the Schrader and the Bismarck ranges to the 
south and the uplifted limestone range of the
I'-V l£_ Ua
Finisterre mountains rise steeply form the sea in the
A
south west. The Hansemann mountains rise just north 
of the present township of Madang. The most 
important river in the area is the Ramu, which rises 
in the highlands and travels 720 kilometres west to 
the sea and enters the ocean only a few miles east of 
the Sepik river. Unlike the Sepik, however, the Ramu 
river is navigable for only a short distance upstream 
as the lower reaches of the river are very swampy. 
There are numerous other rivers which punctuate the 
entire coastline and there are several islands off 
the coast. The largest are Karkar, Manam and Long 
Islands, all of which are still volcanically active. 
Because the area lies within the Ramu/Markham fault, 
the whole region is geologically active. Most of the 
land within the area is considered not to be suitable 
for commercial agricultural development, with the 
best land being that on Karkar island and the north 
coast region. The land in the Ramu river valley and 
along the coastal region, has limited commercial 
potential because of the seasonal rainfall and 
difficult topography of the areas ( Eaton 1981:46). 
This area has the largest mix of languages in the 
counrtry and the people of the region speak about one 
hundred and seventy five different ones. Most of 
these are non-Austronesian. The Austronesian
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languages are confined to the islands and a few of 
the coastal villages (Wurm 1981:34).
Although the people of Madang district had been 
involved in local trade networks, they had been 
outside the trade routes of the white traders and so 
there had been no direct contact with Europeans until 
the arrival, in 1871, of the pioneer anthropologist, 
Nicholi Miklouho-Macklay. He succeeded in forming a 
friendly relationship with the local people but 
although he made three visits to the area to study 
the inhabitants of Astrolabe Bay, he made little 
impact on their lives, save to introduce some new 
plants to the area and to create speculation amongst 
the villagers as to his origin and the source of his 
power (Lawrence 1964:64). Miklouho-Maclay's other 
legacy to the region is the name of the Rai coast, 
which is probably a corruption of his name.
It is one of the ironies of history that 
Bismarck, who was so vehemently against the 
acquisition of colonies, should have been personally 
responsible for the German annexation of New Guinea. 
The acquisition occurred primarily to protect the 
labour supply of Samoan estates of the German 
planters and traders. The German companies in the 
Pacific had become fearful of the expansion of the 
British and the Australians into the region, not only 
because of the loss of trading posts in the Gilbert 
and Fiji Islands through British annexation, but also
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because of the growing competition for the 
recruitment of labour throughout the Western Pacific. 
This was seriously undermining the availability of 
workers for the German plantations in the Pacific 
(Firth 1982:14). At the same time the Queensland 
Government, aware of German economic interests in the 
Pacific, was convinced that Germany would annex all 
of New Guinea and to prevent such a measure the 
Queenslanders hastily claimed the south eastern part 
of the island on behalf of Great Britain. This 
action simply confirmed to the German traders that 
their fears of being squeezed out of the area were 
not without foundation and so they, in turn, put 
pressure on the German Chancellor to consider 
official expansion into the area to protect existing 
German interests.
Adolf Hansemann, a German banker with extensive 
investments in the South Seas and a penchant for 
German colonial development, had conceived a 
grandiose plan in about 1880 for the colonization of 
New Guinea. Hansemann thought of New Guinea as a 
vast real estate development. He envisioned 
acquiring land from the locals, surveying it, 
subdividing it and selling it to floods of would-be 
settlers, primarily Germans from Australia, who would 
purchase the various plantation lots, thus producing 
huge profits for the company involved (Sack and Clark 
1979:14). Bismarck, who was vigorously opposed to
1 1 .
the idea of direct government control in the Pacific, 
was prepared to agree with Hansemann's ideas as it 
appeased the German Pacific traders, while sparing 
the German Government the cost of colonization. Thus 
in November 1884, Germany claimed the northern part 
of the New Guinea mainland, calling it Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland (Firth 1982:17).
The Imperial Charter gave the New Guinea Company 
exclusive rights over the acquisition of land along 
the north coast, for Hansemann had assumed that there 
would be large tracts of vacant land just waiting to 
be occupied. However, the Company's assumptions were 
flawed. Since the locals were semi-nomadic, they 
required far more land for their survival than was 
immediately evident by the size of the villages. 
However, the sole criterion for land acquisition was 
local willingness to transfer it to the Germans in 
exchange for little more than paltry trinkets, 
regardless of whether the villagers needed the land 
or not, or indeed if they had any rights to it at all 
(Woodman papers 1932).
Although the German flag was raised in Friedrich 
Wilhelmshafen (now Madang Town) in 1884, settlement 
did not proceed immediately around the Astrolabe Bay 
area, for the Germans first settled in Finschhafen.
In 1887, Jan Kubary, acting for the New Guinea 
Company, acquired 36,000 hectares between the Gogol 
and Gum Rivers from the Yabob and Bilbil Islanders*
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The islanders were not the real owners of the land, for 
as Austronesians they were late comers to the area 
and had only a toehold in the area. However, when 
the real owners protested to the Company at a later 
date, they were ignored (Lawrence 1964:41). The 
Company did deal with the right people when it 
acguired, in 1892, for the price of two steel axes 
and a few trinkets, what is now part of the business 
district of Madang, from the local Yam people. Since 
these people subsequently had to borrow garden sites 
from relatives, they clearly had no idea that the 
Company intended taking their land permanently 
(ibid:67). So outrageous were most of the 
Company's claims that when they were later 
investigated by an imperial judge, sixteen of the 
twenty-five claims were invalidated, including all 
those which were larger than two hundred and fifty 
acres (Sack 1969:107).
The acquisition of land by the Company squeezed 
the villagers from their livelihood and poisoned the 
relations between the local people and the Germans 
from the beginning and, indeed, have remained the 
source of discontent ever since. Moreover, the 
hostility felt by the people of the district towards 
the Germans over the land issue meant that the 
Company was unable to exert sufficient control over 
the locals to maintain law and order and this helped 
keep settlers away from the north coast region in
droves.
The New Guinea Company's rapacious approach to 
land acquisition was, however, not the only cause of 
the poor relations between the Germans and the people 
of the Madang district. The Germans' punitive and 
violent approach to law and order exacerbated an 
already uneasy relationship. Retribution against 
outbreaks of hostility was indiscriminate and 
frequently ineffective. When two Rhenish 
missionaries, who had tried to settle in 
Hatzfeldthafen in 1891, were killed, the Imperial 
Commissioner, Fritz Rose, burnt the nearby village of 
Simbini although there was no proof that the village 
was involved. A short time later, perhaps not 
surprisingly, a plantation overseer was killed in the 
same area. This time Fritz Rose did find evidence 
which suggested that the culprits were probably the 
Tobenam people. However, not content with just 
allowing his police to open fire on these people, he 
also sanctioned action against the Tobenam's 
neighbours as well (Firth 1982:32). such actions did 
not solve the continuing the hostilities in the area 
and the station at Hatzfeldthafen was forced to close 
later that year(Sack and Clark 1979:60). The same 
punitive attitude existed around Astrolabe Bay as 
well. When Curt von Hagen was murdered by two of his 
Buka guides at Stephansort in 1897, seven villages in 
the area were burnt during the search for the killers 
(Firth 1982:163).
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The Company did try solving the law and order 
difficulties by attempting to establish a system of 
indirect rule by working through political elites.
This proved to be less than satisfactory as the local 
leaders had influence over a relatively small number 
of people. Moreover, the Company had difficulty in 
establishing who the leaders were. Often the real 
men of influence preferred to remain anonymous. When 
the Company was able to establish relations with 
so-called friendly villages, the villagers would use 
their relations with the Germans primarily to act 
against traditional enemies and so any alliances had 
little effect in creating a climate of mutual 
understanding. Thus the Company created an 
atmosphere between themselves and the locals which 
ranged from distrust to open hostility.
Nor did the Company system of indentured labour 
endear the Germans to the people of the Madang 
district. The people of northern New Guinea 
previously had little to do with European traders, 
unlike the people of the Gazelle Peninsular or the 
Solomon Islands, and so there had been no economic 
links built up between the New Guineans and the 
Europeans in this area prior to colonization.
However, the Germans now needed the people of the 
area to participate in the European economic system, 
either directly as labour on the plantations, or 
indirectly through trade in order to keep the Company
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profitable until the plantations began producing.
But the Company system of indentured labour proved 
very unpopular with the people of the Madang 
district. Initially some people, predominantly Siar 
and Kränget islanders who were persuaded by the 
Rhenish missionaries to do so, made themselves 
available for work (Sack and Clark 1979:109).
However, they soon tired of working as they found 
that they could trade for what they wanted through 
the sale of artifacts (Firth 1982:28). Thus the 
Company had to import labour for their plantations.
Initially, Chinese coolies were recruited for the
plantations, but malaria, dysentery and opium took a
terrible toll. Nine hundred and eighty-eight were
indentured in 1892 and of these only four hundred and
twenty survived the first eight months. These were
sent home and from then on only New Guineans were
recruited (ibid:35). However, Kaiser Wilhelmsland
quickly gained a reputation for appalling
working conditions. To maintain the discipline
the planters cut rations, flogged their workers
or confined them to barracks, which at times
►were little more than pig stfes. Although there were 
regulations to protect the labourers, these were 
flaunted by the planters on the grounds that violence 
was the only languages that New Guineans understood 
(ibid:29). Corporal punishment, they argued,
produced effective justice because it instantly
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showed who the boss was and without it, the 
plantation owners claimed, the labourers would rebel 
(Rowley 1958:140-142). Such was the effect of the 
disease and ill-treatment on the indentured labourers 
in Kaiser Wilhelmsland that the death rate ran at a 
staggering 40% (Firth 1982:37). This was an 
appalling comparison with the death rate among 
indentured workers in Fiji of 5.5% and in Queensland 
of 6.2% (ibid:171). The mortality rate for those 
recruited from the Bismarck Archipelago was 50%, 
which Fritz Rose thought was shocking and Albert 
Hahl, the German Administrator, declared to the 
Colonial Department in 1900 that: 'About ten
thousand labourers lie buried in the country around 
Astrolabe Bay', which was a sad indictment 
on the New Guinea Company's labour policy (Frith 
1982:101). It is therefore hardly surprising that 
the brutality which passed for law and order in the 
colony made the people of the district reluctant to 
involve themselves with the Germans and preferred not 
to offer themselves for recruitment. Indeed, in 
1894, for example, less than one quarter of 
indentured labourers in Kaiser Wilhelmsland came from 
the immediate area (ibid :35) and several years later 
Fritz Rose was still having only limited success in 
recruiting local labour (ibid:101).
The New Guinea Company's development of New 
Guinea was proving to be a disaster. Theory in
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Berlin was quite different from practice in New 
Guinea. Tropical disease had taken its toll. The 
original company headquarters had been moved from 
Finschhafen to Friedrich Wilhelmshafen in 1891 when 
Finschhafen was found to be an area rife with 
malaria, causing a large loss of life among the 
German employees. On the north coast, the local 
people resented the German intrusion to the extent 
that the Company could not guarantee the physical or 
economic security of the settlers. While it is true 
that the Company had very limited support from the 
German Armed Forces to try to pacify the local 
people, nevertheless, the task the Forces faced was 
made so much more difficult by the policies of the 
Company itself when it deprived the people of the 
Madang district of their land, then exacerbated the 
situation by the indiscriminate use of violence. It 
was this punitive attitude of the Company which 
deprived the settlers of a reliable labour force and 
helped to make the settlement of northern New Guinea 
a commercial failure. Indeed, in 1899 there were less 
than one hundred settlers in Kaiser Wilhelmsland 
producing between them only one hundred and forty 
seven tonnes of copra (Hempenstall 1978:173).
By the end of the Nineteenth Century, however, 
the attitude in Berlin towards colonization had 
changed and the New Guinea Company was able to come
18 .
to an agreement with the Imperial Government whereby 
the latter assumed responsibility for the 
administration and the cost of the colony. Albert 
Hahl was made the Imperial Administrator and was able 
to use the knowledge he had gained when working in 
Africa, together with the observations he made while 
employed as the Imperial Judge in New Britain to 
formulate an ordered and rational rule for New 
Guinea.
Hahl determined that in order to secure economic 
investment the colony needed to be able to guarantee 
three things; land, labour and law and he set about 
developing policies which would achieve this. He 
realised that those areas which had local disquiet 
were generally those areas which had disputed 
boundaries and such disputes had to be eliminated if 
white settlers were to be attracted to the region. 
Thus, local land owners were far more protected from 
settlers by Hahl than they had been from the New 
Guinea Company. First, Hahl tried to limit 
plantation size to no more than two hundred and fifty 
acres because he realised that the New Guinean's land 
tended to be scattered, rather than concentrated in 
one area, and small plantations were less likely to 
disrupt the local way of life (Sack 1968:110-111). 
Second, Hahl tried to acquire waste lands which he 
could sell to would-be planters, rather than have the 
colonists dealing directly with the locals. Third,
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Hahl tried to solve the problem of the dispossessed 
by setting up reserves for them from land bought back 
from the new owners. Finally/ Hahl only allowed land 
to be sold for cultivation when the rights of the 
land owners had been investigated and the land had 
been correctly surveyed. But/ in spite of this 
rational and apparently humane approach/ these 
reforms were primarily for the benefit of the German 
settlers rather than for the people of the Kaiser 
Whilhelmsland and land acguisition continued.
Indeed, by 1914/ the Germans had in their possession 
some 33/000 hectares around Astrolabe Bay (Lawrence 
1964:40).
Hahl also tried to solve the problem of drawing 
the Madangs into the colonial system. Since Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland had acquired the poor reputation in its 
treatment of indentured workers, it had become 
increasingly difficult to attract imported labour. 
Thus the co-operation of the people of the Madang 
district was vital to the success of the plantations 
around Astrolabe Bay. Hahl approached the problem 
from several different fronts. In 1903, he 
introduced the concept of forced labour. Each adult 
male was expected to work for at least two months a 
year building roads, draining swamps and other public 
works (Sack and Clark 1979:293). Forced labour was a 
source of great discontent. It undermined the work 
of the village as men could no longer garden or
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fish. Nor could the women set about their tasks with 
security since the village, now deprived of its 
warriors, was exposed to the hostility of its 
neighbours. Indeed, so unpopular was the use of 
forced labour that the Germans found they had to 
watch the labourers very carefully or they would 
simply disappear into the bush (ibid:279). In 1907, 
Hahl introduced the head tax as an incentive for the 
Madangs either to find paid employment or to enter 
the cash economy. Hahl introduced a sliding scale of 
payments valued between five and ten marks, depending 
on the economic development of an area. Exempted 
from the head tax were those people who were employed 
by Europeans or were indentured workers. Although 
forced labour remained an option, the payment of the 
head tax rapidly became the preferred way in which 
the Madangs paid their obligations (ibid :308). To 
involve the people of the area even further in the 
cash economy, Hahl forbade transactions between the 
Europeans and the locals in any form of traditional 
currency, including shell money (ibid :220). All 
work was to be paid for in marks. Hahl also 
encouraged the development of an indigenous copra 
industry. Coconut trees were to be planted 'in an 
efficient manner' ( ibid:329) and the sale of whole 
coconuts was forbidden (ibid;217). Even though the 
local copra was not always of the best guality, Hahl 
viewed his economic reforms as a success, since, by
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1910, indigenous copra production far exceeded that 
of the European settlers on the north coast (ibid 
: 313 ) .
Hahl tried to solve the law and order difficulties by 
introducing the type of indirect rule which had been 
used in the German African colonies. Thus, he 
appointed a person whom he considered had the ability 
to strengthen German influence within a group of 
villagers. Basically, the luluai (a term originating 
in New Britain), made sure that the German 
instructions were carried out, whether it be helping 
in the collection of the head tax, supplying forced 
labour or acting as an agent of the police (Firth 
1982:74). By 1911, the number of organised villages 
in Kaiser Wilhelmsland stretched from Hansa Bay to 
Finschhafen as well as parts of Karkar and Manam 
Islands while the numbers of luluais who had been 
appointed numbered sixty-seven. As a result, it was 
claimed that 'Government instructions are obeyed 
everywhere ' (Sack and Clark 1979:322).
However, for the entire period of the Imperial 
occupation of Kaiser Wilhelmsland, relations between 
the people of the north coast and the Germans were 
extremely poor, with the former maintaining a state 
of intermittent hostility. Under Company rule these 
hostilities had manifested themselves mainly in the 
murder of isolated missionaries and planters, but 
under the Imperial administration they became even
more intense. In 1904, the Yam people of Kränget, 
Siar and Bilia Islands as well as the people from
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Yabob and Bilbil Islands, conspired to overthrow the 
administration and murder all the Europeans in 
Friedrich Wilhemshafen. There appeared to have been 
a variety of motives for their actions. The Yam 
people on Kränget Island had been forced to surrender 
part of their island to the Rhenish missionary, which 
was a double blow for them since they had already 
lost their gardens and fishing grounds on the 
mainland opposite. The Siar and Bilia people had 
also been unable to prevent the Germans from 
encroaching on their traditional grounds. These 
people also objected to the system of compulsory 
labour and the missionary attacks on their male 
cults, both of which were seriously undermining their 
way of life (Sack 1973:108). One member of the 
conspiracy, Nalon of Bilia, however, apparently 
wishing to ingratiate himself with the Germans, 
betrayed the plot. The police were able to repel the 
attackers, killing one of the rebels (Hempenstall 
1978:181-182). Although no Europeans were killed, 
indeed, most were unaware that an attack had even 
taken place, German retribution was swift. The six 
ring leaders were promptly tired and executed. It 
was, however, the Bilbil people upon whom the 
greatest German wrath fell. Although originally part 
of the plot, the Bilbil withdrew from the conspiracy
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before the attack actually occurred, but they were 
seen to be the greatest trouble makers. However, 
before any punishment could be carried out the Bilbil 
fled to the Rai coast, where they had long 
established trading connections. It was not until 
the following year, when they tried to settle beside 
the Gogol river, that the German authorities were 
able to catch up with them. Nine Bilbils were shot 
by the police and fifteen were sent to New Britain as 
forced labourers. Their island was confiscated and 
the villagers were settled on the mainland (Sack and 
Clark 1979:265).
Nor were hostilities confined to the area around 
Astrolabe Bay. Anti-German feelings were strong on 
the Rai coast (ibid:292), and on the north coast 
around Hatzfeldthafen, the local people were 
continually aggressive towards the colonizers. In 
1910, the people in the villages around Bogia, 
probably resentful of missionary interference in 
trying to stop infanticide and abortion and fearful 
of losing their land, conspired to kill the district 
officer on his way back to Madang Town and kill all 
the Europeans around Hansa Bay and Bogia. The 
conspiracy was betrayed, but Hahl, instead of seeking 
retribution, simply appointed luluais to the villages 
in the area (ibid:322).
As with the Bilbil, Hahl, however, was less 
merciful with those he viewed as long term
24 .
recalcitrants. In 1908, a Malay bird hunter was 
killed in the Hatzfeldthafen area and the villages of 
Tobenam and Kaiten were punished. In 1910, Hahl 
decided to make a concentrated effort to pacify the 
area once and for all and so sent a light cruiser, 
the S.M. Nürnberg, to fire shells into Kaiten village 
(ibid:322). The next year the Germans were able to 
introduce their administration into the area.
Although Hahl claimed to have introduced 
administrative organization along the coast of Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland, any effective German control, it was 
limited by the social and geographical conditions of 
the region, a fact recognised by Hahl himself (ibid 
:365). The village structure of the local people 
posed several problems for Hahl in trying to 
establish his own political authority. On the one 
hand, he did not fear a general uprising for there 
were too many little village entities which were too 
disorganized for a general rebellion. Moreover, many 
villagers valued the German presence as a means of 
protection against traditional enemies or as the 
suppliers of trade goods. However, Hahl also 
realised that although the existence of these little 
groups precluded any major opposition to German rule, 
the fragmentary nature of New Guinea society made it 
very difficult to incorporate it into the German 
administration (Firth 1982:111). Often, the 
appointment of a luluai could actually cause the
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deterioration of relations between the Germans and 
the locals, rather than improving them. Hahl found 
that the person with the most influence in the 
village was not necessarily the appointed luluai. 
Indeed , the villager with the real status and 
influence would avoid such a position since it could 
compromise his standing with his people, although he 
would resent the German appointee because he felt 
that his traditional powers were being undermined 
(Sack and Clark 1979:279).
The nature of the terrain in Kaiser Wilhelmsland 
also made government control difficult. While German 
warships might be effective against coastal villages 
they had little effect against the villagers 
themselves, who could retreat into the bush or hills 
until the Germans left the area. Nor could the 
Germans protect those coastal villages which had lost 
man power through forced or indentured labour from 
attacks from the mountain tribes (ibid:307). The 
Germans simply lacked the man power to be able to 
exert extensive or effective control. They were 
reliant on only a few naval vessels and the Imperial 
finances ran to just six hundred guns for the whole 
of the New Guinea colony. Of these six hundred guns, 
however, one hundred and fifty were assigned to the 
north coast region, while only fifty were sent to 
each of Rabaul, Namatanai, Manus, Aitape and Morobe, 
clearly indicating the disproportionate difficulties 
the Germans had in this area (Firth 1982:110).
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However, the so-called revolt provided more 
evidence of German paranoia that it did for overt 
action on the part of the people of the Madang 
district. Indeed, it would seem that there was no 
conspiracy at all and the whole event was concocted 
by an indentured labourer, Sizau, who, upon returning 
home, found that his wife had left him to live on 
Siar Island with another man. To revenge himself, he 
took evidence of magic to the district officer and 
claimed that it was part of the plot to overthrow the 
Europeans. This evidence fulfilled the German 
expectations that there would be another conspiracy 
and the assumed conspirators from Siar and Kränget 
Islands were hastily tried before a European court. 
However, while a lot of conflicting stories were heard, 
little real evidence was forthcoming. Nevertheless, 
the assumption of a plot was upheld and the innocent 
islanders were banished (Hannemann n.d.:28). The 
episode, although perhaps not as dramatic for the 
Germans as the 1904 rebellion, was indicative of the 
distrust which existed between them and the people of 
the district in general and the people from around 
Friedrich Wilhemshafen, in particular.
The annual report of the Imperial Administration 
in 1913-1914, indicated that although the coastline 
of Kaiser Wilhelmsland as well as the islands of 
Karkar and Bagabag were under German rule, the areas 
were, in fact, only under superficial control.
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While, it would seem that the hostilities on the 
north coast around Bogia were caused primarily by the 
threat to the local society which were posed by the 
intrusive Europeans, it was land which remained at 
the root of the problems between the Germans and the 
people around Astrolabe Bay. Hahl had recognised 
that the claims of the New Guinea Company were the 
cause of intense resentment and he reached an 
agreement with the local people which would provide 
for a proper survey which would set aside land for 
the dispossessed and guaranteed fishing rights. But, 
in spite of these promises, the surveys failed to 
materialize and the alienation of Madang land 
continued (Hempenstall 1978:188).
So sullen and resentful had the people become 
over the continuing encroachment on to the land that 
the Germans feared there would be another revolt 
against the administration and, in 1912, another 
seemed to have appeared. The people from Siar, 
Kränget, Panutibun, Biliau, and Yabob Islands, 
angered that there lands had been acguired for future 
town development, were accused of conspiring to 
overthrow the German regime. The apparent ring 
leaders were tried and on being found guilty, were 
removed to the Bismarck Archipelago, while the Siar 
and Kränget islanders were resettled, either on the 
Rai coast, or at Megiar on the north coast (Sack and 
Clark 1979:354).
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Moreover, any German advance into the hinterlands had 
been tentative and dangerous (Sack and Clark 
1980:81-82). Even from the beginning of 
colonization, exploration, although encouraged, had 
proved disappointing. In 1895 Otto Ehleri'had been 
shot by his bearers when he had tried to cross New 
Guinea from the Huon Gulf to the Gulf or Papua and 
although von Schleinitz sailed down the Sepik and 
Lauterbach discovered the fertile plains of the Ramu 
river in 1896, such discoveries were pointless as the 
Germans simply did not have the man power to be able 
to protect any settlers moving to these areas 
(Hempenstall 1978:172). Thus, the majority of the 
people in the Madang district remained outside the 
German sphere of influence.
However, those people who fell under the power of 
the Germans, were subject to land loss, exploitation 
and violence which created such conditions of 
mistrust between the colonizers and the colonized 
that it precluded any successful German development 
in Kaiser Wilhelmsland. This mistrust was further 
heightened by the fact that the principles by which 
the people of the Madang district lived were entirely 
ignored by the colonizers. The Germans completely 
neglected the rule of reciprocity, without which 
social order could not be maintained. In the local 
society, any work which was supplied, or any food 
which was given, placed the receiver under an
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Obligation to repay its equivalence in goods or 
labour when asked to do so. Failure to do this 
resulted in shame for the person with the 
undischarged obligation and the avoidance of shame 
was central to a person's social standing (Berndt and 
Lawrence 1971:19). However, when the Germans 
arrived, they took land from the villagers, used them 
for labour and yet were not prepared to reciprocate 
by sharing their great wealth. Indeed, far from 
being ashamed by such anti-social behaviour, the 
Germans were arrogant, mean and treated the local 
people harshly. It is little wonder that the people 
of the Madang district quickly became unwilling 
workers.
Nor could the villagers understand the German 
attitude towards ownership. The people of the Madang 
district did not believe that land could be 
permanently alienated, but the Germans, in spite of 
the promises to the contrary, made little effort to 
return alienated land, and indeed, continued to seize 
more. The villagers also believed that the fruit on 
any trees which they had planted belonged to them. 
However, the Germans punished, as trespass, anyone 
trying to recover it. The people of the Madang 
district also found that the Germans were 
inconsistent in their attitude towards livestock. On 
one hand, the Germans shot pigs which strayed into 
their gardens, but, conversely, when cattle strayed
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into gardens of the villagers the Germans argued that 
it was because the fences were poorly constructed. 
Thus, compensation was not forth coming for damage 
done in either instance (Hannemann n.d.:28).
The Germans also disrupted the social order of 
the villages when they attempted to apply indirect 
rule of the people through the appointment of 
luluais. Such appointments were very much at odds 
with the existing loose hierarchical structure of the 
village where leadership could not be eguated to a 
political situation. Although the headman might have 
been an important* influence within the village, any 
authority he might have possessed came from his own 
personal prestige and not from the office itself 
(Reed 1943:51). To acquire such prestige, a village 
headman was expected to be skilled in a variety of 
occupations. He had to be a skilled hunter and 
gardener as well as knowing the correct rituals, 
dances, myths, and legends pertaining to his village 
(Lawrence 1971:80). Except for Manam Island, where 
only men from certain families could become leaders, 
the position in the rest of Madang was open to all 
(Meggitt 1971:193). However, the position was not of 
life tenure and as soon the power of the headman 
began to wane, usually because old age would prevent 
him from remaining as industrious as he once was, his 
position would come under threat and he might be 
replaced by another who could command greater
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authority from among the villagers. Besides 
possessing traditional skills, the function of the 
headman was to maintain the social order within the 
village group and conciliation rather than impartial 
justice was far more useful in achieving this end.
It was of little use to the headman to punish the 
villager for theft if the thief had so many 
sympathetic kin that greater social discord would be 
created by the latter action than by the original 
theft. It was far better for the headman to patch up 
the relationship and maintain the village harmony. 
Clearly then, the attempt to create a magisterial 
class based on the European idea of impartial 
justice, rather than the intricacies of consensus, 
and reliant on the prestige of the office itself was 
going to fail (Lawrence 1971:93).
The Germans expected the luluai to ignore his 
kinship ties by reporting the wrong doings of his kin 
to the authorities, an action clearly not in the 
luluai1s own best interests, or those of his 
village. Nor was it in the interests of the village 
to condone the use of forced labour as it would leave 
the village in the vulnerable position of not being 
able to protect itself from traditional enemies. Only 
a very foolish headman would agree to do such a 
thing. Thus, because the traditional headman would 
wish to avoid being placed in the invidious position 
of having to work against his own and his villagers'
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best interests he would select a person of no 
consequence to act as a go-between and to take the 
brunt of the wrath of both the German administration 
and the disgruntled villagers (Lawrence 1970:91). Of 
course there were some local people who tried to 
promote themselves by acting for the Germans, Nalon 
of Bilia was the obvious example, but generally those 
men whom the Germans appointed as luluais were not 
men of prestige (Lawrence 1971:91). Indeed, the 
luluais had so little authority, that the government 
found it necessary to appoint two police assistants 
called tultuls to help each carry out his duties 
(Hempenstall 1978:185).
Although there were six missionary groups in 
German New Guinea, only two, the Rhenish Mission 
Society, representing the Lutheran church and the 
Society of the Divine Word, a Roman Catholic order, 
worked in the area around Astrolabe Bay and the 
adjoining north coast. These missions formed the 
third influence for change among the people of the 
Madang district and their presence was, in some ways, 
even more devastating for the local culture than was 
the presence of the German New Guinea Company and the 
German Imperial administration.
The Rhenish mission saw its role as being in the 
service of Germany as well as that of God and, as 
such, it thought that it should try to be a 
civilizing agent to the local people (Firth
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1982:138). The mission arrived in Friedrich 
Wilhelmshafen in 1887 and settled on Siar and Kränget 
Islands, away from the swampy and malaria-ridden 
mainland, as well as trying, unsuccessfully, to 
establish missions at Hatzfeldthafen on the north 
coast and Karkar Island, where it introduced smallpox 
(De'Ath 1981b:72). Marred by inexperience and 
disease, the mission failed to flourish and it had 
few converts (Firth 1982:150). The missionaries 
ascribed their failures to the lack of a sense of 
sinfulness among the local people who saw, therefore, 
no need to obtain salvation. However, it was the 
actions of missionaries themselves, which did much to 
alienate the people with whom they came into 
contact. The mission took local land for their 
mission stations and by 1906, in spite of having to 
withdraw from Hatzfeldthafen and Karkar Island, the 
Rhenish mission had acguired five hundred hectares of 
land at Nagada harbour as well as their Siar and 
Kränget acquisitions. Moreover, the missionaries 
also tended to side with the German authorities 
against the interests of the New Guineans (De'ath 
1981b:72). Whereas other missionaries worked 
actively against forced and indentured labour, the 
Rhenish missionaries encouraged it on the grounds 
that it would make the New Guineans better people 
(Firth 1982:150). They also sought the help of the 
German authorities to stamp out local customs and
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while Hahl concurred with the missionaries over 
issues such as infanticide and polygamy-/ even Hahl 
held up the right of the locals to maintain their 
traditional cults. The missionaries were freguently 
insensitive to the villagers and some were even 
flogged them in an effort to induce control 
(Hempenstall 1978:187). Thus, to the people of the 
Madang district/ the missionaries seemed 
indistinguishable from the German authorities.
Indeed, the Siars believed that it was the mission 
which had contacted the German administration and 
suggested that the Siars be rounded up and deported 
as their punishment for not accepting Christianity 
(Lacey 1973:23 ) .
The conspiracy of 1904 was devastating for the 
mission, for it was clear that the Siar and Kränget 
islanders fully intended murdering all the 
missionaries and the Rheinsh missionaries never fully 
trusted the local people again. However, the events 
of 1912 were even more of a fiasco. For with the 
deportation of the Siar and Kränget people, the 
mission was left with no congregation and no raison 
d'etre (Firth 1982:152). In retrospect, their 
failure was inevitable. The Rhenish mission had 
taken land from the people they wanted to convert, 
denigrated their customs, encouraged exploitation and 
behaved little differently from other Europeans.
Their failure with the local people is reflected by
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the fact that after twenty seven years of 
proselytising they had persuaded only ninety six 
Madangs to convert to Christianity (Firth 1982:152).
The Society of the Divine Word (S.V.D), unlike 
the Rhenish mission, was more concerned with the long 
haul and was determined to become self-sufficient 
before it starting proselytising. The mission 
originally had trouble obtaining land in Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland since the New Guinea Company saw it as a 
challenge to the more Protestant and patriotic 
Rhenish Society. However, after settling first at 
Aitape in 1896, they were eventually granted land at 
Bogia because this area had proved difficult to 
control and it was hoped that the S.V.Ds would 
provide a good moral influence in the area (Wiltgen 
1969:335). In 1904, when the New Guinea Company 
steamer stopped calling in at Bogia harbour, the 
mission decided to move to a more convenient location 
and acquired land from the Sek Islanders at 
Alexishafen. By the following year, the mission had 
planted fifteen hectares of coconuts and fourteen of 
rubber while the timber which had been cut during the 
plantation clearing was milled. Class rooms were set 
up and lessons were given, not just in reading and 
writing, but in also practical subjects such as 
carpentry. Such developments meant that the S.V.D.s 
brought the local people into their economic system 
as well as educating their children, so that by
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1914/ the S.D.V.s could claim to have 3/600 
converts. No wonder Hahl liked these missionaries 
and thought them good for Germany (Firth 1982:154). 
Nevertheless, in spite of the apparent success of the 
S.D.V. mission, its entrenched position and 
possession of some one thousand hectares of land 
contributed to the growing disposition of the 
villagers around Astrolabe Bay (Hempenstall 
1978 : 187) .
By 1914/ it was clear that Kaiser Wilhelmsland 
had failed to flourish as an economic proposition for 
the Germans. The colonial headguarters had been 
moved to Kokopo when the colony was taken over by the 
German Imperial administration because that was the 
entrepot of the copra trade in the south-west 
Pacific. Settlers had failed to come to the mainland 
and there was more than three times as much land 
under non-indigenous cultivation on the Bismarck 
Archipelago and in New Ireland than there was in 
Kaiser Wilhelmsland. Copra production in 1912 was, 
therefore, much greater in the islands, where it 
totalled 10,234 tonnes, compared with only 1,063 
tonnes in the mainland (Firth 1982:180).
Whilst it is true that the disappointing results 
for the Germans were due in part to the poor nature 
of the soil and the difficult topography of the area, 
nevertheless, much of the blame for the failure of 
the colony to flourish must la? in the continued
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hostility between the people of the Madang area and 
the Germans who had taken their land and dislocated 
their society.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ANMEF INTERLUDE
The Australian government acted rapidly to seize 
the German colonies in the Pacific at the outbreak of 
hostilities in 1914. Since the Australian Naval and 
Military Expeditionary Forces (ANMEF) met virtually no 
opposition, the occupation of the German territories 
south of the Equator was completed by September of that 
year. However, the seven years of ANMEF administration 
in New Guinea proved to be regressive. The 
administrators lacked colonial experience and were 
reliant on the German settlers for advice. But without 
the tempering effect of Hahl, these policies were 
concerned only with European economic development and 
were frequently enforced by punitive actions.
The occupation of Madang was a modest affair. The 
Australian troops landed at the main wharf where they 
were met by a German officer. The telephone exchange 
was then destroyed. This action was a symbolic rather 
than a strategic exercise as all the residents of 
Madang were within shouting distance of each other 
(Townsend 1968:80).
But while the invasion of German New Guinea was 
completed with relative ease, the new Australian 
administration faced a real problem with its lack of 
expertise in colonial affairs. This problem was
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exacerbated in March 1915, when the German civil 
administration was replaced by ANMEF personnel. One 
solution to this problem would have been to allow 
Hubert Murray to administer both Papua and New Guinea. 
However, Murray's sympathetic attitude towards the 
indigenous people was perceived as not being in the 
best interests of big business and so he was denied the 
opportunity (Rowley 1971:58). Therefore, in the 
absence of alternatives, the Australians turned to the 
planters for advice on how to administer their new 
possessions. Happily, the primary interest for both 
parties, was the economic development of the colony. 
However, the methods used to achieve this were often 
counter productive.
Hahl's policies were continued, but they were not 
understood by the Australians and so were frequently 
abused. This, together with the influence of the 
planters, who were only concerned with immediate 
wartime profits, meant that the only real interest the 
Administration had in indigenous affairs was in 
relation to the supply of labour. So, far from 
developing better relations with the New Guineans, or 
even maintaining the status quo, the period of control 
under the ANMEF was a regressive one.
It was believed by the ANMEF administration that: 
'success in tropical agriculture can be achieved only 
when labour is plentiful and paid for on a scale far 
below the standard of white men's wages' (Mackenzie
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1934:228). But achieving both a plentiful labour 
supply and maintaining low wages proved to be very 
difficult. A maximun wage was set at five shillings a 
month, for which a labourer was expected to work ten 
hours a day, six days a week. The wage was inflexible 
and no allowance was made for initiative or incentive 
on the part of the labourer (Rowley 1958:157). Higher 
wages, it was argued, should be withheld from the local 
people 'until they learnt better how to use their 
earnings' (Lyng 1919:240). However, this attitude 
meant that the New Guineans increasingly avoided 
employment, especially as wartime prices decreased 
local purchasing power. Nor was this lack of 
enthusiasm helped by the fact that the Australians 
continued to enforce the harsh labour laws which they 
had inherited from the Germans. Corporal punishment, 
for example was readily employed although its use was 
forbidden in Papua. Even after the right of employers 
to employ flogging was withdrawn in 1915, much to the 
angst of the planters, the courts could still sentence 
labourers to be whipped for labour related offences and 
corporal punishment continued to be used in areas which 
were beyond the control of the court (Rowley 
1958:137-147).
The Australians became corrupted by their 
surroundings and maintained the German legacy of 
violence with callous willingness. It was assumed that 
the locals would take bashings for granted and would
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not resent such treatment, it being the only way to 
gain their respect and obedience (Mair 1948:15). One 
private, after only a month in New Guinea, typified 
this attitude in a letter home:
I took one of them and gave him a good hideing 
(sic) which consisted of 36 good solid 
cuts...they worked very well after that but my 
arm was aching for about 4 hours. The nigger I 
gave the hiding too(sic) thinks no end of me and 
told all his cobbers I'm big feller boss which 
means I'm a very good and powerful man."
(Piggott 1988:12).
With such treatment it is little wonder that there 
was difficulty in recruiting labour. This meant that 
the recruiters had to move further out into the 
uncontrolled regions such as the Sepik River area and 
the Bagasin area of the Madang district to fulfil the 
requirements of the planters. It is doubtful, however, 
if those recruited from these areas had much idea of 
the terms and conditions of indenture. But district 
officers did not ask too many questions and generally 
only omitted those men from taking up indenture who 
were obviously under age or who were in poor health.
The administrative officers always assumed that the 
needs of business overrode the welfare of the local 
people (Rowley 1958:131).
The ANMEF also continued to collect a head tax, but
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while the head tax under Hahl had been used as a device 
to bring the New Guineans into the European economic 
system, under the Australians it was seen simply as a 
revenue raiser. Thus, every male over the age of 
twelve who was physically capable of work and was not 
indentured or employed by a European was liable to a 
head tax of ten shillings (ibid;174). Even those areas 
which the Germans had thought to be inappropriate for 
tax collection because they lacked economic 
development, were now deemed to be liable to taxable at 
the discretion of the district officer and those men 
who could not pay the tax were used as forced labour. 
Such policies meant that New Guineans could be away 
from home for long periods of time either as an 
indentured plantation labourer or on forced labour 
detail and this situation lead to resentment and even 
violence (ibid 1958:125).
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Where was conflict, Australian inexperience, 
together with the belief that business interests were 
paramount, meant that keeping order took precedence 
over maintaining justice. German police methods were 
retained. This system took the form of a patrol 
made up of a small detachment of local men 
attached to a European, which moved into an area where 
there was a dispute. The European was frequently 
lacking in perception and would fail to see that the 
police often abused their power, raping and pillaging 
villages, rather than bringing law and order (ibid
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: 210-211). These patrols were frequently so ruthless 
that it can be said that the Australian forces brought 
a standard of government to the people of New Guinea 
unequalled since the days of the New Guinea Company.
In most ways the effect of the Occupation on Madang 
was typical of the rest of the colony beyond New 
Britain. The Australian commanders were really only 
concerned with Rabaul. Indeed, the fact that the 
official war history of New Guinea was entitled The 
Australians in Rabaul is indicative of the obsession 
the ANMEF had with that trading port and consequently 
the rest of the country was comparatively neglected. 
Thus the roads which the Germans had built, especially 
to the north of Madang Town, were allowed to 
deteriorate and the bridges wash away. Patrols beyond 
the township were limited and were not used to extend 
government influence or even maintain existing 
contacts. They usually occurred only when there were 
reports of trouble and so were generally punitive in 
nature. In August 1915, Lt. W.Ogilvy, acting on a 
report of hostility in the Bogia area, mounted a patrol 
in which three local men were shot. The next month a 
German planter, who had no right to be on Karkar was 
attacked on the island. Ogilvy, together with a 
detachment of forty indigenous police against one 
hundred and fifty Karkars, retaliated in a 
military-style campaign. Two Karkars were killed.
Later that month, a patrol was sent to the Rai coast to
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take action against a village which was still flying 
the German flag (Mackenzie 1934:310-312:Rowley 
1958:40). Since Lt. Ogilvy was the brother of Major 
H.O. Ogilvy, the head of the Department of Native 
Affairs, it is clear that such aggressive actions were 
sanctioned at the highest level.
Not only did the Australians antagonise the New 
Guineans through their harsh treatment of them, but 
compounded the problem by allowing indigenous land to 
be further alienated. The expansion of plantations was 
encouraged, especially to the north of the town. Thus, 
the Siars found, when they were allowed to return from 
exile, that the development of the Siar plantation had 
left them with only four hundred and fifty acres of 
reserve. Moreover, all the large trees needed for the 
manufacture of trading canoes had been cut down (Mennis 
1980:87).
Illustrative of the attitude and actions of the 
Australian military personnel were those of Jens Lyng, 
who arrived with the initial expeditionary force in 
1914 and stayed for the duration, becoming the District 
Officer for Madang towards the end of the occupation. 
His ideas, many of which he published in the Rabaul 
Record in 1917, illustrated the prejudices, lack of 
foresight and the corruption which was typical of the 
Australian Administration and which he, in turn, 
ultimately inflicted on the population of Madang.
Lyng, although an educated man, was greatly affected by
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the German attitude towards the New Guinean people. He 
admitted that although he had initially been revolted 
by the idea of corporal punishment, he changed his mind 
when a Capuchin monk justified its usefulness on the 
grounds that it was a civilizing agent (Lyng 1925:193). 
He also concurred with the view put forth by a German 
missionary, Pater Kleintitschen, that the local people 
were ' deceitful, supersititious, callous, cowardly, 
avaricious, untruthful, thieving, hypocritical, 
ungrateful and lazy; in fact, ... would seem to be 
utterly beyond redemption' (Lyng 1919:164).
Like the rest of the Australian administration,
Lyng put the economic development of the new colony 
above the welfare of the New Guinea people. As 
district officer, he was confronted with the problems 
associated with the recruiting system. He realized 
that it was impossible to be sure if boys were old 
enough to be legally indentured, or, indeed, if they 
understood the recruitment process at all. And 
although Lyng may not have been aware of the extent to 
which the recruiters had moved into the uncontrolled 
areas, he was certainly not unaware of the coercion and 
bribery which occurred between village leaders and the 
recruiters which led to the buying or kidnapping of 
boys for indenture (Lyng 1925:188). However, while 
Lyng might have acknowledged these problems he refused 
to make any reforms because, for, as he himself 
admitted, a closer inspection of the system would have
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resulted in 'the whole economic machinery of the 
Possession coming to a standstill' (ibid:186 ) . Indeed, 
Lyng admired the actions of the recruiters and settlers 
in opening up the country and assumed that any 
disruptions to the local people's way of life through 
these illegal activities was simply the unfortunate 
by-product of such pioneering work and of no real 
consequence (ibid :186).
Lyng's ignorance of local custom made his attempts 
at mediation a farce and must have left the Madangs 
confused and resentful of Australian justice. In one 
instance a dispute arose over the status of a young 
widow as to whether she should stay with her 
brother-in-law or be returned to her father. Lyng, as 
the local magistrate, decided on the former option. 
However, the girl returned to her father anyway and so 
provoked a further dispute, presumably because the 
bride price was not refunded. Lyng then publically and 
tactlessly asked the girl what she wanted to do and 
again returned her to her father. Her father promptly 
arranged for her to be marry again, at a bride price 
higher than the original one and so created even 
further antagonism between the two factions. To 
prevent further disputes, Lyng decided to resolve the 
problem by marrying the girl to one of his policemen 
(ibid:197).
Such an incident was not atypical of the hopeless 
and inefficient magistracy that passed for justice in
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New Guinea. But, the problem of injustice was 
compounded by the Australian abuse of the powers of the 
luluais. The army officers seemed to have no real 
idea of their role but used the luluais as agents of 
the administration, even to the extent of allowing them 
to inflict corporal punishment on offenders, which made 
the luluais very unpopular with their own villagers. 
Moreover, they were harangued by the Australians for 
continuing to wear German insignia. No wonder Lyng 
found that the position of luluai was not embraced 
enthusiastically by the villagers (ibid:172).
Lyng was not deliberately cruel, but his racist and 
unenlightened attitudes, although a product of his 
time, made him insensitive to the plight of the local 
people. Thus, in spite of acknowledging the distress 
of the people of the Madang district, he justified 
their condition as being the result of their failure to 
adapt to a changing situation and acknowledge the 
dominance of the white man. So while he might 
recognize the difficulties which were involved in 
raising head tax for those with virtually no access to 
the cash economy, he, nevertheless, argued that its 
collection was necessary as a way of producing revenue 
(Lyng 1919:237). He could also argue that the 
decline in the local birthrate was due to the maternal 
apathy while ignoring the effect that the Australian 
labour policies had on it. Certainly, the wholesale 
removal of adult men from the villages gave the women 
less chance to produce a family and their increased
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work load certainly mitigated against their wanting 
children (Lyng 1925:174).
ANMEF rule ended in 1921. The policies of the ANMEF 
had proved to be counterproductive to economic 
development. They failed in the Madang district 
because the occupying forces lacked the rational 
approach to such development which had been the 
hallmark of Hahl's administration and development in 
Madang had been neglected in favour of development in 
Rabaul. Moreover, the occupation had done little for 
race relations in the district. The ANMEF had been 
aggressive, unnecessarily violent and exploitative and 
while it is true that its activities brought more New 
Guineans into contact with Europeans, it can be argued 
that such contact was not a pleasant experience.
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CHAPTER THREE
A ' C  CLASS MANDATE
In the period of the Mandate, between 1921 and 1941, 
the Australian administration's approach to native 
welfare was characterized by paternalism and parsimony 
since the primary focus of the its policy was to foster 
economic development for the benefit of big business 
and Australian settlers. Thus, while government 
attitude towards the local people was certainly less 
repressive than it had been under the ANMEF, it 
developed few policies which would benefit them. Much 
of the vacuum which was left by the administration's 
failure to provide services, was taken up by the 
missions and while in many instances they did an 
admirable job, their agenda often created confusion 
among those they sought to help.
In late 1920, Australia was awarded a 'C' 
class mandate by the principal Allied powers, which 
although not an outright takeover of the country, was 
for all practical purposes, an annexation, and in May 
1921 the civil administration of New Guinea began.
There were no immediate changes to the existing 
administration for, initially, the military personnel 
remained in charge under the administrator General 
Wisdom. There was little analysis of the complex 
problems that would be associated with governing the
mandate, which was hardly surprising since the 
acquisition of New Guinea was seen primarily as a 
commercial prize for services rendered during the First 
World War. Although it was assumed that being of 
British stock Australians would possess the innate 
ability to rule, the need for actual policies to 
develop the Territory, especially a native policy, was 
barely acknowledged. The Sydney Morning Herald made 
its ideas clear about the future of the Territory when 
it criticized General Wisdom's administration because 
it was run 'according to a narrow conception of what 
is good for the natives' (Mair 1948:14). Indeed, the 
primary policy of the Australian government appeared to 
have been the commercial exploitation of the Territory 
while avoiding of cost in its administration. Thus, 
even with the sale of the exappropriated German 
properties, the amount of money spent to maintain the 
existing services remained very limited.
The administration of the mandate was far less 
punative and violent than its predecessor had been.
This was partly due to the fact that the Australian 
government had to supply an annual report to the League 
of Nations on its activities in the Territory, 
including an account of its relations with the 
indigenous people and so its policies on this issue 
were expected to have a more humanitarian approach than 
had previously been evident in Australian's relations 
with the local people. However, the lack of staff
numbers in the administration made it difficult to
carry out more than routine patrols in those areas 
which were already under control and thus avoided, by 
necessity, incursions into uncontrolled regions which 
could have provoked violence.
Nevertheless, native policy remained vague. Local 
customs which were not repugnant to the general 
principles of humanity (Report on the Territory of New 
Guinea, hereafter TNG Report, 1914-1921:19) would be 
preserved, disease would be eradicated and village 
hygiene improved. Local agriculture would be 
encouraged. Education would be provided and the New 
Guineans would be introduced to civilization through 
the medium of paid employment, primarily as plantation 
labourers (Radi 1971:79). Frequently these policies 
clashed with commercial interests or were 
philosophically incompatible. Indigenous agriculture 
was not encouraged where it collided with European 
interests. Nor could village customs be preserved when 
large numbers of males were absent labouring on the 
plantations. Moreover, the administration assumed that 
at all times it knew what was best for the New 
Guineans. Consultation was virtually non-existent, 
which meant that while the administration might have 
been kinder than its predecessor, it was, nonetheless, 
paternalistic and authoritarian and failed to encourage 
local political development until just before the 
outbreak of the Second World War.
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In Madang, just a staff of nine, including three 
medical personnel, was expected to administer some 374 
villages bounded by an area to the mouth of the Ramu 
river in the west, east to Saidor and south towards the 
Central Highlands (TNG Report 1921-22:113). Patrols 
were limited and little could be done to bring new 
areas under control. Indeed, it was not until the mid- 
1920's that exploratory patrols were undertaken in any 
big way. In 1926 a patrol, covering some four hundred 
miles on foot, moved into the Upper Ramu and Markham 
valleys and penetrated the Bismarck and Finisterre 
mountains (TNG Report 1926-27:234). In later years 
the Rai coast and the Bogia hinterland were explored, 
as were the high points of the Bismarck Mountains, the 
area between the Ramu and Sepik rivers, parts of the 
Gogol valley and the Bagasin area. But even in the 
period immediately before the war in the Pacific, there 
were large parts of the district, such as the Adelbert 
Mountains, which had hardly been penetrated.
Generally, the vast majority of patrols were for 
administrative purposes: to count heads, to lecture on 
hygiene, or to collect head taxes. To facilitate such 
administrative proce«dures and make supervision easier 
for patrol officers, the administration adopted a 
policy of collecting scattered families and 
amalgamating them into communities (TNG Report 
1921-22:113). Communication with these villages 
remained difficult, however, since, with the exception
of the Madang to Alexishafen road, roads in the 
district remained no more than bridle tracks. As with 
the other parts of the Territory, as money became 
available from the sale of German property, the number 
of administrative personnel increased, but there were 
few improvements to the facilities in the district.
The Territory's main source of wealth was to be 
copra and it was on this premise that the 
administration's policies hinged. It was not, as it 
turned out, a very secure source of income since 
commodity prices fluctuated alarmingly. Moreover, it 
was an industry which required substantial land and 
labour. By 1932, 34,000 labourers were required to 
maintain production (TNP Report 1932-33:159). Hence, 
like the preceading administrations, the Australian 
policies of direct concern to the local people related 
to the indenture system.
From 1921 the expropriation of German properties 
moved rapidly along. The Territory was seen as a 
reward for ex-servicemen, so, instead of returning the 
land to the original owners, the Commonwealth resumed 
it, although the existing rights and privileges of the 
New Guineans to hunting, fishing and gardening areas 
were preserved. Thus, the freehold plantations, 
totalling about 6,800 hectares, along the Madang coast 
and on Karkar Island, remained in European hands 
(Lawrence 1963:48). It could be argued that this 
alienated land made up only a small portion of the
total area of the Madang district, but the plantations 
were on the most fertile land and in the best situated 
areas. Even when there was a clear case of unjust 
exploitation, economic interests overrode those of the 
New Guineans. The land which the Biliau claimed as 
theirs now formed part of the Madang township and was 
not returned. Nor was all of the land which had 
supposedly been sold to Kubary, back in the nineteen 
century, returned to its original owners, in spite of 
an exhaustive inguiry by Justice Phillips in 1932. 
Phillips was meticulous in his enguiries and even 
walked the boundaries of the land between the Gogol and 
Gum rivers. He interviewed numerous local people in 
the area, all of whom declared that they had never sold 
any land to the Germans and that the Bilbil did not 
have rights to the land on which they now lived, let 
alone any right to sell it to the Germans some fifty 
years earlier (Woodman papers 1932). The Biblil, on 
the other hand, were afraid that if they claimed their 
land they would be banished again and so they denied 
ownership of any part of the mainland, even the clay 
areas which they had clearly used for years to make 
their pots (Mennis 1981:52). Phillips recognized that 
some of the land must belong to the Bilbil and returned 
a little of it to them, but the bulk of it was given to 
other villagers and the Bilbil were not repatriated to 
their island. Nor were the most productive lands 
restored to their rightful owners, for, in return for
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compensation payment of £99, the Modilon-Yomba and 
Wagol plantations remained in European hands (Lawrence 
1963:48).
While the loss of their land was devastating for 
those involved, this policy affected far fewer people 
in the Madang district than did the indenture system, 
which made an enormous impact on village life 
throughout the region. The administration might 
justify indenture by arguing that those who were 
indentured found a superior life on the plantations 
away from sorcery, fear, initiation, sickness and tabu 
(TNG Report 1932-33:161), however, the system was in direct 
opposition with the mandate's policy of encouraging 
village life and was indicative of the conflict which 
existed between native welfare and economic 
expedience. Certainly the new labour regulations which 
were introduced in 1922 were designed to give greater 
protection to indentured workers. Medical care on 
plantations was to be improved. The only disciplinary 
action employers could take was to withhold tobacco 
rations (TNP Report 1921-22:54). And, indeed, the 
administration did try to stamp out violence towards 
the New Guineans. Some Europeans, including a 
missionary from Bogia, were brought to trial for assault 
(Woodman papers 1931). But the battle for justice was 
very one sided while the penal provisions for labour 
related incidents still existed and the employers had 
far greater access to the courts than the villagers
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did. Such one-sided justice was reflected in the 
1927-1928 Annual Report, which recorded thirty-four 
prosecutions against employers for assault throughout 
the Territory but six hundred and twenty prosecutions 
against New Guineans for work-related offences such as 
neglect of work or desertion (TNG Report 1927-28:15).
In spite of the administration's assertions to the 
contrary, indenture was designed to be a cheap source 
of labour. Contracts were for three years which was 
about twice as long as the term in Papua, because it 
was claimed that it took that length of time to train a 
New Guinean effectively. If a labourer was to be 
re-engaged he was allowed to return to his village for 
only three months, which was just long enough for him 
to procreate (Mair 1948:139). Since the indentured 
workers were trained for little except labouring jobs, 
even after years of contact with Europeans most had no 
idea of how the benefits of European civilization were 
achieved. This meant that on returning to their 
villages most indentured New Guineans brought with them 
many misconceptions which produced results not 
envisioned by the administration
Closely related to indenture in its impact on 
traditional village life was the head tax. Policy on 
taxation was ambiguous. The administration thought 
that the head tax was justified on the grounds that the 
money raised from it was for the direct benefit of the 
natives of New Guinea since it was used to employ an 
anthropologist, supply medicines and education and to
encourage the development of indigenous plantations 
(Mair 1948:62). But it was not meant to be used as an 
inducement for villagers to join in the paid labour 
force. However, because Hahl had introduced it for 
this purpose the tax continued to have that effect. 
Indeed, the annual tax of ten shillings took no account 
of the villagers' actual access to the cash economy and 
this meant that men freguently had no option other than 
to leave their village for indentured work (Mair 
1948:63) .
Like most bureaucracies, the policies conceived in 
Rabaul were freguently at odds with practice in the 
field. In Madang, many of the field officers realized 
that there were problems associated with the tax 
system, for while those Madangs in the Astrolabe Bay 
area has little trouble in raising taxes, those in the 
remoter areas had real difficulties. Assistant 
District Officer Nurton found that the inhabitants of 
Long island had absolutely no source of income; they 
were visited twice a year by Chinese traders, to whom 
they sold their agricultural implements in order to pay 
their taxes ( A.D.0.Nurton, Patrol Report, Sept., 1932). 
J.K. McCarthy refused to collect taxes from some 
villages in the Ramu valley because they had no access 
to cash (McCarthy Papers 1934-35). Patrol Officer 
Bloxham thought that it was inadvisable to collect head 
taxes from the newly openfted up Bagasin area because 
its imposition would see w<» u t h e  introduction of 
indentured labour into the region (P.0. Bloxham Patrol
Report 1932-33). So unrealistic were some of the 
administration's demands, that it could be argued that 
the introduction of the head tax had more to do with 
being able to claim that new areas were under 
control, than it had with the capacity of the 
New Guineans to pay it.
While the administration might deny that the head 
tax was being used as an inducement for indentured 
labour, the assumption was held that this was exactly 
the case. The findings of L.G. Vial on the 
relationship between the introduction of the head tax 
and labour recruitment in the Morobe District were 
probably also true for the remoter parts of the Madang 
District. Vial concluded that:
...the normal development of a subdivision is a 
fairly rapid increase in the percentage of 
indentured labourers from nought to about 20% of 
adult males as it is brought under control. In 
this early stage the people recruit readily for 
the novelty of going away to work or to obtain 
the steel which they have seen to be much 
superior to their own implements. During the 
time between the first warning to prepare for 
taxation and two or three years after tax is 
first collected the figure rises to about 30% and 
then there is a gradual decline to 10% to 15% as 
other means of making money are discovered (Vial 
1938 : 395).
Moreover, these newly recruited labourers were more
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likely to leave the district altogether. Generally, 
the people of the Madang district were notorious for 
their disinclination to work outside the area (Reed 
1943:217). However, recruitment figures in the 
Territory annual reports indicated that on average, over 
forty per cent of Madang workers were employed in other 
districts, primarily New Britain and Morobe. Since it 
would appear that plantation labour within the district 
could be supplied from villages near the plantations 
(TNG Report 1921-22:113), an arrangement which suited 
both the employer, who could do his own recruiting, and 
the employee, who could maintain close links with his 
village, it was, therefore, the people from the newly 
opened up areas, who needed a source of income, who 
filled the labour needs of other districts. This trend 
was even more evident when the Bulolo gold fields 
opened up (TNG Report 1937-38:40).
There were, however, as Vial suggests, reasons 
other than the imposition of a head tax which made some 
people in the district make themselves available for 
indenture. Certainly, some were attracted to the idea 
of adventure in the outside world, especially those who 
already had relatives indentured in other areas 
(Woodman Papers 1931). Indeed, a few Madang people had 
already shown themselves to be very adventurous, for 
six Bilbil men had travelled to German East Africa as 
policemen before World War I (Mennis 1982:27).
Moreover, many of those recruited in the uncontrolled
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areas were gullible villagers who were victims of 
unscrupulous recruiters rather than men seeking work 
just to pay the head tax (Downs papers 1938-39).
Of concern to the Australian administrative 
officers was the perceived decline in the birth rate 
which occurred with the removal of indentured males 
from their villages. Figures supplied by J.K.McCarthy 
appear to bear out these concerns. On Bagabag Island, 
between 1933 and 1935 the indenture rate was five to 
eight per cent of the total population and the 
population of the island remained static during that 
period. On Long Island, in the same period, where the 
indenture rate was between eight and ten per cent of 
the total population the population actually declined 
by nine per cent. Conversely, on Karkar Island, where 
seven per cent of the total population was indentured 
during this period, the population maintained a 
constant growth. McCarthy concluded that this 
stability occurred because the majority of indentured 
labourers were employed on the local plantations 
(McCarthy Papers 1934-35:1).
However, many in the district, especially those in 
areas of long contact with Europeans, preferred to 
avoid indenture altogether. Certainly, the 
consistently low level of re-recruitment among the 
Madangs, usually less than ten per cent, although 
comparable with other areas of New Guinea except for 
New Britain, clearly indicated that the locals 
preferred to find incomes in ways other than indenture
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(TNG Report 1927-28:15). However, it was not easy for 
them to achieve access to the cash economy and little 
was done to promote their interests. Those people 
along the coast, especially those in the immediate 
vicinity of the town or plantations were able to raise 
funds for head tax by selling fruit and vegetables, but 
indigenous copra production was not developed because 
of opposition from plantation owners. Nor were many 
experts employed by the administration to help develop 
native plantations. By 1936, indigenous copra 
production was only a fraction of that produced by 
Europeans, which was a complete reversal of the success 
which Hahl had achieved twenty years earlier (Reed 
1943:256). In Madang, it was assumed that it was the 
low price of copra, only four shillings a bag, which 
discouraged its production by the villagers (Downs 
papers 1938-39:3). However, such an assumption was 
somewhat simplistic, especially in view of the fact 
that even at these prices, one or two bags of copra 
would have gone some way towards paying off the head 
tax. Probably the major difficulty facing the village 
copra grower in Madang was lack of transport. Roads in 
Rabaul and New Ireland were far better and in those 
places copra was already producing local entrepreneurs 
(Radi 1971:131), but in Madang, copra was very 
difficult to move. Some villagers brought it up the 
coast to Madang Town by canoe. Indeed, one group, on 
the Rai coast, subscribed to buy a sailing boat, 
although they allowed it to fall into disrepair
(McCarthy papers 1934-35). However, most were forced 
to sell it to nearby plantations, which had better 
transport, be it punt, skiff or even steamer, and since 
they were a captive market, the villagers were usually 
paid low prices. The Lutherans complained to the 
administration about this exploitation, but there was 
little will on the part of the administration to act 
against the plantation owners. Where villagers were 
actively encouraged, either by administration officers 
or plantation owners, or both, as on Karkar, there was 
enthusiasm to grow and dry copra (McCarthy papers 
1934-35). But such examples appear to be the exception 
rather than the rule and indigenous agriculture in the 
district was left to languish.
Although the administration did little to advance 
the indigenous economy, it was determined to improve 
living standards of the local people in other ways, but 
the implementation of its policies frequently 
disadvantaged the villagers involved. The native 
regulations which existed in Papua were introduced into 
New Guinea. These consisted of measures relating 
pimarily to health concerns such as the construction of 
latrines, the burial of the dead and the compulsory 
inoculation of villagers. Village houses were to be 
built to a certain standard and whole villages could be 
moved at the whim of the administration. Often hamlets 
were consolidated into villages for the convenience of 
the administration and to the detriment of the 
villagers, who subsequently could have long walks to
reach their gardens (TNG Report 1921-22:113). There 
was little, if any discussion with villagers about the 
introduction of these regulations, but, with fines of 
£2 to £3 being imposed for their non-observance, the 
penalties for breaking them were severe (Mair 
1948:47).
If the administration did little for indigenous 
economic development in the Madang region, neither did 
it encourage local political development. In spite of 
the friendlier approach of the administration, 
especially towards the people in the more remote areas, 
the shift was really only from repression to 
paternalism. No thought was given to the idea of 
sharing political power. The administration continued 
to try imposing indirect rule through the appointment 
of luluais and tultuls. The function of the luluais, 
who were nominated by their people and appointed by the 
district officer on the recommendation of the patrol 
officer, was to act as the agent of the administration 
in that they were expected to oversee all regulations 
and report any irregularities to the district officer. 
They did not have magisterial powers but they could 
arrest wrongdoers and bring them to court. They were 
also expected to superintend road maintenance and keep 
the village coconut groves free of pests as well as 
arrange carriers for government patrols. For these 
services they were exempted from head tax ( TNG Report 
1926-27:85). Those luluais who showed greater
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capacities were appointed paramount chiefs and it was 
envisioned that these so-called chiefs would ultimately 
evolve into a native magistracy (TNG Report 
1930-31 : 95 ) .
However, in the Madang region, the attempt to 
introduce indirect rule ran into all sorts of 
difficulties. One of the major problems for the 
administration was the rivalry which emerged between 
the government appointees and the mission teachers.
After World War I, the Rhenish mission revised its 
proselytizing methods, and instead of trying to 
converted the Madangs on a one-to-one basis, sent 
indigenous evangelists into the villages, where they 
succeeded in converting entire populations. The mission 
teachers, as a result, often became men of status who 
rivalled the government appointees for power in the 
village. Indeed, the mission teachers had several 
advantages. They were perceived as having an 
education, however scant that might be. They had the 
backing of the mission and were in constant contact 
with the villagers. And although they were usually 
outsiders, this fact worked in their favour, since they 
were perceived as being more impartial than the 1uluai 
(Mair 1948:55; Downs papers 1939-40:9). Certainly, it 
would seem that the villagers did not accept the 
authority of the luluais since even the most trivial of 
matters were left to the adjudication of the patrol 
officers (Downs papers 1938-39:4). Nor was the
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selection of a paramount chief a success. Indeed, the 
numbers of those appointed to this position fluctuated 
throughout the 1930s, being three in 1931, five in 
1933, three in 1937 and five again in 1939. Possibly 
the large number of languages within the region made it 
difficult to make appointments which would be 
acceptable to several villages, but the lack of 
appointments also reflected the lack of leadership 
material suited to the reguirements of the 
administration. One patrol officer scathingly wrote 
that in the area between the Gum and Gogol rivers that, 
'There was no native remotely resembling or even 
fractionally fit for the position' (Downs papers 
1938-39:5).
It was not until the late 1930s that the 
administration began to reassess its political 
relations with the villagers, especially those who had 
been in long term contact with Europeans. The whole of 
the central area of the Madang district was by now 
considered to be under government control and for the 
first time treated differently from those areas which 
had been more recently opened up. The area, containing 
some 47,482 people, was divided up into sub-divisions 
which were defined and treated as entire units. An 
officer was attached to each unit and conferences were 
held by him and attended by the local officials from 
that area. Various matters were discussed and the
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pove: . Lnd duties of the village officials were 
explained. For the first time the village officials 
found themselves working with the administration and 
not for the administration. The government officers 
found that the local people, instead of being passive, 
freely entered into discussions and were guite capable 
of putting forward suggestions as to the management of 
the district. Not suprisingly, such an approach helped 
to boost the prestige of the village officials and 
their newly acguired authority helped to create greater 
effiency within the district, with patrol officers 
needing to do less adjudication of trivial matters (TNG 
Report 1939-40:27). Unfortunately, this newly found 
confidence in the local people came in 1940, which was 
too late for them to be able to practice genuine 
political participation in the administration of their 
area .
Whilst it can be argued that the imposition of a 
head tax, the encouragement of indentured labour and 
the introduction of the various government regulations 
played no small part in the breaking down of village 
life, the government anthropologist, E.W.P. Chinnery, 
claimed that it was the missionaries, rather than the 
administration, who had a far greater impact on the 
lives of the villagers ( TNG Report 1932-33:158). 
Indeed, his claim was particularly true of the Madang 
region for two reasons. First, the missions were able 
to establish close working relations with the Madang
people in their villages, whilst lack of money 
prevented the administration from doing little other 
than mounting annual patrols. Second, in Madang, the 
rivalry which existed between the two churches,
Lutheran and Catholic, spurred each to move into the 
more remote areas to claim souls before the other 
arrived. Not only did this sometimes bitter rivalry 
create confusion among the people of the Madang 
district, but it also annoyed the administration, which 
saw the push by the missions into the uncontrolled 
areas as undermining the influence of the government.
When Australia assumed control of the mandate, the 
missionaries in the District were predominantly 
German. In 1926, the German Property Ordinance 
extinguished title to all missions held by Germans and 
invested title back to the particular faith of the 
mission whose property was involved (TNG Report 
1925-26:33). Since the Holy Spirit Mission was 
Dutch-based, it experienced little upheaval and its 
clergy remained predominantly German and Dutch. The 
German Rhenish missionaries, however, were replaced as 
early as 1922 by Americans, who were usually the 
offspring of German migrants and, by 1932, they 
assumed full control (TNG Report 1932-33:144). Not 
only did the personnel of the mission change, but so 
too, did its financial status. Unable to obtain 
support from Germany during World War I, both missions 
were forced to expand their plantation operations to
become self-sufficient. Moreover, with the takeover by 
the Americans, the Lutheran mission now had access to 
'the fox-furred forums that so generously distribute 
largesse on behalf of the Associated Women's Clubs of 
America', as one employee of the comparatively 
impoverished Australian administration bitterly pointed 
out (Downs papers 1938-39:9).
Not only did the Lutheran mission benefit from a 
change in its financial fortune, its conversion rates 
also increased rapidly with its changes in 
proselytizing style. In 1919, the first indigenous 
evangelists were sponsored by their Morobe congregation 
to work in the Amele area. Most could not read or 
write, but they had learnt Bible stories, verses from 
the scriptures, hymns and prayers. The native teachers 
were able to convert whole villages into Christian 
congregations. In 1925, some of these converts began 
to move into the Trans-Gogol region and by 1930, the 
Lutherans claimed some spectacular results, with 40,000 
adherents in the district ( TNG Report 1930-31:103).
In 1934, conversions began in the Bagasin Basin area 
(De'Ath 1981b:73). The Lutheran church also began to 
encourage indigenous congregations to organize 
missionary activity in uncontrolled areas. The cost of 
the work undertaken by the Lutheran Mission in the 
Bunabun hinterland and the issue of how this could best 
be achieved was discussed by the elders of Karkar and 
Bagabag islands, who decided to sponsor the education
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of young boys from the Bunabun area by bringing them to 
the missions on Karkar and Bagabag (Downs papers 
1938-39:9). However, Chinnery was right and the influx 
of native teachers began to affect village customs. In 
a report of the Madang district marriage customs and 
language Patrol Officer Bloxham made the observation 
that customs were dying out because:
every village in the area had a native 
teacher established and the younger men are 
no longer following the original custom in 
its entirety...the missionary insists on 
the abolition of polygamy and this is 
creating a social problem, as the man with 
two wives had to get rid of the second wife 
before he can become a Christian. As this 
second wife had been obtained by the outlay 
of wealth the native regards this divorce 
as a waste of money (P.0.Bloxham,
Madang District Patrol Report, No.8 1932-33).
Nor were the SVDs slow in taking up the Lutheran 
challenge; the district thus became a centre of 
theological rivalry. Because the Lutherans had moved 
into Siar and Kränget and the Catholics into 
Alexishafen, the Nobanob area became split by the two 
religions. In some village, like Riwo, both religions
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were represented and the village supported two rival 
churches with rival congregations. In the 1930s the 
rivalry continued in the north-west region of the 
district, where the Catholics tried to expand their 
operations from Bogia, through Josephstaal and along 
the Ramu side of the Adelbert Mountains, while the 
Lutherans tried to penetrate the area inland from the 
coast at Bunabun (Downs papers 1938-39). Along the Rai 
coast and the Upper Ramu valley the Lutherans held 
sway, although the Catholics were able to establish a 
mission post in the immediate vicinity of Saidor 
(Lawrence 1964:86).
The rivalry between the mission continued unabated, 
exasperating the administration, partly because the 
Australian administration distrusted foreigners and 
partly because it saw the actions of the missions as 
undermining the civilizing of the local people, which 
was the role which the government had assumed for 
itself. One incident sums up the three way conflict 
succinctly. In the 1930s a Dutch SVD priest was 
arrested in the Ramu area near the Trans-Gogol on a 
charge of having burnt the house of two Lutheran 
Mission helpers who had encroached on his territory.
The response of the local magistrate to this action was 
to sentence the Dutch missionary to five years hard 
labour. The sentence was later reduced on appeal 
(De'ath 1981b:67).
For the most part, however, it was the Lutheran
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native mission teachers whom the administration saw as 
the major disruption to their expansion into the 
remoter areas. It was maintained that the indigenous 
teachers followed a pattern of behaviour which 
conflicted with the establishment of good government. 
For the first two years they were, according to Patrol 
Officer Downs, generally religious fanatics; this 
period was followed by another of indifference to 
religion, but because of the status they had acguired 
as mission teachers they were able to channel their 
energies into village politics and so weaken the power 
of the administration-appointed village officials 
(Downs papers 1939-40:9). Moreover, it was found that 
the actions of the mission teacher who had moved into 
the uncontrolled areas undermined the position of the 
administration before it had even moved into the area. 
In the Magela area of the Adelbert Mountains the 
mission teachers had variously told the villagers that 
the kiap (government officer) would come and frighten 
them into submission. Others said that the villagers 
should prepare a road and rest hut in anticipation of 
his imminent arrival, although the kiap, knowing 
nothing of such plans, did not come. These actions 
created future resentment among those villagers 
involved which was difficult for the administration to 
repair (Downs papers 1938-39:8).
The ideas of the mission teachers did not always 
coincide with those of the European missionaries
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either. This was especially true after the outbreak of 
the Second World War when village mission teachers 
began to spread propaganda which suggested either the 
imminent departure of all Europeans, save for the 
missions, or foretold of the impending return of the 
Germans, who would create a perfect state (Downs papers 
1939-40:9). Such actions only confirmed to the 
Administration the view which it had held for some 
time, that although the American missionaries were nice 
enough people, they lacked the organizational ability 
of their German counterparts and thus were unable to 
maintain control over their mission helpers (Downs 
papers 1938-39:5).
The administration saw the periodic disturbances 
which occurred in the Adelbert Mountains as being the 
result of mission rivalry in that area. The anxiety of 
the mission teachers to push into that area ahead of 
the Catholics created a lot of tension, not just 
between the Lutheran mission and the administration, 
but also between villages. Some villagers objected to 
any missionary activity in their areas and would attack 
converted villages. This could occur even when the two 
villages had been traditionally on friendly terms 
(Downs papers 1938-39:11). Other villagers thought that 
the mission helpers who penetrated their area were 
connected with labour recruiters and objected to their 
presence (Downs Papers April, 1939:1).
Moreover, when the missionaries got into trouble,
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even in the more remote areas, the administration was 
expected to go in and rescue them, stretching already- 
strained resources and goodwill. In August 1936, a 
missionary party on patrol was attacked in an area 
southwest of Bunabun village. The party had been 
ill-prepared for the patrol: it lacked reliable
interpreters, the mission helpers were discourteous to 
the villagers and the largesse distributed by the 
missionaries was seen by the villagers as a sign of 
weakness. One of the European missionaries was 
slightly hurt in the attack, which was reported to the 
district officer by a village messenger. The district 
officer sent up a plane to look for the missionaries, 
but the attempt proved to be futile since the 
missionaries had walked out of the area themselves and 
had gone to Karkar island for medical treatment before 
turning up in Madang Town a week later. The district 
officer was furious at the waste of time and the money 
which had been spent on what was no more than a storm 
in a teacup, and asked the administrator to have the 
area declared uncontrolled as a lesson to the Lutherans 
and prevent their entering the area again (D.O. Oakley, 
memorandum to Director of District Services and Native 
Affairs, 31.8.38). Sir Walter McNicol was sympathetic, 
but declined the reguest, possibly because such actions 
would have been hard to explain in the League of 
Nations (memorandum to Secretary, Prime Minister's 
Department, Canberra, 5.5.39). But the administration
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was again forced to intervene in the same area when a 
group of villagers enlisted the help of their 
traditional friends to drive out a group of missionary 
helpers. In the skirmish, the wife of one of the 
mission helpers was badly wounded and again 
administration was forced to intervene (A.D.O. Kyle, 
Patrol Report, March 1939).
While the administration frequently resented 
mission activity and individual officers appeared 
almost hostile to the presence of missionaries, 
especially in the less controlled regions, they were 
not above exploiting them for the benefit of the 
government. It was even thought that the competition 
between the two churches could be used to speed up the 
building of roads, especially in the west of the 
district where the competition was fiercest. Moreover, 
it was recognized that the good auspices of the 
missionaries was necessary if labour recruitment in 
more remote areas was to be successful (Downs papers 
August 1939:4).
Some missionaries, however, argued that rather than 
missionary activity, it was government patrols which 
caused the most disruption to village life. Certainly 
the native police had acquired a reputation for 
brutality and although there had been moves to improve 
standards they remained poor, leading one Catholic 
missionary to claim that:
At night, or even during the day, while the
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European patrol officer is resting, his native 
boys, taking advantage of the opportunity, 
interfere with the women of the primitive 
natives or rob their gardens. Disturbances 
are naturally the result. Then arms are put 
into motion to shoot down the primitive 
people; in this manner countless lives are 
lost, as everyone knows; in fact, on the word 
of numerous government officials with whom I 
have discussed native police boys, they have 
been the cause of untold trouble in 
uncontrolled areas. (De'Ath 1981b:67).
Actually, there were very few reports of 
disturbances by New Guineans in the Madang district 
during the period of the mandate, reflecting both the 
friendlier approach of the administration and the lack 
of finances which restricted the number of patrols into 
the newer areas; nevertheless, the most irnfamous attack 
against an Australian patrol in the Madang region 
occurred in circumstances such as those described by 
the missionary.
In July 1936, A.D.O. Nurton was attacked on the 
Rai coast, beside the Mot River. In the attack one 
policeman was killed, four villagers were injured and 
two rifles were stolen. Nurton established that the 
cause of the raid was the theft of a pig by the police 
and the rape one of the village women. Resentment 
smouldered along the coast and the patrol found the
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area difficult to cover, not simply because of the 
rugged terrain, but also because traps of sharpened 
bamboo spikes had been set along the paths. Nurton 
made himself a suit of armour, Ned Kelly style, and 
built a barricade for the patrol at Saing. Nevertheless, 
in spite of these precautions, in late September,
Nurton was badly wounded by a group of villagers. They 
had approached him, asking for peace. Nurton told them 
to put their bows and arrows aside, but when the women 
got close to him, they drew bush knives from their 
bilums and attacked him. Six people were killed in the 
skirmish. Although Nurton was badly wounded, he was 
able to make his way back to Madang, where his leg had 
to be amputated (E.W.P. Chinnery to Administrator,
9.10.36’, A.D.O. Nurton, Report in Rabaul Times,
23.10.36). This dramatic incident, which was widely 
reported in the Australian press, was, however, an 
isolated one. Generally patrols into the uncontrolled 
areas were handled with sensitivity; the administration 
was far more interested in making friends with the 
people of the mountainous regions, and the punitive 
approach which had characterized the settlement of the 
coastal region was absent.
Whatever arguments can be presented on the comparative 
effects of the administration and the missions on on 
village life, when it came to the field of education 
there was no contest, for the administration played 
virtually no role at all. Indeed, it can be
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argued that although all New Guineans were treated 
poorly by the administration in terms of education, 
since so little was spent on it, in spite of the 
institution of an education tax, the people of the 
Madang district were treated most poorly of all.
Madang did not acquire a government school until 1941, 
although four had already been established in New 
Britain, one in Kavieng and one had even opened in the 
new area of Chimbu before the people in the Madang 
district had access to an administrative school 
(Lawrence 1964:48). Moreover, the people from the 
district did not feature in the enrolments of these 
other schools, although people from outside the school 
area did. For example, in 1928, there were thirty five 
people from Manus enrolled in the elementary school in 
Rabaul, as well as seventeen from Morobe and eight from 
the Sepik, while there was only one person enrolled 
from Madang. Yet the Madangs were fully aware of the 
benefits of education, for in 1941 a group demanded a 
school and were told that a teacher would be supplied 
if the group built a European school. This they 
achieved in less than four weeks and they were given a 
European teacher. The school operated for less than a 
year (Mair 1948:171).
Thus it was that the missions were left to provide 
education to the people of Madang. By 1925 the SVDs 
were educating some 2,656 people, while the Lutherans 
were educating 2,815 (TNG Report 1924-25:36), and by
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1936 the two had 204 and 119 village schools 
respectively (TNG Report 1934-35:95). Moreover, this 
was achieved without the cooperation of the 
administration, partly because the administration 
thought that the lack of the use of English in the 
mission schools would be an impediment to further 
technical education and partly because the missions saw 
government subsidies as a threat to their independence 
(Radi 1971:106). However, the mission schools provided 
only limited schooling for the Madangs.
When the Rhenish missionaries had first arrived in 
Madang in the previous century, they had learnt the 
local Graged language, which they proceeded to teach to 
other people in the district. After the First World 
War, the vernacular was used in most villages, although 
the Lutherans used the Amele language in the Bagasin 
area and Kate was introduced onto the Rai coast 
(Lawrence 1964:55). Tokpisin in the classroom was 
avoided. Only the Bible and catechisms were produced 
in the vernacular and in most of the Lutheran mission 
schools in the district, books continued to be printed 
in Graged (De'Ath 1981b:75).
The implication of this educational approach was 
obvious. Villagers were expected to become literate in 
a second language, which itself was used in a 
restricted area. It was a system designed to ensure 
Madang educational insularity. Nor was the guality of 
the education provided by the Lutherans very high.
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While the Lutherans might have claimed to have had 122 
schools in 1935, 119 of these were village schools
staffed by native teachers, whose literacy was such 
that they could only impart the most rudimentary 
knowledge of the written word. The other Lutheran 
schools were a secondary school and a technical school, 
to which the abler boys from the village schools were 
sent (Lawrence 1964:55).
The SVDs had even more village schools than the 
Lutherans, and they had more European teachers. For 
example, in 1925, they had Europeans controlling twenty 
three schools, while the Lutherans had only three. 
Moreover, the SVDs had several elementary schools, as 
well as two training schools and a technical 
school. The range of subjects taught by the SVDs 
emphasised their practical approach to education, an 
approach which met with the approval of the Australian 
administration as it had done with the Germans (TNG 
Report 1927-28:79). Subjects included boat building, 
printing, cooking, washing and sewing as well as the 
three Rs (TNG Report 1926-27:39). However, teaching 
was done in tokpisin because most of the teachers, both 
European and native, had limited English and their use 
of tokpisin as a form of communication was condemned by 
the administration as being clumsy and inexpressive 
(TNG Report 1921-22).
Thus the administration abrogated its 
responsibility for education in the Madang district and 
expected the missionaries to fill the vacuum. However,
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the efforts of the missionaries were less than 
satisfactory because the type and quality of the 
education which they provided meant that they 
frequently produced confusion rather than 
enlightenment.
The war in the Pacific brought the temporary 
retreat of the Australian administration. On paper, 
the administration looked as though it had been 
successful. It had extended its influence into the 
hinterland of the Madang region. Administration posts 
had been set up at Saidor and Bogia, and if the people 
of the hinterland could still be aggressive, then the 
coastal people were obedient and submissive. However, 
it left behind a disappointing legacy of lost 
opportunities. While it is true that the development 
of the Madang district was hampered by lack of finance 
and that other districts, especially New Britain and 
Morobe, outperformed Madang economically, it is also 
true that the administration lacked both the will and 
the vision to do more with the local people than to 
issue instructions. The locals were virtually excluded 
from economic development except as labourers. Nor was 
there much effort to encourage leadership and political 
cooperation. Those whom the administration chose to 
call leaders were little more than go-betweens. Even 
those Madangs who had been in contact with the 
Europeans for more than fifty years were not encouraged 
to accept political responsibility. And yet the
missions were able to find leaders and encourage the 
development of village participation in its 
enterprises, although not always with satisfactory 
results, since those leaders the missions used were 
frequently unskilled and uneducated. Thus, the Madangs 
were caught between a paternalistic and authoritarian 
administration, which suppressed local participation in 
the development of the colony, and the missions, which, 
while encouraging local participation in their 
churches, also produced confusion.
CHAPTER FOUR
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THE RISE OF THE CARGO CULTS
In 1940/ the administration in Madang was disturbed 
by an outbreak of cargo cult activity, known as the 
Letup singsing, in the Sek-Nobanob area, among people 
who were assumed to have had the longest exposure to 
European civilization. The administration was puzzled 
by such a development among comparatively advanced 
people and it could only vaguely assume that the 
activity was a transitional stage in cultural change 
(TNG Report 1939-40:28-29). However, the Letup 
singsing was more significant than the administration 
realized, for it typified the mutual misunderstanding 
which existed in the Madang region, even after fifty 
years of colonization. In short, it would seem that 
the Madangs, while affected by the many far-reaching 
social, economic and technological changes which had 
taken place, particularly along the central coastal 
region of the area, had not altered the intellectual 
basis of their society. Indeed, rather than rejecting 
the values of their own society in favour of a 
seemingly more advanced one, they continually altered 
their own myths and legends to accommodate the changes 
presented by the colonizers. Furthermore, if the Letup 
singsing was the re-affirmation of the beliefs of the 
people of the Madang region, then the reaction of the
administration to this event indicated the extent of 
the Australian ignorance of the Madang society and 
culture.
Certainly, it can be said that the colonizers 
possessed no great understanding of Madang ideas, 
beliefs and social structure. Government was imposed 
from the top, with little concept of its impact on 
Madang society. Thus it was hardly surprising that 
successive administrations were unable to induce those 
men with status and prestige to become allies. Although 
it was realized that the villagers avoided nominating 
their real leaders for appointment as luluais, little 
was done to ameliorate the situation until 1940, when 
the institution of native councils may have improved 
the status of the luluais and tultuls. Of course, the 
Lutheran Mission realized that its helpers were most 
effective and had greater authority when they were able 
to escape the claims of kinship and this, together with 
the mission helper's claim of a religious base for his 
authority, made him far more influential than the 
luluai, but this was hardly a solution the 
administration could follow.
Because of its inability to appoint suitable 
luluais, the administration was even less likely to be 
able to develop a system of senior leadership or 
paramount chiefs, which it had envisioned would 
emerge. It can, of course, be argued that such a 
concept would have been difficult anyway since the
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influence of the headman, which relied upon consensus, 
declined with his distance from his base; but since 
other areas, such as Morobe and New Britain, produced 
many more paramount chiefs than did the Madang 
district, it may well be that other factors militated 
againgst such appointments in the Madang area. Indeed, 
it is possible that village groups in Madang pursued 
exclusivity to such an extent that it was difficult for 
a single leader to emerge.
While it has been assumed that the great linguistic 
diversity in Papua New Guinea owed its origins to the 
difficult terrain of the country, this can hardly be so 
in Madang, which contains one of the highest 
multiplicities of languages in the entire country. On 
Karkar Island, for example, where there are two 
distinct languages, Takia and Waskia. While it is true 
that one of these languages is of Austronesian origin, 
and the other is not, the languages have remained 
distinctly separate, although there is no geographical 
impediment to their merging. Clearly the people on 
Karkar want to retain their linguistic
differentiation. Nor can it be argued that the people 
of the Madang area developed different languages 
because they were isolated from each other. Indeed, in 
pre-colonial times, many in the region knew each other 
well through their trade contacts. Not only did the 
Bilbil people trade their pots towards the east as far 
as the Morobe area in their large trading canoes, but
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on the northwest coast there were also well established 
trading networks between the people of Karkar, Malala, 
Bogia, Sarang and the immediate hinterland which were 
conducted through family members or individual friends 
(Dagil 1975:62). Because there was no geographical or 
social impediment to induce such a diversity of 
languages, the inference can be drawn that the Madangs 
developed these languages because they wanted to remain 
exclusive from each other (Laycock 1982:35). It is 
therefore unlikely that the various groups would have 
accepted the imposition of a leader whose language 
proclaimed him to be an outsider. So it was not 
surprising that while the administration continued to 
be ignorant of the Madangs relations with each other, 
their attempts to impose such leadership remained 
unsuccessful.
While it was assumed by both the church and the 
administration that they were bringing profound changes 
to the Madang way of life, in fact, the Madang people 
were interested only in the material changes which were 
introduced by these institutions and saw no need at all 
to reject their traditional ideas and values. Indeed, 
as the missionary Hannemann observed, the Madangs 
thought that 'nativization was as good as 
westernization' (Hannemann n.d.:45). Certainly the 
Madangs realized that the Europeans had vast wealth in 
which they certainly wanted to share, but they did not 
understand its source. That this was so is hardly
surprising since neither the Australian nor the German 
administration attempted to involve the people of the 
Madang area in the colonial structure, save as vessels 
for administrative orders; it was thus difficult for 
the Madang people to learn how European society was 
organized. Nor did the indenture system supply any 
answers. Three years labouring on a copra plantation 
was unlikely to enlighten the Madangs about the 
intricacies of European economics. Indeed, it created 
confusion, for while the wealth of the planter was 
clearly visible to the labourer, even after three years 
of contact its source remained a mystery. Therefore, the 
Madang people could only explain the source of European 
goods in Melanesian terms. This lead to frustration 
which manifested itself in a variety of ways, the most 
notable of which was the emergence of movements which 
were termed cargo cults.
From Saidor to Bogia, on Manam and Karkar islands, 
anthropological studies indicate that there was a 
basic belief that the origins of the material world 
came from non-material sources. For the people of the 
district, the knowledge of their environment came from 
the deities, who revealed their knowledge if the 
correct ritual were performed. Thus true knowledge for 
the Madangs was not the knowledge of secular skills, 
but the knowledge of the correct words and rituals 
(Lawrence 1964:31). The skill of the spear maker lay 
not with his handiwork, but with his performance of the
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correct ritual which would ensure the spear's 
accuracy. Such laws relating to the deities were 
revealed in dreams and only those men who knew how to 
tap into these laws could be considered for leadership 
(Lawrence 1988:8).
The coming of the Europeans, therefore, posed a 
major problem for the Madangs as the Europeans refused 
to share the rituals which would reveal the secret of 
their wealth. The Madang people had no other recourse 
than to seek an explanation through their own myths and 
dreams; as circumstances changed but access to European 
goods still failed to materialize, the myths, like 
Procrustes' guests, were made to adjust. The new myths 
were freguently accompanied by changes in the attitude 
of the Madangs to the Europeans.
Peter Lawrence traced the changes in the Madang 
myths in his book Road Belong Cargo. His studies 
clearly showed the flexibility and resilience of the 
Madang intellect. In the original legend which existed 
in the area around Astrolabe Bay, there were two 
brothers, Kilibob, the good one, and Manup, the bad 
one. The former sailed around Madang establishing the 
languages and distributing material goods. The 
appearance of Nicholi Miklouho-Maclay was interpreted 
by these Madangs as being the return of Kilibob, since 
the anthropologist distributed largesse among them.
The initial response towards the Germans was similarly 
one of friendship, but by 1900 the Madangs could hardly
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associate the exploitative Germans with the benign 
re-appearance of Kilibob and so the myth was modified 
to explain the German reluctance to share their 
wealth. The modified myth related how Kilibob had 
sailed along the Madang coast in a steamer, offering 
the villagers a choice between bows, arrows and canoes 
or guns and dingies. The foolish Madang ancestors had 
selected the former goods, leaving the better materials 
for the Europeans. Kilibob would now return with a 
cargo of rifles and expel the Germans (Lawrence 
1964:60) .
It is evident that the Madang people assumed that 
they had always had the right of access to the cargo 
and that they were only prevented from having it by the 
stupidity of their ancestors. Hence, when it became 
clear that the Germans were not going to share the 
secret of their cargo, the Madangs began to search for 
the right ritual to untap the source for themselves, 
using a variety of technigues to manipulate the deities 
into revealing their knowledge. As early as 1904 the 
Rhenish mission reported that there was a:
...so-called secret cult called 'Afa' in 
Bogadjim, 'Mesiab' in Siar and Ragatta and 
'Ai' in Bongu. This secret vice, in 
conjunction with magic and belief in ghosts, 
hold the people in a vice (German New Guinea 
Annual Report, 1904-05, Addendum from 
Rheinische Mission, cited in Rowley 
1968:168).
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It was in conjunction with this secret cult that the 
central Madang groups tried to overthrow the German 
administration in 1904. Even after the failure of the 
rebellion, the Madangs remained, if not openly hostile, 
then at least sullen and uncooperative with all the 
Europeans in the area.
There is little doubt that the expulsion of some 
Madangs in 1912 was an extremely traumatic event and 
subsequently the Madangs began to change their attitude 
towards the colonizers. The Siars, believing that 
their exile had occurred because they had failed to 
accept Christianity, converted upon their return from 
the Rai coast to prevent being exiled again (Lacy 
1973:24). Because the new administration had allowed 
the Siar people to return from exile, other Madangs 
were willing to be more cooperative with the 
authorities by working for the Europeans, paying taxes 
and converting to Christianity (Hannemann n.d.:29-30). 
It was about this time, too, that the Lutheran 
missionaries changed their methods of proselytising, so 
that conversion rates among the Madangs rose rapidly.
Adoption of Christianity by the Madangs, also, 
appeared to have occurred very largely because it was 
assumed that the missionaries would now supply 
the ritual which would restore the lost cargo. 
Christianity was thus recast as a Madang legend. God 
had given Adam and Eve cargo and then withdrawn it.
But later, when God decided to destroy the world he
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gave the cargo to Noah. Unfortunately, Ham lost his 
cargo, while Shem and Japeth retained theirs. Ham 
became the ancestor of the Madangs, and Shem and Japeth 
became the ancestor of Europeans (Lawrence 1964:76)
It was during this period that many Madangs 
underwent a cultural revolution. This was partly 
because of the zeal of the missionaries to eradicate 
all signs of heathenism and partly because the Madangs 
themselves were eager to appear cooperative with the 
missionaries in order to acquire the secret for the 
acquistition of cargo. Thus the meziab cult was 
discontinued, and on Kränget Island candidates for 
baptism were forced to show their sacred objects to 
women and children before being baptized (Hannemann 
n.d.:39). Wooden statues were regarded by the 
missionaries as being idolatrous and the Krangets were 
made to throw them out, often to be retrieved by the 
missionaries and sent overseas to museums, the 
hypocrisy of which did not escape the Krangets (Mennis 
1980:61,108). In 1923, the Siars banned dancing 
because it was thought to be out of harmony with God 
(Hannemann n.d.:40).
Nevertheless, in spite of this outward show of 
cooperation, the Madangs changed their ideas little, if 
at all. Magic continued to be used. Indeed, the 
Madangs made the most of their contact with indentured 
people from other areas such as Morobe, the Sepik or 
Manus Island to acquire more magic rites (Hannemann
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n.d.:41). Sometimes, however, the outward changes and 
inner convictions led to conflicts of interest. The 
Bilbil, for example, ceased their age-old trading 
voyages along the north coast of New Guinea about 1935 
because they became Christians. They were forbidden, 
by the Lutheran missionaries, to use the magic rituals 
associated with sailing, but this meant that the 
Bilbil no longer felt protected on their journeys and 
so they were afraid to venture out to sea (Mennis 
1982:297).
The missionaries, however, did not reveal their 
knowledge and the Madang myth was changed again in the 
1930s. Now Kilibob was equated with God and Manup with 
Jesus. Both, it was said, would shortly return with 
guns to expel the Europeans who had been too selfish to 
share the cargo ritual (Lawrence 1964:93).
Towards the end of the decade, a series of cult 
movements began to spring up along the Madang seaboard, 
motivated by the frustrating failure of the 
missionaries to reveal the secret of the supply of 
cargo. It was thought that the missionaries were 
purposely withholding vital information either by not 
teaching English to the Madangs, hence the enthusiasm 
for a government school, or by not revealing those 
parts of the Bible which contained the relevant 
knowledge (ibid:90).
Evidence of the cult movements in this period is 
scarce. Frequently, the movements were secret ones and
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the overstretched administration failed to detect 
them. Even when it did, it was not necessarily 
interested since these cults were directed against the 
missionaries and posed no direct threat to the 
administration. The missionaries were deliberately 
kept in the dark by the Madangs, although some 
knowledge of cult activities was obtained by the 
Lutheran missionaries, Inselmann and Hannemann.
Indeed, Hannemann suggested that cult activity appeared 
along the central coast as early as 1924 (Morauta 
1974:36). Another early cult originated on the Rai 
coast. Originally designed to kill a missionary helper 
through its magic, an areca nut, wrapped in a bread 
fruit leaf, was passed from village to village, 
although its original significance was lost when it 
moved from the Rai coast. In another new myth, it was 
said that Elias of the Bible would come and kill 
adulterers. Some villagers built houses and filled 
them with provisions to prepare for his arrival.
Elias, according to the myth, was taken to Sek, an 
area associated with Kilibob and disappeared 
(ibid:3 8).
In 1937, at the other end of the Madang district, 
near Bogia, another movement started. It began when a 
labourer named Mambu, who had been recently repatriated 
from Rabaul, returned to his village and began to 
demand that the villagers pay him a head tax, rather 
than give it to the administration. The SVD
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missionaries in the area heard of his actions and made 
him return the money. Mambu, whose previous attitude 
to the Church had made him appear a likely candidate 
for catechist training, now turned implacably against 
it. He retreated into the hinterland where he began to 
deliver his message to the nearby villagers. Mambu 
claimed that their ancestors had been manufacturing 
cargo for them in the interior of Manam volcano, but 
the Europeans entrusted with its delivery had taken the 
cargo for themselves. He declared that the time was 
coming when the ancestors would rectify the situation 
and bring ships laden with cargo to a huge harbour 
which was to be created in front of Mambu's house.
When the time was right for the ancestors to act, all 
gardening must cease and the pigs must be destroyed as 
a sign of faith in the ancestors' actions, for without 
such a sign the ancestors would not come. In the 
meantime, head tax was to be paid to Mambu and the 
villagers were no longer to work for the 
administration or go to church or send their children 
to school. Those villagers who disobeyed would be 
punished by their ancestors when they returned. Mambu 
built some small, temple-like, buildings in some of the 
villages. He carried out a form of baptism and 
insisted that the villagers wear European clothing, 
burying their traditional clothes in an elaborate 
ceremony. Mambu demanded money for his prayers to the 
ancestors, declared himself to be immune to wounding,
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and remained celibate. He referred to himself as King 
long ol kanaka and liked his followers to call him the 
Black King (Burridge 1960:182-186).
Both the administration and the mission were 
alarmed by the results of Mambu's activities. School 
and church attendance fell. Roadwork declined and 
collecting head tax became difficult. Mambu was 
arrested in early 1938 and eventually taken to Madang 
in chains. The movement, without its leader, was 
assumed to have collapsed (ibid 1960:186). But, as 
Burridge himself found, the memory of Mambu remained 
very strong within the Bogia area. Indeed, the 
villagers claimed that Mambu knew the secret of the 
source of cargo and was arrested to prevent his 
revealing it (ibid 1960:189).
The Letub cult, which may have existed throughout 
the 1930s in the central Madang region, reached its 
height after 1937, when it spread from its origins in 
Sek village, along the coast to Bilbil and into the 
hinterland behind Alexishafen to Nobanob, thus 
encompassing areas of both Catholic and Lutheran 
influence. The people in these areas were convinced 
that the missionaries had deliberately misled them 
about the nature of God. In reality, the villagers 
claimed, both God and Jesus Christ were local deities, 
whom the missionaries prevented from returning to 
Madang with the wealth that had been lost by foolish 
Madang ancestors because the missionaries wanted the 
wealth to stay with the Europeans. A new ritual was 
devised which would enable the deities to return. 
Prayers and hymns were sung. Sacrifices and
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invocations were made to the deities and to please the 
ancestors sufficiently to intercede with the deities on 
the Madangs' behalf, a special dance, called the Letub 
dance, was devised. This dance was characterized by 
shaking and swaying and was the most visible sign of 
the cult (Lawrence 1964:92-96).
The administration was not inclined to take action 
against the cults, for they were not considered to be 
harmful to good government. Indeed, some government 
officers considered that those mission teachers who 
championed the German cause were a greater security 
risk (Downs papers 1939:9). Generally, it assumed that 
the cults could be controlled if the leaders were 
arrested and government officers discussed the issue 
with the villagers (TNG Report 1939-40:27). Even when 
the tultul of Kauris village, one Kaut, declared that 
he wanted to become king of Madang, the administration 
was disinclined to act. However, after repeated 
complaints from Lutheran missionaries, it eventually 
had Kaut arrested but let him go the next day when it 
was clear that he was not a political threat.
The following year, 1941, a cult, known as the 
Kukuaik cult, began to manifest itself on Karkar 
Island. Like the Letub and Mambu cults, this cult was 
the result of reaction to the perceived failure of the 
missionaries to reveal the secret of access to cargo to 
the Karkar people. The movement followed similar lines 
to the others, especially in that the ritual associated
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with it appeared to have a connection with Christian 
rituals. Indeed, the Lutheran missionaries on the 
island first assumed the cult to be a Christian 
revival. However, it became evident that the 
phenomenon was not Christian when the gardens became 
neglected and labourers failed to turn up at the 
plantations. This neglect was to show the ancestors 
that the villagers had faith in their ability 
to persuade the deities to reveal the secret of 
cargo. Dancing, chanting and visions became common. 
Kubai of Boroman village made himself leader of the 
movement and appointed 'kings' and 'soldiers' to run 
the villages. Because he believed that the Europeans 
had sacrificed Jesus in order to learn the secret of 
the access to cargo, he killed his wife and planned for 
her reappearance by plane by having an airstrip cleared 
at his village (McSwain 1977:94).
Because of complaints by missionaries and 
planters, the administration acted and a police 
contingent was sent to arrest the leaders, including 
Kubai. Most of those involved were simply charged with 
breaking their labour contracts. The Karkars, however, 
assumed that the action taken by the administration 
occurred because the villagers were coming close to 
discovering the secret of the access to cargo. So 
although the administration effectively stopped the 
Kukuaik movement by removing its leaders, it did not 
destroy the ideas which lay behind the movement
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(ibid:96 ) .
One of those in the police party was Tagarab of 
Milguk village in the Amele area. He had worked in 
Rabaul and had been involved in the general strike of 
1929. Some time in the 1930s he joined the police 
force, eventually serving in Madang. In 1937, he may 
have started a communal village garden scheme near the 
Madang township, the produce from which he sold 
to the local police (Morauta 1974:38). Tagarab was 
influenced by the Kukuaik cult and was probably 
influenced by the Letub cult as well and, as a result, 
he blamed the missionaries for the lack of cargo being 
delivered to the New Guineans. By mid-1942, the war in 
the Pacific had reached New Guinea and Madang had been 
bombed. Tagarab fled the town and returned to his 
village. In Milguk, he declared that these events were 
a precursor to the arrival of cargo, which would 
shortly be brought by the spirits of the dead in the 
guise of Japanese airman. The villagers were expected 
to continue with the Lutheran hymns, prayers and other 
forms of worship, but now they were to use them as the 
fulfilment of their obligations to the deities rather 
than the Christian God. Gardens and food production 
were neglected, for there was no need for them.
Because of the confused situation in New Guinea in 
1942, Tagarab was able to avoid the Australian 
authorities, although some of his followers were 
gaoled, so the cult continued to spread, from the south 
Nobanob area to parts of the Gogol valley and the
Bagasin area (Lawrence 1964:104).
The war at first by-passed Madang. Rabaul fell in 
January 1942 but although Madang was bombed from the 
air, the Japanese did not enter the town until 
December, when troops moved east from Wewak. The Rai 
coast region was penetrated after the battle of the 
Bismarck Sea when the Japanese began to retreat to the 
west (Allen 1981:14). Reaction to the arrival of the 
Japanese into the Madang district was varied. Because 
of the cult activity in the period before the Japanese 
invasion, some Madangs welcomed their arrival. Others 
remained loyal to the Europeans, but usually because 
there were close personal relationships. The majority 
of Madangs, however, found that they had little, if 
any, control over a confusing situation and simply 
tried to survive the experience by taking no sides at 
all. Tagarab and Kaut were the most prominent 
collaborators because they believed that their future 
lay with the Japanese. Kaut tried to manipulate 
the situation to his own advantage by declaring that 
the Japanese recognized him as king of Madang. But 
such a declaration seemed unlikely since the Japanese 
had little tokpisin. Tagarab kept up his own cult 
rituals, hoping that the Japanese would get rid of the 
Europeans and then reveal the secret of access to 
cargo. When the tide of war turned against the 
Japanese, Tagarab joined them in their retreat to the 
Sepik: however, when he protested to the Japanese over
their increasingly harsh treatment of villagers,
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he was shot (Lawrence 1964:110).
Motives for the acceptance of the Japanese invasion 
varied. Some saw it as the fulfilment of their 
prophecies. The inhabitants of Riwo village assumed 
that the coming of the Japanese would be accompanied by 
access to cargo, for the paper money which the Japanese 
had given them had a picture on it which they 
identified as the place at Alexishafen where Kilibob 
had brought his boat. It was therefore assumed that 
the Japanese must be acting as his agent and Kilibob 
would now return with the original cargo that their 
ancestors had ignored (Mennis 1980:3). A similar 
attitude towards the Japanese also existed on Karkar, 
although not all supported them simply because of 
cargoist beliefs. Some leaders worked with the 
Japanese as a way of acquiring wealth and prestige. 
Others, including Kubai of Boroman, avoided committing 
themselves to either side until the likely outcome of 
the war had been decided. A few village leaders 
remained loyal to the Australians and to their 
churches. Generally, fear was the greatest determinant 
of Karkar reaction to the Japanese and, although it 
appeared that the Japanese leadership on Karkar was 
tolerant of local customs and religion, the violence of 
the ordinary soldier ensured that the majority of 
Karkars obeyed their rule (McSwain 1977:75).
This reaction was generally true, too, of the 
mainland. On the Rai coast, the Japanese had first
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been greeted as friends who would supply the cargo 
which had been withheld by the Europeans. A Lutheran 
mission helper even persuaded one village to betray the 
local coast watchers, Bell and Laws, to the Japanese to 
facilitate its prompt delivery (Lawrence 1964:108). 
Initially, too, the Japanese tried to make friends with 
the local people. In places like Ord village in the 
south Nobanob area they shared their food with the 
villagers. Frequently, however, the villagers lived in 
fear of Japanese actions. Lacking heavy earthmoving 
equipment, the Japanese used local labour to build 
airstrips at Alexishafen, Madang town and Bogia (Allen 
1981(a) :14). They also forced the villagers to make 
gardens to supplement their reliance on imported food 
and villagers were used as carriers. Opposition to 
Japanese demands could result in villagers being shot 
(Mennis 1981:62). At Amele and Bogia the Japanese 
forced the local people to watch the execution of 
American airmen. When the war began to turn against 
the Japanese, relations between them and the Madangs 
deteriorated even further. As food supplies declined, 
the Japanese stole pigs, fowls and other food from the 
Madangs. Some resorted to cannibalism (Lawrence 
1964:110). Others fled into the bush where some made 
friends with the locals enabling them to stay hidden 
for years. Nine former Japanese soldiers remained in 
the Finesterre Ranges until late 1949, when they gave 
themselves up to Australian authorities (Pacific Islands
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Monthly, October 1949:27).
In some areas, village leaders tried to protect 
their people from violence by cooperating with the 
Japanese. Kamot, the luluai of Riwo, turned over an 
American pilot to the Japanese after the latter had 
learnt of his presence near the village (Mennis 1980:5) 
but generally the leaders felt as helpless as everyone 
else. On occasions, remarkable loyalty to the defeated 
Europeans was shown. In spite of the assumption that 
the missionaries had failed to share the secret of the 
access to cargo, when those missionaries who had stayed 
in Madang were rounded up and put on Kränget Island, 
they were fed by the locals until they were shipped to 
the west (Mennis 1980:93). Conversely, in the battle 
for Shaggy Ridge, it has been suggested that some 
villagers fought for the Japanese by pretending to be 
members of the Papuan Infantry Battalion, while the 
people of the Ramu valley maintained a position 
consistent with their pre-war attitude and were hostile 
to everyone, Japanese and Allies alike (Inglis 
1969:519).
Probably, however, the general attitude of the 
people of the Madang district towards the mayhem which 
surrounded them in the period of the Second World War, 
can best be summed up by a Tangu from the Bogia area 
who said:
You see, we do not understand. We are
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just in the middle. First the Germans
came--and the Australians pushed them
out. Then the Japanese pushed out the 
Australians. Later, the Australians and 
the Americans forced the Japanese to go. 
It is beyond us. We can do nothing.
When a kiap tells us to carry 
his baggage we had to obey. When 
a German told us to carry his 
baggage we had to obey. When a 
Japanese told us to carry his baggage 
we had to do it. If we did not we 
might be killed. All right, there it 
is...that's life (Burridge 1960:12).
The government anthropologist had noted as early as 
1932 that:
The condition in some parts of New 
Guinea to-day is that of people who 
have been abruptly thrown into the 
melting pot of changing events without 
adequate assistance to adjust 
themselves (Chinnery, cited in TNG 
Report 1932-33:158).
But while the government antropologist might be 
sympathetic to the plight of the villagers, the 
administration had neither the funds or the will to 
provide that assistance which could change the
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Situation. It is therefore, hardly surprising that 
there should have been a reaction by the people of the 
Madang district to the frustrating and bewildering 
situation in which they found themselves. In the 
absence of a satisfactory solution to the problem, not 
even the war in the Pacific could induce the people of 
the Madang district to give up their belief in the 
cargo movements.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE RISE AND FALL OF YALI
In the immediate post-war period, the Australians 
found themselves not simply trying to rebuild Madang 
town and its environs after the destruction of the war 
in the Pacific, but also trying to combat the cargo 
cults which continued to flourish throughout the 
district. In their campaign they enlisted the support 
of Yali, a Madang war hero. Misunderstandings on both 
sides, however brought the alliance to grief, with 
devastating consequences for Yali.
When the Allies returned to Madang in early 1944, 
they found the town and the surrounding villages had 
been completely destroyed. Initially, the Madang 
people were as fearful of the Australians as they had 
been of the Japanese, and with some justification. The 
actions of some of the ANGAU (Australian New Guinea 
Administrative Unit) personnel could be very harsh. The 
Bilia people were removed from their island to make way 
for an Allied hospital (Mennis 1980:87). People who 
were thought to have collaborated with the Japanese 
were dealt with severely. The Riwo luluai was gaoled 
for six months for his actions (Mennis 1980:5), as was 
Kaut, the pro-Japanese cargo leader (Lawrence 
1964:110). Even those who had worked with the 
Australians were not immune to this tyrannical
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behaviour for six New Guinean soldiers were gaoled for 
periods varying from a month to a year for causing 
trouble in Madang Town, in spite of the fact that they 
had been fighting with the Allies for more than two 
years (De'Ath 1982:4). Indeed, many local people fled 
into the bush to avoid the brutality of the 
Australians. However, some Madangs found that other 
Australian soldiers were friendly and guite prepared to 
share their food with the locals until their gardens 
revived (Mennis 1980:93), while other Madangs overcame 
their initial fears to the extent that they were 
prepared to work for ANGAU ( Mennis 1981:64).
In late 1944, a curious incident occurred in 
the Bagasin area which was to have important 
ramifications in the administration of post-war 
Madang. The Bagasin area had been a pro-Japanese 
region and had remained so, even after the Japanese 
withdrawal and the Allies did not occupy the area. The 
luluai of Sekwari village, a former policeman named 
Kaum, had been the leading local collaborator and when 
the Japanese left he gathered the people together and 
held seances and offered prayers to the deities. Gifts 
of food were left in the cemeteries for the ancestors 
(Lawrence 1955:9). Kaum them collected the weapons 
which the Japanese had left behind and organized some 
fifteen hundred to two thousand people into a camp, 
which he surrounded with a palisade. Those who did not 
have Japanese weapons, he eguipped with wooden rifles,
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which Kaum declared would be replaced with real guns by 
the deities, after which the Japanese would return and 
defeat the Allies. In preparation for this event, the 
people were drilled by him into a small army unit. The 
end of the rebellion came in November, when a 
contingent of native police and European soldiers, led 
by Captain Blood, attacked and defeated Kaum at his 
fort. Kaum was arrested and sentenced to nine months 
gaol (Lawrence 1964:112-114).
The actions of Kaum had quasi-Christian overtones; 
indeed, Kaum called himself Jesus Christ and there were 
prayer meetings, while the movement had links with the 
Letub singsing (ibid:113). But the administration could 
hardly argue that this cargo activity was simply a 
reaction against the missionaries and ignore its 
existence, as it had in the pre-war years, because the 
Bagasin Rebellion, being pro-Japanese, was clearly 
directed against the Australian administraion. Thus, it 
was evident that a way had to be found to counteract 
the movement.
In January 1946, the new civil administration 
replaced ANGAU and a far more liberal policy towards 
the people of New Guinea was instituted. This change 
in direction was not simply attributable to Australia's 
trustee obligations imposed by the Trustee Council of 
the United Nations; it also reflected a new awareness 
among Australians themselves of their role in New 
Guinea. For while the war had exposed New Guineans to
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a different sort of Australian, ordinary soldiers who 
treated them almost as equals, large numbers of 
Australians, too, were exposed to New Guineans for the 
first time. There was a feeling among many Australians 
that the 'fuzzy wuzzy angels' should be rewarded for 
their contribution to the war effort and many grand 
schemes were formulated which were designed to turn the 
New Guineans into educated people, who could become 
reasonably paid workers, or producers of cash crops, 
businessmen and participants in government (Burridge 
1960:22 ) .
The town of Madang had to be rebuilt. Much of 
this was done by importing American quonset huts from 
Manus Island, which would otherwise have been sold to 
the Chinese for scrap metal (McCarthy 
1963:226). Indeed, there seemed to have been a 
prodigious waste of residual war materials and the 
administration had difficulties for many years 
obtaining equipment for rebuilding. However, of more 
immediate importance to the administration in Madang 
were the difficulties posed by the continued outbreaks 
of cult movements.
In late 1945, another cult started in the Dumpu 
area led by an ex-Lutheran-mission-teacher called Pales 
or Paulus, who had been a batman for an Australian 
officer during the war. He told the villagers that they 
should pray to God and to the deities for cargo and 
that they should make offerings to their ancestors in
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the cemeteries. He also advocated sexual promiscuity- 
on the grounds that God had previously withheld cargo 
from the people because they were always guarrelling 
over adultery. Promiscuity would remove this problem 
since the people would live in harmony and hence God 
would supply the cargo. From Dumpu, the movement 
spread to Bogajim and down the Rai coast to reach 
Saidor by early 1946 (Lawrence 1955:9).
Although there were now administrative staff in 
Madang who had served in New Guinea before the war,
J.K. McCarthy and Harold Woodman to name two, their 
knowledge of cargo cults was limited, mainly because 
they had seen them as a problem for the missions rather 
than a problem for the administration. Thus, their 
solution to the disturbances was unimaginative and they 
reverted to the old colonial idea of trying to find a 
suitable native leader to disseminate the ideas of the 
Administration on its behalf. The leader it selected 
was Yali, who was to become possibly the most 
nationally famous of all Madangs.
Yali was born in the hinterland of the Rai coast, 
which he left in 1928, while guite young, to work as an 
indentured servant in Wau. In 1931 he returned to his 
village of Sor to become a tultul. He often accompanied 
government officers on their patrols, including 
Nurton's ill-fated one of 1936. In 1937, after the 
death of his wife, Yali joined the police force and was 
sent to Rabaul. He was stationed in Lae at the
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outbreak of war in 1939, where there seems to have been 
a lot of talk among the police boys that when the 
Australians were defeated the new masters would reveal 
the secret of cargo. Late in 1941 Yali was posted to 
Madang and was part of the party which was sent to 
Karkar to put down the Kukurak cult. He was then sent 
to Lae until it was occupied in February 1942; however, 
instead of deserting, as many of the other native 
police did, Yali stayed to help evacuate Madang and Rai 
coast workers to their homes before he joined the 
coast watchers, serving in Talasea and on the Rai 
coast. From here he was sent to Port Moresby, 
promoted to sergeant of police and to Queensland to be 
trained in jungle warfare. In Queensland he was highly 
impressed by the Australian way of life, and thought 
his own was poor by comparison. He was also extremely 
impressed by the extravagant promises made by members 
of the Australian Services of the rewards which would 
be given to New Guineans in return for their war 
efforts. After his sojourn in Australia, he was 
returned to coast watching along the Morobe coast until 
he was again sent south to Queensland for futher 
training and promotion to sergeant-major (Lawrence 
1964:117-124). Yali was then made part of a 
reconnaissance party which landed in Tanamerah Bay 
prior to the Allied landing in Hollandia in March 
1944. The party was discovered by the Japanese and 
five of the eleven in the party were killed. Yali,
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however, was able to return to the Australian line at 
Aitape, a journey of one hundred and twenty miles 
through Japanese held territory. The Australians were 
highly impressed with Yali's heroic actions to the 
extent that it was declared that 'Yali can have a place 
in any party where danger is to be faced and courage 
and resource are gualifications' (Feldt 1991:373).
After his Hollandia adventure, Yali was again sent 
south to Brisbane and Sydney for another six months.
He returned to Madang where he spent a month on leave 
in his village before being sent to Morobe, serving 
there until he was demobilized in late 1945 (Lawrence 
1964 : 126) .
While he was home on leave, Yali had been dismayed 
to find that the area was rife with pro-Japanese 
sentiment. He believed that if this attitude were 
maintained, the promises which had been made to him in 
Brisbane regarding the rewards which would be 
forthcoming for helping Australia during the war would 
be be denied these villagers. Yali, therefore, told 
the villagers about his experiences in Brisbane and 
repeated the extravagant promises which had been made 
to him there. He said that the Australians were going 
to reward those people who had fought against the 
Japanese with good houses, boats, vehicles, clothes and 
food. Unfortunately, because the area had extensive 
cargo beliefs, Yali's pronouncements were taken to mean 
that he had discovered the secret to the access to
Ill-
cargo (ibid;134). The administration had no idea that 
Yali's words would be thus interpreted, so when Yali 
returned to the Rai coast in late 1945, wanting to 
promote the Australian cause in that region, the 
District Officer was pleased to allow him to continue 
thinking that a local voice was needed to counteract 
the continuing pro-Japanese sentiment in the area 
(ibid:137). The Catholic mission, however, was 
initially less enthusiastic about Yali's actions 
suspecting that they might well be connected to the 
Letub movement (ibid:138)
When Yali returned to the Rai coast, he began a 
movement which was to became known as the Rai coast 
Rehabilitation Scheme. His aim was to build large 
villages modelled on the neat and tidy towns which he 
had seen in Queensland. Houses were to be built in 
straight lines. Latrines were to be dug, streets were 
to be kept clean and shrubs and flowers were to be 
planted. Pigs were to be kept in a proper place 
outside the village.
Yali's initial effort occured at at Sangpat, where 
he created a model village on the beach. The local 
Lutheran congregations guickly became involved in his 
work and the church elders became his secretaries and 
advisers. Return soldiers were appointed as 'boss boys' 
whose function was to supervise work in the village 
(Lawrence 1955:10). The villagers themselves were to 
maintain personal cleanliness and lead orderly lives,
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for Yali claimed that the Australians would not be 
friendly with them until they had achieved these things 
(Lawrence 1964:143). So successful did Yali's effort 
appear, that by late 1946 the administration was 
pleased with his work. It was thought that because 
Yali had travelled to Australia and had seen its 
civilization, he understood the uselessness of cargo 
cults to achieve material wealth, consequently, his 
efforts in the Rai coast Rehabilitation Scheme were 
officially supported (McCarthy 1963:225). Indeed, the 
Patrol Officer at Saidor thought that 'Yali's word has 
not begn a hindsrance in the area and it was good 
advice which blended very much with the Kiap's way of 
government' (Pacific Islands Monthly, Sept., 1950:45).
However, the administration's view of Yali was 
unrealistic. On the surface, Yali appeared to be a 
clean, well-groomed, loyal war hero. He got on well 
with Europeans and because he had travelled to 
Australia it was assumed that Yali understood the ways 
of the Australians. But there were problems associated 
with Yali's understanding of the Australian way of 
life; Peter Lawrence himself confessed that he had 
originally credited Yali with greater perception than 
was it was realistic to assume (Lawrence
1964:127). Yali was, after all, uneducated, illiterate 
and actually had a very shallow understanding of 
European concepts--which is hardly surprising since he 
spoke only tokpisin, and so could hardly have asked
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probing questions of Australians while he was in their 
country. Indeed, it would appear that Yali's 
interpretation of his observations in Australia were 
heavily reliant on discussion with other other New 
Guinean soldiers. While it is probably true that at 
this point Yali did not believe in cargo cultism, he 
did believe that the war-time propaganda pedalled by 
the Australians would literally come to pass and that 
great material rewards would be given to New Guineans. 
The fact that Yali spoke only in tokpisin to his own 
people, probably increased the chances of 
misinterpretation. It is hardly surprising, therefore, 
that Yali's pronouncements as to the coming of a better 
way of life should be interpreted as cargo 
doctrine (ibid:127).
Unknown to the administration, stories about Yali 
quickly circulated along the Rai coast and as far away 
as Madang Town. It was claimed that Yali was the new 
Messiah who would arrange for the delivery of cargo.
It was even claimed that he had been killed by the 
Japanese and gone to heaven, where he had been promised 
cargo (ibid;136). Leaders of the Letub cult visited 
Yali and showed him the paraphernalia of their cult. 
Yali was non-committal but by not refuting the cult 
leaders he further fuelled the rumours about himself. 
Other cult leaders, predominantly former Lutheran 
mission teachers from the Rai coast, attached 
themselves to Yali and persuaded him that there was
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little difference between their programmes and his, 
since they were both trying to improve the villager's 
standard of living. Whether or not Yali believed the 
cargo leaders at this stage is open to debate. Indeed 
in 1955 Lawrence thought that Yali had accepted their 
ideas, but by 1964 he reassessed his opinion and 
thought that at the end of 1946 Yali was simply a 
foolish bystander at the cargo rituals (Lawrence 
1955:10; Lawrence 1964:149). Nevertheless, Letub men, 
Pales of Dumpu and Kaum asserted that Yali was their 
leader and that their authority derived from him.
Unaware of the close connection Yali had with the 
cargo leaders of southern Madang, the administration was 
well pleased with the Rehabilitation Scheme and asked 
Yali to take his message to the Bogia area, which was 
still pro-Japanese in outlook. On his way to Bogia, 
Yali visited Alexishafen where he was interviewed by 
the acting bishop. He was told that the Catholic 
Church could only support his programme if Yali 
advocated monogamy and without this support the Church 
would actively oppose him (Lawrence 1964:151).
Yali brought his message to Bogia. Ex-soldiers 
were appointed as boss boys to carry out his work. 
Monogamy was enforced, often with unfortunate results 
and there were several instances of suicide. Faced with 
this misfortune, the administration made Yali revoke 
his instructions in this regard. Yali resented the 
poor advice which he had been given by the Church and
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from that point he refused to support it and its 
teachings (ibid:153). In spite of these problems, Yali 
made a huge impression of the people of the region.
The Tangu of the Bogia hinterland thought that Yali was 
unlike any other man they had ever meet. They were so 
impressed by his words that they did as Yali suggested 
and immediately began to combine their small hamlets 
into larger villages, a move which they had persisently 
refused to countenance when asked to do so by the 
administration. They also began to build paths so that 
they had easier access to the coastal region. Such an 
abrupt change in thinking is evidence of the power of 
Yali's charismatic personality. But it is also clear 
that the Tangu associated him with the cargo movement 
(Burridge 1960:137).
Yali's rehabilitation scheme continued apace, but 
the administration, although still interested in the 
scheme, failed to lia/se closely with Yali and 
misunderstandings continued to undermine its outcome. 
For example, the administration had decided that the 
old luluais and tultuls should be replaced with a 
village council. When Yali installed his ex-soldiers 
as boss boys in villages he assumed that they would be 
replacing the soon-to-become-obsolete village 
officials. But these appointees were responsible only 
to Yali and not to the administration. Yali also tried 
to set up schemes to encourage economic progress in the 
region, but they tended to be disorganized because they
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had no proper support or supervision from the 
administration and most of them failed ignominiously 
(Lawrence 1964:157).
In mid-1947, the administration decided that Yali 
and some other prominent native leaders should be sent 
to Port Moresby to discuss plans for the long-range 
development of the country. Yali, however, assumed 
that the visit had been organized to honour those 
promises which had been made to him in Brisbane. He 
thought that his efforts on behalf of the 
administration, would now see him rewarded by being 
made a patrol officer, thus gaining eguality with the 
Europeans. Yali also hoped that the journey to Port 
Moresby would enable him to have the authority of the 
missions curtailed.
It was hardly surprising that when news of Yali's 
impending journey became known, it was thought that he 
was going to Port Moresby to secure cargo (ibid:158).
As a result of this assumption, cargo activity rapidly 
spread throughout many parts of Madang. It moved into 
the Bagasin area and the Ramu valley, where several 
ex-soldiers argued that the old village leaders should 
be replaced by boss boys who would carry out the 
reconstruction of the villages and ban polygamy.
Without these changes, it was alleged, Yali would not 
give them a share of the cargo. Pales introduced cargo 
ideas to the Dumpu area, claiming he had been sent 
there by Yali and the Lutheran church. Kaum began a
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new cult just outside Madang town when he foretold of 
an earthquake which would destroy all the Europeans and 
herald the arrival of cargo; after this occurred, Kaum 
claimed, he would become ruler of the Gogol and Bagasin 
areas while Yali would rule Madang and the Rai coast.
He spread these ideas to Saidor when he was transferred 
there with a government work team (ibid:164).
While all these events were occurring in Madang, 
Yali's journey to Port Moresby proved to be almost a 
complete failure for him. From the first it proved to 
be a disappointment, for instead of being sent to the 
capital in the manner befitting a person of consequence 
Yali and his co-travellers were not treated with 
dignity. The journey was so disorganized that although 
Yali left Madang on the 12th August he did not arrive 
in the capital until the 28th September. Here he 
discussed the development of village councils, 
education and agriculture with the administration. 
However, when he raised the issue of the rewards which 
he had been promised in Brisbane, he was told that 
those promises were not going to be upheld. He was 
told that the Australians who had made them had 
exaggerated and although Australia was prepared to 
reward the New Guinean war effort by improving health 
and education services as well as providing war damage 
compensation, these rewards would be provided gradually 
and there would be no bulk cargo (ibid:169).
Yali was personally devastated. He later told Peter
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Lawrence that 'the white men had lied to us and didn't 
want to help us. We just wouldn't get anything to get 
a better life' (Lawrence 1964:170). Further 
disappointments were in store. The administration had 
rewarded Yali for his efforts by creating the position 
of administrative overseer or foreman, with an annual 
salary of £48 a year and rations, so that he could 
continue his work against the cargo cults. However, 
while this position might have put him above other 
indigenous New Guineans, it still left him inferior to 
all Europeans in the Territory. This was a humiliating 
experience for Yali, for he realized that no matter 
what he did for the administration he would never be 
accepted by the Australians as an egual.
However, in spite of these disappointments, Yali 
did manage to curb the power of the missions in his 
area. The administration encouraged Yali to draw up a 
set of laws which would define the relationship between 
the old and the new societies. Issues such as marriage 
rites, land rights, funeral ceremonies, betrothal 
customs, drinking, sorcery and village councils were 
covered. The main purpose of these, as far as Yali was 
concerned, was to reduce the powers of the missions; 
this he achieved by stating guite clearly the rights of 
villager and the limitations of the administration in 
relation to polygamy and paganism. While it can be 
argued that Yali's knowledge of tribal custom was not 
sufficient to draw up laws relating to native
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custom without coming into collision with tribal elders 
and that the 'laws' had no legal basis at all 
(ibid:173)/ the laws did enable Yali to begin a pagan 
revival which had the support of the administration, 
and the missions were powerless to interfere with it.
The administration was so pleased with their 
relationship with Yali that they asked him to address 
the Madang people on his return from Port Moresby and a 
large function was arranged on Bilia Island so that he 
could be heard (Pacific Islands Monthly, May, 1950:35). 
People came from Madang, the Rai coast and the Bagasin 
area, while the European communty was represented by 
the leaders of the administration, the church and 
commerce. In his speech, Yali denounced cargo cults and 
told the people that the way to buy the goods they 
wanted was by earning money (Lawrence 1964:184). Yali 
made a similar speech in Saidor but there he also told 
those assembled, including the local Lutheran pastor 
and the Catholic priest, that the Administrator had 
told Yali that the people had the right to perform 
their traditional ceremonies and the missions did not 
have the authority to prevent it (ibid:186).
Back in his own village of Sor, Yali told his 
people what had really happened in Port Moresby and 
said that it was clear that the Europeans had lied to 
them and, in reality, they wanted the New Guineans to remain 
as villagers. Yali said that they had been tricked by 
the church into giving up their traditional rites and
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accepting Christianity because the missions had no 
intention of sharing their wealth with the villagers. 
Yali was finished with the missions, and to prove his 
point he took two more wives (ibid :188).
In spite of his continued public denunciation of 
cargo cults, the major cult leaders still tried to 
attract Yali to their cause. Pales visited Yali but 
they had a major falling out over the question of 
promiscuity. Yali also refused to be influenced by 
Kaum. However, another cargo leader, called Gurek, 
did begin to have an effect on Yali. Gurek came form 
Sek and so was involved in the Letub cult. He was able 
to modify the ideas of this cult to such an extent that 
he was able to persuade Yali that the cargo secret was 
the right of every Madang villager and was not reliant 
on European knowledge. Yali accepted this view and the 
modified Letub cult was fused with his own traditional 
cermonies to become a new cult (ibid : 195 ) .
Thus Yali became a cult leader. The 
Rehabilitation Scheme had now become pointless since 
the Australians had repudiated their war-time promises; 
hence Yali had to find another way to deliver the 
material goods he thought the villagers deserved. This 
time he would acquire them without any recourse to 
Europeans.
Under Yali's leadership the cult spread quickly 
through out the Madang area. The Rai coast, Bogia, 
central Madang, the Bagasin area and the Ramu valley
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were all affected (ibid:196). Kaum was now greeted as 
a friend, while some missionaries were treated with 
hostility. Not all areas accepted Yali's cult. Biliau 
and other neighbouring villages to the west of Saidor 
refused to embrace his idea* because they thought that 
they would retain greater influence with the 
administration if they declined. At Amele, the 
paramount chief, Gulu, exerted considerable influence 
over several neighbouring villages and because he 
supported the administration was able to halt the 
Yali's influence in his immediate vicinity (ibid:201 ) . 
Kaum attached himself to Yali's rising star, claiming 
to have egual status, but his own people of the Bagasin 
area were not impressed with his claims and threatened 
to report him to the administration if he persisted 
(ibid:203). On Manam Island there was ambivalence. On 
the one hand Yali's ideas influenced the islanders, but 
on the other, they refused to accept any leadership 
from outside (Burridge 1960:140). Thus, although there 
were reports of cargoism, it did not develop to the 
extent that it did in other regions (Pacific Islands 
Monthly, May, 1950:85). Despite these exceptions,
Yali's cargo teachings were widespread, and they 
occurred virtually without the knowledge of the 
administration. The villagers were very secretive 
about their activities and although the missions 
complained about Yali's teachings, administrative 
officers had no way of deciding whether they had a
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cargo or a pagan basis. Thus Yali was able to 
continue with his administrative work at Saidor and was 
allowed to make patrols into the hinterland to spread 
administration propaganda. But these patrols became 
increasingly brutal and Yali became very abusive 
towards pro-mission villagers and mission helpers.
Women were ill-treated by other members of the patrol 
and the patience of the administration began to wear 
out. While there was no outright violence against 
Europeans by the cargoists, there was a general 
feeling of unease among Europeans in the Madang area.
This unease may have reflected the changing times 
in general rather than the specific actions in Madang. 
Many Europeans felt that too many changes had 
occurred too rapidly in New Guinea since the end to the 
war. Sweeping changes to the labour laws had been made 
by the Australian Labor Government. External 
Territories Minister, Eddie Ward's policies had 
abolished the indenture system in 1947 and the 
administration now determined the number of villagers 
who could be employed, rather than the professional 
recruiter. Both working hours and the length of 
contracts had been reduced. Furthermore, breaches of 
contract were no longer be held to be criminal 
offences but were deemed to be misdemeanours which 
could be punished only by a fine. Local workers were 
even entitled to workers compensation (Mair 1948:208)
Such reforms may have impressed the ILO, but most
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planters saw them as leading to their ruination. One 
planter declared in the Pacific Islands Monthly that:
I am more firmly convinced than ever that 
you can have no well-controlled and 
efficient labour service here unless you can 
find a way of punishing these lads for 
labour breaches, either through their 
stomachs or their hides. The new ordinances 
provision for punishment is fatal to the 
whole thing (Pacific Islands Monthly,
October, 1950:13).
When the disruption of the labour supply in Madang 
coincided with the new ordinances, it appeared to 
plantation owners that the decline of their power was 
truly underway. Believing that Yali was behind the 
problem, they vehemently complained to the 
administration and demanded that something be done to 
do something about his influence (Pacific Islands 
Monthly, May, 1950:33).
However, it was the missions which brought about 
his downfall. It is little wonder that Yali had 
incurred their enmity, since his activities had clearly 
begun to undermine their authority. The Lutheran 
mission began to build a case against Yali.
Disaffected villagers told of his heavy-handed justice, 
including one incident in which Yali overstepped his 
judicial powers by illegally detaining four people.
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Yali was also accused inciting the rape of a woman 
(Lawrence 1964:218). The mission published an article 
which strongly criticised Yali's activities, accusing 
him of leading cargo cult activities and destroying the 
work of the mission. The administration initially 
backed Yali against these claims, but when the mission 
was able to provide evidence of the irregular nature of 
Yali's actions, the administration was forced to arrest 
him and bring him to trial. It was unfortunate that by 
the time of his trial those members of the 
administration who had been his staunchest supporters, 
such as J.K.McCarthy and the Saidor District Officer, 
Prowse, were no longer in Madang, and without their 
support little was done to try to understand Yali's 
point of view (J.K McCarthy in ibid:vii). Indeed, the 
extremely harsh sentence of six years imprisonment 
which was imposed on Yali was clearly designed to 
assure the Europeans in Madang as well as the rest of 
the country that the time had not yet come when the 
interests of the villager would outweigh theirs.
As disturbing as the Yali's activities had been for 
the Europeans in Madang, labelling them part of an 
anti-white movement (Worsley 1957:255) was to 
misinterpret the situation. In effect, Yali's 
activities had been an eguivalence movement. Far from 
wanting to overthrow the Europeans, Yali had wanted to 
share in their wealth and be accorded eguivalent 
status. But such an ambition was highly likely to fail.
125 .
First, the administration, although recognizing his 
outstanding leadership qualities saw Yali, basically, 
as a functionary who could spread administrative 
propaganda. Yali might have been considered a superior 
native, but that was all he was thought to be.
Moreover, because the administration was prepared to 
use Yali for its own purposes, it failed to inquire too 
deeply, if at all, into Yali's own beliefs and 
aspirations. Thus the relations between Yali and the 
administration were based on a misunderstanding from 
the beginning. Secondly, while the missions, too, were 
prepared to use Yali to promote their propaganda, when 
Yali began to question the attitude of the church 
towards himself and the beliefs of his people and 
skillfully to manipulate the administration to support 
his position, the mission had to muster its forces 
agoinst him in order to maintain its influence with the 
Madangs. Thirdly, the powerful plantation owners, who 
had been made very nervous by labour reforms, saw Yali 
as a force who would undermine their profits. In the 
end all three groups were opposed Yali because all 
three groups felt threatened by a New Guinean who 
tried to assert himself. In 1950, local leadership 
still had to be controlled by the colonists.
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CHAPTER SIX
CASH CROPPING AND THE RICE FIASCO
It was generally assumed in the 1950s and 1960s 
that the modernization of colonies and the rise of 
nationalism would occur as the per capita income of 
those colonized increased (Howlett 1973:249). The 
initial stage of this evolution would be achieved by 
the planting of cash crops which would create a 
peasant class. This class, unlike the pre-existing 
self-contained tribal society, could then be 
incorporated into the wider society. Such a stage, 
it was assumed, would only be a transitional one; 
democratic and economic development would occur until 
a modernized state eventually evolved (ibid:252).
This idea was embraced by the Australian 
administration and the 1950s saw the beginning of 
economic and political innovations in the Territory. 
The production of cash crops was actively 
encouraged. In Madang, it was assumed that such a 
policy would also help to undermine the influence of 
the cargo cults, which, even after the imprisonment 
of Yali, still posed a major problem for the 
Administration. It was hoped that economic 
development would counter the claims of the cargoists 
by allowing the local people the chance of acguiring 
the goods they wanted by participating in the
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European economic system. However, many of the 
schemes which were introduced into the Madang 
district failed because they were too simplistic and 
uncoordinated and ignored the complexity of New 
Guinean society; moreover, their goals were at cross 
purposes with the ambitions of the local people.
A three-part policy was formulated to stimulate 
indigenous economic development in the Madang 
region: the production of cash crops, particularly
rice would be encouraged; simple cooperatives would 
be set up to enable people to run their own economic 
affairs; and roads would be built to allow easier 
access to markets (Hancock 1955:46).
The administration was very enthusiastic about 
the development of rice as a cash crop for the north 
coast. Ever since the arrival of the Europeans, New 
Guineans had shown a preference for rice; by 1950 
the expense of importing it had become quite 
significant. Thus the idea of developing an 
indigenous rice industry was appealing. Rice, it was 
thought, had several advantages for the villagers 
over the usual indigenous crops; it was more 
nutritious, had a relatively small bulk, stored well 
and had a short cooking time. Moreover, not only 
would rice supplement the local diet, but the surplus 
could be sold to provide villagers with an income. 
The advocates of rice as a cash crop produced some 
extremely optimistic financial projections. It was
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estimated that by 1960 135,000 growers in the Madang 
and Sepik districts would produce an annual yield of 
4,000 tons, with as much as 2,300 tons being sold to 
provide an income for the villagers (ibid:52).
The Madang area, it was thought, was particularly 
suited to rice growing because it contained the two 
fertile river flats of the Ramu and the Gogol; 
however, it was conceded that dry rice growing should 
be introduced before extensive paddy growing was 
developed. To this end the agricultural station at 
Madang experimented with several types of rice before 
it found four varieties which would be suitable for 
the area. The seeds from these varieties were 
distributed among the villagers (ibid:48 ) .
Some of the local people, such as Gulu, the 
paramount luluai of the Amele region, embraced the 
venture with enthusiasm. Gulu had been a staunch 
supporter of the administration for a long time and 
had cooperated with the Lutheran mission, sending his 
sons to their training schools (ibid:47). It can be 
argued that his support for the administration's 
programme was in his own self interest, since it 
would enhance his status both with the administration 
and with his villagers; nevertheless, his position as 
paramount luluai and his ability to halt the 
influence of cargoism in his own area indicted that 
he was already a person of stature within the Amele 
community, so it is likely that he believed that the
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development of rice production in his area would be 
of genuine benefit to his people. Gulu made sure 
that the roads from the villages were well maintained 
so that there would be easy access to the markets of 
Madang. Of greater significance, however, was the 
fact that he was able to persuade the Department of 
Agriculture to provide a power mill to enable the 
villagers to hull their own rice. To be able to keep 
proper records of the use of the rice huller, the 
Department helped the Amele people form a rural 
progress society. Gulu was made its first president.
Rural progress societies soon became very 
popular. Administration officers encouraged 
villagers to begin planting rice and within four 
years of Gulu acquiring his rice huller, ten more 
village groups in the district had formed rural 
progress associations and purchased rice hullers 
(ibid:48). The administration regarded the rural 
progress societies as good training ground for the 
local people who could now be taught to look after 
their own economic affairs and, in anticipation of 
further educational and economic progress, the native 
Economic Development Ordinance was passed in 1952. 
This ordinance was designed to allow the rural 
progress societies to be re-organized to form 
cooperatives which would become 'schools of 
citizenship' (McAuley 1952:502). Accounting methods 
were to be kept very simple. With the help of
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government officers records were to be made of 
initial subscriptions, which were usually raised 
from war compensation payments, while records of the 
cost of rice production and its transportation to 
market were also expected to be maintained (Hancock 
1955:49).
Initially, some of the societies did very well.
By 1954, Amele had acquired, in addition to its 
huller, a tractor, trailer, disc plough, tiller and 
seed drill, as well as setting up a trade store.
£2,738.18s.8p had been paid out to the producers. In 
the same year, the Bogia RPS had acquired a diesel 
engine and a mill, as had the Uligan RPS (ibid :49; 
Madang Agricultural Station Report 1953-54).
The third part of the administration's economic 
policy in the Madang district involved the 
development of the road system. In 1950 a visiting 
United Nations mission thought that it was impossible 
to :
conceive of any permanent or steady 
progress, economic and social as well as 
political, if the various centres and the 
different areas of the Territory are not 
linked together and if a system of main 
roads with which local communications 
could be gradually connected, does not 
break the isolation of the inland 
communities, groups and villages (Hancock 
1955:46) .
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This situation was thought to be particularly 
applicable to Madang as the existing roads had been 
badly damaged and road building projects were 
initiated which would facilitate the transportation 
of rice and other cash crops to market as well as 
opening up land for European enterprises such as 
cattle production. The construction of two major 
roads was made a priority. One road was to follow 
the north coast as far as Awar near the Ramu River, 
while the other went inland to Gusap to open up the 
Gogol and upper Ramu valleys (ibid:50).
Enthusiasm helped to overcome many of the 
problems associated with road building in the 
region. Virgin forest had to be cleared. Roads had 
to be constructed which took into account the high 
rainfall and the unstable geological nature of the 
area. Equipment for the projects was poor— there 
were no bulldozers and only three old trucks were 
available to build nearly three hundred miles of 
road; even axes and shovels were in short supply and 
planters and missionaries had to contribute equipment 
to the projects. There was no overseeing engineer. 
However, there was no shortage of labour with usually 
about two hundred villagers working at any one time 
on the roads (ibid:50). It was estimated by that by 
the time the north coast road reached Dylup, about 
ten thousand people had been employed on its 
construction (McAlpine, Patrol Report, Madang No. 2,
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1954-55). Road construction often incorporated 
pre-war tracks, as well as using roads which had been 
built by the Japanese and the Allies. The major 
problem facing the road builders was their inability 
to provide effective river crossings. Army pontoons 
were used and a bailey bridges were salvaged from 
army dumps in a effort to complete the north coast 
road, but it was not completed as an all-weather road 
in either the 1950s or 1960s and most produce in that 
period still found its way to market by boat rather 
than by road. Nor was the construction of the Dumpu 
road satisfactory and the road remained subject to 
road slippage and landslides.
As the administration found with the road 
building efforts, when it came to rice growing and 
rural progress associations, enthusiasm alone was 
unable to solve the problems which developed. The 
villagers encountered numerous difficulties, 
freguently brought about by lack of 
administrative coordination in implementing the 
projects. Patrol officers encouraged villagers to 
grow rice before roads were built to take the rice to 
market and rice hullers were often many miles from 
the villages which they were supposed to serve. The 
Garia, in the Bagasin area, had to carry their rice 
thirty of forty miles before it could be milled 
(Lawrence 1953:570).
Literacy, or rather lack of it, also created
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problems for the implementation of the 
administration's economic plans. The war had 
completely interrupted education in the region and it 
had not yet been seriously recommenced, so there were 
not enough literate villagers to keep
financial records which the administration considered 
adequate. Villages had to share expertise and even 
those few who were literate had seriously limited 
abilities. Lawrence cited the example of one RPS 
secretary who only agreed to take on the job if funds 
did not exceed £100, as he could count no higher. In 
another instance, three villages, which had hired a 
mill from the Department of Agriculture for £15, were 
unable to work out the cost to each village 
(ibid:570).
Labour also posed a problem for the rice planting 
projects. In many areas of Madang men still left the 
villages in large numbers to seek work in towns and 
on plantations. In Rao village, in the southeast of 
the region, for example, 303 men were away at work, 
leaving only 304 men in the village. This was not 
enough to carry out normal village activities, let 
alone plant rice and build roads as well 
(Jensen-Muir, Patrol Report, Madang No.10, 1953-54).
Similar figures indicated that this problem was 
widespread. In the Umum/Fulumu group of villages, to 
the northwest of the Amele region, 59 percent of 
able-bodied men were away from their villages in outside
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employment (Johnson, Patrol Report, Madang No.8, 
1953-54), while in the Garia area, just on 50 percent 
of men were absent from their villages (Johnson,
Patrol Report, Madang No.12, 1954-55). In the 
Josephstaal/Atemble area, it was found that although 
only 24.3 per cent of men were away in paid 
employment, 36.8 per cent were being used for road 
works (Griffin, Madang Report, Madang No.2,
1953-54). It was thought, by supporters of the 
scheme, that these labour problems would be overcome 
as the RPS grew more affluent and could purchase 
machinery such as tractors, which could do the work 
of those men who had left the village (Hancock 
1955:51). This, it can be argued, was somewhat 
unrealistic, for the societies needed to grow rice 
guickly to obtain the machines before the villagers 
lost interest in the projects and this was very 
difficult because of the shortage of labour.
Lack of coordination between the administration 
and missionaries also produced unwanted tensions.
When the Lutheran mission installed a rice huller at 
their mission at Bagasin, it created several serious 
problems for the villagers in the area. Some 
villagers had worked for four years for the Amele RPS 
to earn money for a huller of their own but had not 
yet acquired one because the Department of 
Agriculture had thought that the roads to the village 
were still inadequate. Thus, when the Lutherans 
moved in with a huller, it was thought that such an
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action presented an unfair advantage to those who had 
been idle. Moreover, the money which had been 
donated by the villagers and held by the village 
elders to be used by the Amele RPS for rice hulling 
was now given to the mission. The mission also 
received a percentage of the rice hulled to pay for 
fuel, which meant that no rice was sold outside the 
area. So much discord was produced by these changes 
that several of the villages split up (Johnson,
Patrol Report Madang No. 7, 1954-55).
However, the main difficulty for the 
administration in promoting and sustaining interest 
in the rice growing projects was that their policy 
was at cross purposes with the aims of the 
villagers. The administration assumed that the 
villagers would grow rice so that they could acguire 
consumer goods, such as laplaps, tinned fish and 
tools. The Australians also thought that the wealth 
which accrued from the rice crop surpluses together 
with the hard work which was needed to plant the rice 
and build the roads would divert the villagers' 
interest in cargo cults (De'Ath 1981a:32). The 
villagers, however, grew rice because they thought 
that by doing so they would be able to achieve 
eguivalence with the Europeans and have the same 
wealth and power as the colonizers (Denoon 1981:118).
It is, therefore, hardly surprising that a scheme, 
imposed from the top and based on so many false 
assumptions on both sides, was doomed to failure.
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Patrol officers in the Madang area viewed the 
establishment of rural progress societies as being in 
the vanguard of the war against cargo cults and so 
were continually extolling to the villagers the 
virtues of growing rice. However, their reports 
indicate that reactions to the rice growing scheme 
were mixed; even where there was enthusiasm, the 
administration officers frequently missed signals 
which suggested that rice growing had not replaced 
cargoist thinking, but rather complemented it.
Certainly patrol officers were vigilant in their 
hunt for overt signs of cargo activity. On the north 
coast, a villager from Dylup was sent for trial for 
saying that the Japanese would shortly return and 
enforce peace between the villages (Worchester,
Patrol Report, Madang No.M (sic) 1952-53). However, 
some officers failed to understand that the absence 
of overt cargo cult activity did not mean that 
cargoist thinking did not still exist and their false 
perceptions frequently led to reports which gave the 
erroneous impression that attitudes were radically 
changing throughout the region. One officer noted 
that in Kambu, a village in the Josephstaal area, 
earlier manifestations of cargo cult activity were no 
longer evident and efforts had been made to cultivate 
rice (Griffin, Patrol Report, Madang No.2, 1953-54).
Another officer noted that in the Bagasin area there 
was enthusiasm about road building and rice growing
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and no evidence of cargo ritual even in that former 
stronghold (Neal, Patrol Report, Madang No.16, 
1952-53). In the north coast area around Rempi, a 
patrol officer reported that there was now general 
enthusiasm for rice growing and noted that:
when it is remembered that the area was 
particularly badly affected by Yali and 
his teachings the programme is even more 
to be commended (McAlpine, Patrol Report, 
Madang, No . 2 , 1954-55).
Other officers were not so sanguine about the 
rapid decline in cargoist beliefs. At Urugina, for 
example, it was presumed by the villagers that when 
the road had been completed cargo would be sent to 
them by the administration (McAlpine, Patrol Report, 
Madang No.6, 1953-54). Near Josephstaal, a cult 
movement was started by a villager called Tanggugava, 
who told his people that it had been revealed to him 
in a dream that if certain rituals--including being 
kind to pigs, dogs and wives, washing before eating 
and exchanging rolled cigarettes--were performed, 
cargo would be sent to them from the Europeans on 
Manam Island. His cult was taken up by several 
groups around Josephstaal. After a couple of months, 
when it was evidently thought by some that the cult 
would not work, Tanggugava was reported to the police 
and several cultist were imprisoned. However, the 
cult had also spread to the west where it was taken
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up by the luluai of Gunakoko village. He told his 
people to plant the barrel of a football pump in the 
ground, plant flowers and dig holes and cargo would 
appear through the holes. Variations of this ritual, 
although without the pump, were performed in 
neighbouring villages. Like the other cult, it 
remained a secret from the Australians until it also 
was revealed by a villager. This time it was the 
wife of a police constable, who, on returning home 
saw the rituals and reported them. Police action 
followed and six were arrested, including four 
village officials. The local patrol officer, in 
spite of lecturing the villagers about the benefit of 
hard work and imprisoning the cult leaders as a 
deterrent, was pessimistic about any rapid change in 
the villagers' beliefs and thought that, until 
the native can be made to see and 
understand the manufacture and origin and 
method of acquisition of the coveted 
things of the Europeans, intermittent 
manifestations of cult activity would 
continue (Griffin, Patrol Report, Madang 
No.3, 1955-56)
Rice growing also failed because the schemes 
conflicted with the traditional village structure and 
the traditional values of the Madang people. 
Initially, in some regions, traditional land usage 
was overturned and communal gardens were set up where
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the people could work together for the general 
progress of the project (Hancock 1955:47). But these 
changes brought dilemmas to the villagers. The 
Tangu, for example, found that rice growing led to 
conflict between the traditional leaders and those 
men who supported the scheme. The best workers 
resented having to work in communal gardens for it 
undermined they own ambitions since they had to give 
up time that could be used to further their personal 
political status growing their own produce. The 
luluais, who may have understood the benefits which 
could be obtained from growing rice, created 
difficulties for themselves if they insisted on 
establishing rice projects in the face of such 
opposition. If they went to Bogia to ask for help 
from the administration, they would lose three days 
work from their own gardens; but if they made the 
sacrifice and undertook the journey, it would confirm 
to everyone that they were trying to find a short cut 
to power and thus would not gain them respect. It 
was easier and less contentious for everyone to 
ignore rice growing altogether (Burridge 1971:109).
The traditional socio-economic conditions in the 
villages certainly militated against the success of 
the administration's schemes. Rice was freguently 
grown because the administration told the village to 
do so even though the villagers might not have 
understood either the benefits which might accrue
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from growing cash crops or the need for long term 
commitment (Lawrence 1964:269). Research based on 
the results of experiments at the Madang Agricultural 
station, suggested that rice growing was, in fact, an 
impractical and poor alternative to local crops.
The rice crop on the agricultural station yielded 
2,000 lbs. per square acre, per annum. Sweet potato 
yielded 25,000 lbs per square acre in three and a 
half months (Madang Agricultural Station Report, 
1953-54). It was, always going to be difficult to 
persuade villagers to produce an alternate crop 
which was harder to plant and harvest and had a 
smaller yield than their traditional crops on the 
promise that it might accrue them wealth in the 
future. Generally, the administration was as 
unrealistic about the revolutionary effects which 
rice growing was likely to have on the ideas and 
lifestyle of the villagers as the villagers were 
about the wealth, power and prestige they would gain 
from participating in the project.
In various parts of the district, the formation 
of cooperatives and the production of cash crops 
other than rice was encouraged by the
administr% ation. On Karkar and Manam Islands, copra 
and cocoa, rather than rice, formed the basis of cash 
cropping and the subsequent rise of rural progress 
societies and cooperatives. On these islands, 
however, the flourishing projects were initiated by
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local people rather than being imposed by the 
administration.
About the same time as Gulu was beginning to mill 
rice at Amele, the paramount luluai on Karkar, Salum, 
had been responsible for the purchase of a copra 
boat. However/ when the cooperative officer arrived 
on the island he enforced its sale because of 
irregularities in its original purchase; the money 
from the boat, as well as other village savings, 
totalling about £40,000 was used to establish nine 
RPS on the island (McSwain 1977:99). By 1958, 
modernization on Karkar seemed to be progressing 
well. Membership of the societies totalled 3,000, 
two cooperative trade stores had been established, 
and cocoa bean production had been developed 
alongside copra (McSwain 1977:103). Yet five years 
later the cooperatives were in decline.
Romola McSwain suggests that the reasons for the 
decline were similar to those explaining the failure 
of cooperatives in other areas; namely, that the 
local people had unrealistic expectations of the 
cooperatives, lacked an understanding of the wider 
economic world and lacked local expertise. The 
clerks who ran the trade stores often did not 
understand the idea of profit. Goods were given away 
to relatives, or acquired on unlimited credit. Lack 
of education made it difficult for the cooperative 
directors to evaluate the efficiency of the store
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clerks, although efficiency was not always the goal 
of the directors either. When the chairman of the 
Maro cooperative tried to replace an inefficient 
store clerk, he himself was replaced. An efficient 
clerk, it would seem, undermined the prestige which 
might accrue to the directors through their largesse 
with the store's stock (ibid;101).
However, McSwain argues that it was the basic 
lack of understanding of the wider economic world 
which was the primary reason for the collapse of 
support for the cooperatives. The Karkars were 
convinced that fluctuating or low prices which they 
could receive for their copra were part of a 'plot' 
by some power, possibly the Australian administraion, 
to prevent their societies from achieving success.
It was thought that efficient European officers were 
moved to prevent their revealing the secret of their 
wealth. Moreover, the initial loss of the copra 
boat, which the Karkars could not understand, as well 
as the difficulties in establishing a cooperative 
copra drier, seemed like further evidence of this 
'plot'. Because they were convinced that the people 
behind the 'plot' were retaining the profits from the 
cooperatives, the Karkars stopped selling their crops 
to the cooperatives and began to sell them to the 
European planters and traders who gave them 
consistent prices (ibid:102).
Although the cooperatives faded away, cash crops
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continued to flourish and some local leaders became 
successful planters. According to McSwain, one of 
the attractions of developing native plantations was 
the fact that the local leaders who traded with the 
Europeans thought they could achieve social and 
material eguity with them and the development of 
such an association may well have proved a greater 
attraction for Karkar leaders than the fetes t=he 
establishment of indigenous and independent 
cooperatives (ibid:104).
The economic relationship between the European 
planters and the Karkars was mutually advantageous 
and, during the 1960s, many of the Karkars used the 
wealth they gained to acguire symbols of European 
prestige (ibid:111). The most popular symbol was the 
establishment of village trade stores. Their rapid 
proliferation (more than one hundred opened between 
1964 and 1968) provided major competition for the 
cooperative stores. However, despite the growing 
affluence of some Karkar villagers, most of them 
still relied on the Europeans on the island to help 
in the purchase of vehicles or the running of the 
trade stores, suggesting that the European economy 
was still beyond the comprehension of most of the 
islanders (ibid:117).
On Manam Island, the traditional leader, Irakau, 
had established himself as an entrepreneur. He had 
set up a plantation of more than 6,000 trees, had
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planted twenty acres of rice, and employed some fifty 
workers (Hancock 1955:51). He appeared enthusiastic 
about the modernization of his island for soon after 
he started his enterprises, Irakau organized a 
meeting of the island leaders and at this meeting he 
declared that the people of Manam should give up 
their old customs of sorcery and fighting and embrace 
the new practices which had been introduced by the 
Europeans. To re-enforce his words he announced that 
the sacred objects associated with magic were to be 
shown to the women in order to break their 
power (Lutkehaus 1990:304). However, his work 
practices disturbed European planters and he 
received no support from them. He could sell his 
copra at very competitive prices because his 
overheads were lower than those of his European 
counterparts, but it appears that he did not supply 
his workers with rations and by calling on his ties 
of kinship managed to avoid payment altogether to 
many of his workers. Because of the irregular nature 
of his enterprise, no copra boats would take his 
produce to market and no European would lend him 
money for expansion, except for the SVD mission, 
which needed his support to maintain congregation 
numbers (Burridge 1960:231-232). In spite of the 
suspicions of the European planters, the 
administration supported Irakau because it felt that 
his enterprise was an example to the community and an 
antidote to Yali's teachings.
145 .
Although many villagers continued to grow copra and 
cocoa, twenty years after Gulu acquired his rice mill 
from the Department of Agriculture, the mill had been 
reclaimed by the jungle (Allen 1981:118). The great 
rice growing scheme had failed, not only because of 
the problem of overcoming practical difficulties such 
as the lack of expertise and roads, but, mainly, 
because the administration and the villagers were 
working at cross purposes. The administration had 
wanted to initiate a peasant society and 
revolutionize New Guinean ideas, but the villagers 
grew rice to achieve equivalence with the Europeans. 
Neither aim was feasible in the short term. The 
traditional village structure and beliefs were too 
well entrenched to be overturned by such simplistic 
alternatives as rice growing and cooperatives, while 
the pace of the rice growing revolution was too slow 
for the ambitions of the Madang villagers.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE INTRODUCTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The move towards the modernization of the Territory 
in the post-war period was not just devoted to economic 
change. The administration also introduced political 
changes which, it was thought, would develop indigenous 
leadership. Policy development in these areas, 
however, was frequently inadequate and local response 
to it ranged from initial enthusiasm to apathy and 
bewilderment.
By the early 1950s, the administration was 
extremely disappointed and frustrated with the general 
inability of village officials to create progress in 
their villages. Administration records of the postwar 
period indicate that the general problems which made 
the system of appointing luluais and tultuls 
unsatisfactory at this time, were the same as those 
which had faced the various administrations since the 
beginning of colonization. In an effort to resolve 
these problems, the administration began to introduce 
local government councils. This new policy was 
initially greeted with optimism by most Madangs, but, 
their support waned when the new system did not meet 
local expectations.
The patrol reports of the immediate post-war period 
produce clear evidence that the old system of
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appointing village officials was deficient in many 
areas. In the southwest of the Madang district, for 
example, one patrol officer found that the luluais 
could not get the people to obey them. However, he 
could find no one who would be an improvement 
(McAlpine, Patrol Report, Madang No.6, 1953-54). At 
the opposite end of the district it was reported that 
the village officials could only exert their authority 
when a patrol officer was present (Johnson, Patrol 
Report, Madang No.12, 1954-55).
In some areas there was even an oversupply of 
village officials, which led to complete 
disorganization in the affected villages. In Gagaru 
village, near Bundi, a population of 970 was served by 
thirty-three village officials. Most of them were war 
time 'boss boys', who thought that they could still 
retain their authority. The administration was partly 
responsible for the confusion: some of the officials
had been appointed when the area was attached to 
Kundiawa and some had been appointed when the area had 
returned to the control of the Madang district. None 
had any idea of their duties and many thought that the 
office was hereditary, or could be purchased, or could 
be used in raising bride price (McAlpine, Patrol 
Report, Madang No.6, 1953-54). Probably no other areas
was as chaotic as this and there were actually village 
officials whose actions met with the approval of the 
Australian officers. Mangare, from a village in the
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north Ramu area, was thought to have good control of 
his village and was always cooperative with visiting 
patrols (Griffin, Patrol Report, Madang No.2, 1953-54), 
while the paramount luluai of Bogadjim had maintained 
control in his village for twenty years, although his 
influence had not extended beyond it (Healy, Patrol 
Report, Madang No.8, 1952-53).
The extension of power beyond the immediate village 
was a common difficulty for the luluais♦ When Geni, 
the luluai of Yandara, in the upper Ramu area, sought 
to take seven people from a neighbouring village to 
Madang for trial because their own luluai was absent, 
the villagers tried to take revenge on him for his 
actions. They were only prevented from doing so by the 
timely arrival of a patrol officer (McAlpine, Patrol 
Report, Madang No.6, 1953-54).
Another problem which the luluais faced, was the 
insistffnce by the administration that serious cases 
should be taken to Madang for judgment. Such a task 
meant that not only did the luluai lose time in his 
gardens, but such a judgmental and confrontational 
action could create conflict within his village. In 
some areas, when the luluai tried to exert his 
authority, the villagers packed up and left the village 
(Worchester, Patrol Report, Madang, no number,
1953-54). However, when a luluai successfully solved 
village problems by mediation and to the satisfaction 
of the villagers, the administration grumbled that its
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authority was being undermined by such action (Healy, 
Patrol Report, Madang No.8, 1952-53). In other places, 
the luluais lacked control because of the changing 
labour laws. Casual plantation workers could now be 
employed by planters, but the labourers built their 
shanty dwellings beside existing villages and the local 
luluai had no authority over these newcomers 
(Worchester, Patrol Report No. M (sic), 1952-53).
Nor were the efforts of the administration helpful 
in empowering village officials. To facilitate better 
control and make census taking easier, the 
administration resorted to the pre-war tactic of 
discouraging people from living in the bush by 
combining villages and moving them along side roads. 
This action proved to be no more successful than it had 
been in earlier times. Not only did the policy impose 
hardships on the villagers as the people lost their 
gardens or had to walk long distances to reach them, 
but thejTewere few gains to be made which offset these 
losses (ibid). Even when villages were combined, 
villagers tended to regroup themselves, making it 
difficult for the luluais to be able to exert 
authority over everyone in the new villages. Some 
disgruntled villagers left the new village altogether 
and returned to the bush (Griffin, Patrol Report,
Madang No.2, 1953-54). Although it was acknowledged
that some leaders (such as Sang from Serang near Dylup)
had influence which extended beyond their villages,
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generally few village officials were recognized by the 
administration as having outstanding leadership 
gualities (McAlpine, Patrol Report, Madang No. 2, 
1954-55).
The administration was so short of conspicuously 
successful indigenous leadership that when Irakau of 
Manan Island began his commercial enterprises it was 
happy to praise his ventures (Hancock 1955:51).
However, had it bothered to investigate his actions 
further, the administration may have been less 
enthusiastic, for Irakau certainly did not represent 
the egalitarian ideals which the administration 
preferred in its political development, but rather was 
an example of indigenous political elitism. The 
administration based its assumptions on the fact that 
Irakau had never been a village official, and thought, 
therefore, that he had come from the commoner side of 
Manam society and had achieved commercial success in 
spite of this handicap (Burridge 1960:231). Burridge, 
however, claimed that Irakau was, in fact, a Tanepoa, a 
member of the Manam ruling caste, which was why he was 
able to exploit so many Manam people and have them work 
for him for nothing (ibid:236). The administration's 
false assumption that Irakau could not have been a 
traditional leader because he had not been a luluai or 
tultul, indicated that men of status still saw no 
reason to make themselves available to the
administration.
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The outstanding exception in the administration's 
almost futile quest for suitable local leadership was 
Gulu, the paramount luluai of Amele. He continued to 
impress administration officers with his ability. In 
1953, he had organized fellow village officers to meet 
each Tuesday to solve small problems and it was thought 
that because of his work it would be possible to create 
a genuine village council in Amele along the lines of 
the ones which had been established on Manus Island and 
Hanuabada village near Port Moresby (Johnson, Patrol 
Report, Madang No.8 1953-54).
While the administration was well aware of the 
deficiencies in the appointment of luluais and tultuls 
and recognized the need to introduce a form of 
government which would enable New Guineans to have a 
greater say in their own affairs rather than just be 
the recipients of instructions, the decision to begin 
the new system of village councils at Amele was also 
clearly designed to combat Yali and his teaching.
Gulu, they knew, was a strong supporter of a more 
rational approach to change and had long been an 
influential ally of government policy. When the 
Ambenob Council was formed in September 1956, the 
action was thus seen as an antidote to the spread of 
cargoism. The council eventually encompassed some 135 
villages with 29 elected councillors representing about 
23,000 people (TPNG Report, 1970-71:257).
Local government was extended to Karkar Island in
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1958 and it was gradually introduced into other regions 
in the district in the years leading to independence.
Local Government Councils in the Madang District
Council Year No.of Villages No.of Councillors Pop
Almani 1965 78 37 8,899
Ambenob 1956 56 30 12,424
Arabaka 1964 102 35 10,371
Astrobale 1966 46 18 5,739
Bundi 1965 30 30 7,601
Iabu 1963 16 15 4,774
Josephstaal 1969 66 18 6,479
Karkar 1963 59 29 17,206
(Amalgamation of Takia and Waskia Councils)
Madang Town 1971 18 9,827
Rai Coast 1964 121 33 13,500
Simbai 1967 56 29 16,053
Sumgilbar 1961 56 27 7,666
Rao Bieri 1964 43 21 4,745
Usino 1967 87 29 10,823
Yawar 1962 91 41 14,209
(TPNG Reports, 1966-67 : 274 , 1970-71:257).
Initially, there was enthusiasm for the new local 
councils. In the mid-1960's, when the formation of new 
councils was at its zenith, there was a very large 
participation rate by the Madang people in the 
elections. In the year 1966-67, for example, there 
were seven council elections and of the 22,503 people 
eligible to vote in them, some 20,501, or 91 per cent did.
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Such a figure compared more than favourably with other 
districts in the Territory. At the same time, for 
example, New Britain had a participation rate of only 
60 per cent, although more enthusiasm was shown in the 
East Sepik and Bougainville local elections where there 
was a participation rate of 83 per cent and 67 per cent 
respectively (TPNG Report, 1966-67:279). The 
enthusiasm was probably more evident in the elections 
for newer councils than it was in the older council 
areas, where there were already signs that the support 
for local government was beginning to wane.
On Karkar Island, which was one of the earliest 
areas of local government in the Territory, Romala 
McSwain studied the performance of the council and 
traced its triumphs and difficulties in her book The 
Past and Future People. According to McSwain, the 
people of Karkar initially prized the new system of 
government as being an important step in 'restoring 
their dignity and social integrity' (McSwain 1977:135). 
When the first elections for the Tarkia and Waskia 
councils were held in 1958, there was certainly an 
overwhelming support for the new system with voter 
turnout of 93 per cent. Several years later, the Local 
Government Council Inspection Report was full of praise 
for the efforts of the Karkar Council, (which was now 
an amalgamation of the original two, Takia and Waskia). 
It was reported that the councillors initiated and 
carried out their village duties. They had effectively
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provided school buildings and had sponsored useful 
village projects such as digging wells and building 
latrines and community centres. The council had also 
built roads and maintained road transport (ibid:139).
So successful did the council become that, by 1968 it 
had an income of £59,000 and employed sixty workers, 
making it one of the wealthiest councils in the 
Territory (ibid:131).
However, support for the council was on the wane 
and in the local government elections of 1966, the voter 
turnout had declined to only 56 per cent. Moreover, 
the standards of the council were beginning to fall.
In 1968, the school facilities were deemed to be poor 
and truancy was becoming a widespread problem. The 
villagers began to ignore hyg»ene standards and there 
was a shortage of supplies for the first aid post. The 
council vehicles were in disrepair and much of the road 
working equipment had broken down (ibid:131).
McSwain concluded that there were three major 
reasons for the decline in council achievements.
First, there was a shortage of skilled workers and it 
was the unskilled, unsupervised ones who damaged the 
council vehicles. Secondly, the councillors themselves 
had many shortcomings. Primarily, they lacked the 
education to understand the finances which were 
involved in running a council. Grants, aid and 
subsidies were beyond their comprehension. Thirdly, 
there were shortcomings in the local government system
155.
itself. Supervising officers were encouraged to 
support the initiatives of the councillors, but they 
were also expected to oppose initiatives if they 
contravened local government rules. Such a role was an 
invidious one for the supervisor, and it undermined the 
authority and confidence of the councillors. Moreover, 
little training was available to the councillors.
There was a training school in Madang, but, according 
to McSwain, its emphasis was on the pursuit of finances 
for on-going development rather than on consolidation 
of that which had already been achieved. The 
implications of such an approach were that the older a 
council became, the harder it was to administer 
(tbid:133).
It could be argued that the Australian administration's 
expectations for local government councillor were quite 
unrealistic. Under the luluai system, a village leader 
had little chance to do anything other than obey the 
instructions of the administrations. Now, the 
administration expected him to make a quantum leap and 
run a complex system of government which was quite 
foreign to his traditional village structiure. He was 
expected to acquire new skills and display new 
initiatives which would advance the cause of modern 
government, but, he faced enormous difficulties in his 
new role. The Papua New Guinea councillor lacked the 
trained staff and had to undertake much of the work 
which would have been delegated to council staff in
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Australia. Frequently he supported new undertakings to 
earn the praise of the administration without 
understanding the financial obligations entailed in the 
new commitments (ibid:130). The Papua New Guinea 
councillor was also expected to have the abilities of a 
traditional 'bigman' and be able to persuade, mediate, 
disseminate news and organize labour. Moreover, he 
needed to be able to persuade others to assist in food 
production because he needed the goods to bestow 
hospitality which was befitting his position as 
councillor (ibid:144). It was little wonder that the 
councillors on Karkar thought that they were hard 
working leaders (ibid;135). Because some of these 
councillors recognized the difficulties they were 
facing, they agreed, after an initial reluctance, to 
the establishment of a multiracial council on Karkar. 
The inclusion, in 1967, of two Europeans on the council 
enabled the village leaders to gain access to European 
expertise, but this modification undermined the 
enthusiasm and confidence which the councillors had for 
the new political system; this was reflected in their 
opposition to further political development at this 
time, especially self-government (ibid:151).
It was not only the councillors who found the new 
system of government less than satisfactory. There was 
growing disillusion among the Karkar people about local 
government, which was indicated by a decline in the 
electoral participation rate. This decline can
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perhaps, partly be attributed to specific problems,
(the Takia people, for example, found it difficult to 
maintain interest in local government after the 
amalgamation of the two original councils, when they 
found they were too far from council meeting to be able 
to participate easily), but the major reason for the 
decline in support was the fact that local government 
did not live up to the expectations of the Karkar 
people. Services on the island improved initially with 
the implementation of local government, but the changes 
did not match the expectations of the islanders. Local 
government, they found, was no more able to deliver 
social or material eguivalence with Europeans than 
cooperatives or cash cropping.
Although the problems varied, all local councils in 
the Madang district had difficulties in establishing 
themselves and delivering services to their villagers. 
In the Amele area, unlike Karkar, there was, initially, 
a clear demarcation between 'official work', which was 
connected with the work of the Ambenob council, and the 
work of the village. Younger men were, therefore, 
elected to undertake the former work, while the older 
leaders remained to look after village interests. This 
attitude irritated the administration, which complained 
that the councillors were only the 'front men' for the 
real village leaders. However, Louise Morauta, in her 
study of the Ambenob council in her book Beyond the
Vi1läge, believed that this position was only true of
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the council in its early days and that it changed as 
the traditional leaders began to offer themselves for 
election as a way of reinforcing their village status 
(Morauta 1974:150)
The Ambenob council, not surprisingly since it was 
formed as a bulwark against cargoism, was the scene of 
antagonism between those who supported the 
administration and the church and those who were 
followers of Yali. The council was overtly 
anti-Yali and at the time of Morauta's study thirty of 
the thirty-seven councillors were Christian. Moreover, 
its hostile attitude towards Yali was continually 
reinforced by the administration, with whom it 
continued to have close ties. The council made it 
clear that it opposed Yali and that his supporters were 
not welcome into the area? it even blamed Yali for its 
own failings (ibid:150).
Thus, while the strength of support for Yali, even 
twenty years after his fall from grace, remained 
strong, his supporters were certainly under-represented 
on the council. Morauta suggested that less than one 
tenth of the councillors were pro-Yali, although 
support for him in the district, remained at about 
37 per cent. The reason for this disparity was, she thought 
that the villagers tended to vote for those people whom 
they thought would do the best job for the village and 
the best person to achieve development for a village 
within a council hostile to Yali and his followers was
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unlikely to be a cultist. On the other hand, cultists 
may not have voted in the elections because they saw no 
point in doing so (ibid;160).
While the cultists may have been under-represented 
in the council, their attitude to it affected its 
work. The cultists preferred to solve their own 
problems without recourse to their councillor, thus 
undermining the status and effectiveness of their local 
representative. Moreover, it was the cultists who 
consistently failed to pay their taxes, causing 
resentment among those who did and making council 
funding difficult (ibid;156).
Ambenob council district was not the only district 
to be hindered by divisions between cultists and 
non-cultists. But while Ambenob councillors could 
ignore the pro-Yali members on its council because they 
were in such a minority, the adjoining council of 
Astrolabe Bay was predominantly made up of cultists, 
with the president belonging to one faction and the 
vice-president belong to the other (Lawrence 1971:181).
On Karkar the formation of a multiracial council can 
be seen as a response to the difficulties associated 
with the administration of local government on the 
island. Although the Karkar councillors had initially 
rejected the administration's suggestion that they 
include Europeans on their council, they reversed their 
decision in 1967 when their own educational 
inadeguacies made the council increasingly difficult to
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manage (McSwain 1977:137). Karkar was not the only- 
council to change its composition and by 1967, six of 
the eleven councils in the district were multiracial 
(TPNG Report 1966-67:27). While the proliferation of 
these councils may be seen as a pragmatic response by 
villagers to the difficulties which they experienced in 
administering their local government area competently, 
their actions may also reflect a less pragmatic 
reaction. Villagers had not acguired any immediate 
substantial material gains through the implementation 
of local government and it is therefore probable that 
some villagers thought that once Europeans were elected 
to a council they would then be obliged to share the 
secret of the access to car^o with their fellow 
councillors and wealth would be instantaneous. 
Councillors may have also accepted the proposition of 
multiracial councils because they thought that they 
would acguire greater status by their closer 
association with Europeans. Regardless of the reasons 
for the proliferation of the multiracial councils, 
however, their very existence was evidence that the 
original local government policy had been too ambitious 
and their introduction was a compromise which 
highlighted the deficiencies of many of the councillors 
and undermined their confidence to deal with a more 
complex world.
In the 1950s, many villagers had been prepared to 
try the administration's new initiatives and as a
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result cargo movements appeared to be in decline in 
some areas. However, the failure of cash cropping, 
cooperatives and local government to deliver social and 
material eguivalence with Europeans led to the 
re-emergence of overt cargoist activities in some parts 
of the district in the 1960s. On Karkar, in 1960, some 
of the old kukuaik rituals, such as cemetery 
beautification and prayer and confession meeting began 
to reappear (McSwain 1977:182). The most bizarre 
manifestation of cargo ritual, however, occurred in the 
following year. The Bishop of Alexishafen was invited 
to Abar, a village which had had a falling out with the 
church, for reconciliation talks. When he refused to 
sacrifice a black rooster, a willing black villager was 
substituted. Lagit, the local luluai slit the throat 
of another man, who held out his arms in the shape of a 
cross. The rationale for this action was, that since 
Christ had died for white men, this black man would die 
for all black men and thus equality would be 
achieved (Rowley 1965:175). Other examples of overt 
cargo rituals were comparatively rare, but, other forms 
of thinking began to emerge. This thinking began to 
reveal itself in a variety of ways, such as in the 
attitude many villagers had towards bisnis and 
Christianity.
The Lutherans and SVDs had re-established 
themselves in the Madang district after the war. The 
Lutheran Church, observing the effect of Yali and his
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ability of harness and organize local support, decided 
that it could devolve its authority to the local people 
and in 1956 the Evangelical Lutheran Church of New 
Guinea (ELCONG) was formed, However, in spite of being 
nationalized, for a long time the hierarchy of the 
Lutheran church remained predominantly European. It 
was more difficult for the SVDs to change in the 
same way because their religion was constrained by far 
stricter reguirements for its clergy, and so both its 
clergy as well as its hierarchical structure remained 
expatriate in this period. Both the Lutherans and the 
SVDs, now found that they had a new problem in that 
they no longer had a duopoly of proselyting.
Prior to the Second World War, the various missions 
in New Guinea had more or less remained within certain 
discrete boundaries; now those boundaries were being 
challenged. The new competition came from an influx of 
missionaries who came predominantly from American 
fundamentalist churches such as Gospel Lighthouse (Four 
Square Mission) and the Jehovah's Witnesses (De'Ath 
1981b:80).
While villagers might have said that they adopted 
their new religion because they felt abandoned by the 
older religions (Josephides 1990:59) or because they 
felt pique towards actions of former clergy (Burridge 
1960:234), it seemed that some of the appeal of the new 
churches was their similarity with the expectations of 
cargoism. Literal interpretation of the Bible,
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millennianism and the intense interest with the 
genealogy of the patriarchs made the fundamentalist 
religions an attractive proposition for many villagers 
(Josephides 1990:64). Moreover, while many Madangs 
rejected overt cargo rituals because they knew that 
Europeans would never take part (McSwain 1977:182), the 
elaborate rituals which some villagers adopted from the 
fundamentalist churches and which appeared to be akin 
cargo rituals, were something they could share with 
Europeans (Josephides 1990:65). True cargoists, 
however, would reject even fundamentalist churches and 
retain their pagan traditions.
Another development in this period, was the status 
and importance which the Madangs gave to bisnis.
B.J. Allen, in his study on the East Sepik, came to the 
conclusion that:
Bisnis is a broad concept manifested in a 
number of ways, which include processing 
crops for sale and investing money in 
enterprises which it is believed will cause 
large amounts of money to accrue to the 
individual. The processes by which money 
is generated are poorly understood, if 
understood at all, by many people (Allen 
1976:252).
The idea of bisnis was associated with many 
enterprises which proliferated in Madang in this 
period--cash cropping, cooperatives and village trade 
stores--in the belief that being involved with the
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right one would provide status and wealth. However, 
most villagers had little idea of how bisnis really- 
worked and presumed that it was just a matter of 
pressing the right button to achieve success. While it 
can be argued that such an attitude is little removed 
from cargoism, bisnis differs from cargoism in that it 
rejects traditional methods of acguiring wealth and 
adopts new methods, even though those new methods are 
poorly comprehended.
Although the number of local government councils 
continued to increase in the Madang district until 
1973, the interest of the villagers in local 
government, especially in the older local government 
areas, declined. This decline manifested itself in 
various ways, such as the decline in the number of 
voters in elections, the growth of multiracial councils 
and the re-emergence of overt cargo rituals. While 
failure to meet the unrealistic expectations of 
villagers, was an important factor, blame for the loss 
of support for local government must be shared by the 
Australian administration. While it is true that the 
local government system could not deliver the rapid 
changes which the villagers expected of it, 
nevertheless, the infrastructure of the system also 
failed the villagers. The local government council 
system was far too complex and it was unreasonable for 
the administration to expect village leaders to have 
the level of understanding and expertise necessary to 
make a success of such a foreign institution. The
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introduction of local government did little to increase 
the understanding of the Madangs in the wider world 
beyond their village. Therefore, although some Madangs 
were prepared to forego cargoist beliefs and adopt new 
strategies in order to acquire material and social 
equivalence with Europeans, their understanding of the 
of new ideas remained limited and ill-formed.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS
It was assumed, in post-war New Guinea, that 
independence would eventually be granted to the 
Territory at some vague time in the future. Mindful 
of this, the Australian administration began 
embarking upon a programme of national political 
advancement in the 1960s to increase indigenous 
responsibility. The response to these political 
changes by the people of the Madang district was to 
look increasingly towards those with European skills 
to represent them.
In I960, the Papua New Guinea Act increased the 
size of the Legislative Council, which had been 
formed in 1949. Then in 1963, after a UN delegation 
led by Sir Hugh Foot had criticised the slowness of 
the devolution of power to New Guineans, a new act 
was passed setting up an elected House of Assembly.
Elections were called for the middle of 1964. Of 
the sixty-four members of the new House, ten would be 
appointed; indigenous New Guineans were expected to 
form the elected majority (TPNG Report 
1968-1969:12).
The Madang district was to be represented by four 
electorates: a special electorate, which took in
both the Sepik and the Madang districts and was only
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open to the non-indigenous population; the Madang 
electorate, which covered the area from Karkar Island 
to Bundi and incorporated Madang township; the 
electorate of the Rai coast which extended from the 
Kabenau River into the western part of the Morobe 
district; and the electorate of Ramu, which 
encompassed the western part of the district.
The Madang electorate was won by Suguman 
Matribri. Suguman was a Karkar with local government 
council experience, a gualifiction which was common 
to the majority of the candidates in the first 
national elections. He had been vice-president of 
the Waskia council and although he was a Catholic, 
had worked for many years on Kurum, a Lutheran 
plantation on Karkar. Suguman owned trade stores on 
both parts of the island and had attended a meeting 
of the fifth Legislative Council in Port Moresby.
Like Taeosi and Stoi Umot in the Rai Coast 
electorate, Suguman was encouraged by the local 
administration officer to run for the Assembly 
(McSwain 1970:149).
Suguman was run to a close race by another 
councillor, Bato Bultin. Bato was a subsistence 
farmer and at the time of the elections was 
vice-president of the Ambenob Council (ibid:177). 
What probably secured Sugaman's victory was the fact 
that he had not only a solid block of support from 
the people on Karkar, but an extremely high informal
vote (18.3 per cent) was registered in the seat of
Madang, which told against Bato (Bettison
et.al. 1965:420), for some 3,000 people on the
mainland cast their vote for Yali, although he did
not stand in the electorate, rather than for Bato (Harding and
Lawrence 1971:181). Against all assumptions,
Yali's career did not end when he was gaoled in 1950, 
and he was able to re-establish himself on the Rai 
coast. When the Rai Coast Council was installed in 
February of 1964 he becme its first president.
Doubtless encouraged by this local support, he 
decided to contest the Rai Coast Open 
electorate. Unfortunately for Yali, the boundary of 
the electorate cut him off from many of his 
supporters around Dumpu, Madang Town and the western 
end of the Rai coast (Harding 1965:205). Although 
there were nine candidates for the seat, only two 
others, beside Yali, were serious contenders: Stoi
Umut from the more populous east end of the 
electorate and Advent Tarosi from the Morobe coastal 
region of Sio. The missions, the Catholic Church in 
particular, reacted energetically to Yali's 
candidature and opposed him strongly, favouring as 
their candidate the impeccably credentialed Tarosi.
Tarosi was a government teacher and a clerical 
officer with the administration who had received the 
BEM. for his wartime services and was considered by 
the administration to be an outstanding natural
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leader. However, Yali and Tarosi were competing for 
the same votes along the coast and Stoi was able to 
capitalize on this and win the election (ibid:197). 
While Yali and Tarosi made their opposing views on 
cargo very clear, Stoi managed to have a foot in each 
camp. While he supported the Lutheran church, and 
they supported him, he was not above suggesting that 
his prowess as a business man was the result of his 
having discovered the secret to the source of 
European wealth. Harding was of the opinion that 
cargoism did no more than reinforce Stoi's victory 
and that tribal and ethnic factors played a far 
greater role in determining the outcome of the Rai 
coast election (ibid:211). However, in spite of the 
fact that Tarosi was defeated in the western 
division of the electorate he polled 41 per cent of 
the vote, compared with Yali's 35 per cent. This 
suggested that even in Yali's stronghold there was 
already a move towards finding a man who had the 
necessary European skills to be an effective 
representative of the people. In the Special 
Electorate, Frank Martin from the Sepik defeated John 
Middleton from Karkar, while in the Ramu electorate 
John Meanggarum defeated three other candidates 
(Report of Chief Electoral Officer, 1964:24-25).
The newly elected members of the House of 
Assembly found that being a national member was a 
more difficult task than being a councillor and that
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traditional politics were not adequate for the new 
situation. Electoral support was difficult to 
maintain. Promises made by national politicians were 
often unrealistic, as were the expectations of their 
constituents, leaving the latter disillusioned and 
the former without support. Such was the case with 
Suguman Matibri. The Karkar people thought that he 
had not kept them informed on what was happening and 
that his role as their representative did not meet 
their expectations. Moreover, they thought that 
Suguman was undermining the egalitarian Karkar 
culture by building an ostentatious new house 
(McSwain 1970:149).
The elections in 1968 saw an expanded House of 
Assembly. Eighty-one seats were contested, of which 
fourteen were regional, the rest being open 
electorates. Madang district now had its own 
regional electorate and five open electorates. These 
were: Bogia, along the western coast; Mabuso (Madang, 
Usino, Bundi) in the central area, stretching from 
the Madang township as far south as Bundi; Sumkar, 
which included Karkar and Bagabag islands and the 
adjacent coast; Rai Coast, from the south of Madang 
Town to the east of Saidor; and Middle Ramu in the 
hinterland behind Bogia.
While these new electorates were certainly 
smaller in area than the previous ones had been, it 
was, nevertheless, difficult for aspiring
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representatives to make themselves known to all their 
electorate. Some of the difficulties which faced the 
national candidates at election time could have been 
alleviated had a strong political party system been 
built up in the Territory, but, in spite of some 
attempts to start parties, they were very weak 
outside the House itself. The failure of such 
development, it has been argued, and with some 
justification, was the result of the administration's 
policies. Luluais were selected to serve the 
administration rather than the people. Decisions for 
the national good were made in Canberra, so that 
there was always a lack of response to local issues. 
Lack of economic and educational development meant 
that there were no working, middle or educated 
classes and those few who were educated were 
encouraged to join the Public Service, to work for 
the administration rather than to enter 
politics. Institutions which might have served as 
nurseries for political development, such as 
cooperatives and local government councils were 
discouraged from participating in elections (Loveday 
and Wolfers 1976:2). Indeed, local councillors were 
expected to remain neutral during elections and 
evidently did in many places (Harding and Lawrence 
1971:172). Attempts by local people to form 
political organizations usually led to accusations of 
cargo cultism. Moreover, many villagers were
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suspicious of political parties, in part because they 
did not understand what they were and in part because 
they wished to avoid political conflict and preferred 
to reach decisions by consensus (ibid : 173).
It is, therefore, hardly surprising that when 
political parties began to make their appearance in 
the Madang district in the lead-up to the 1968 
national elections they were started by Europeans and 
based upon Australian models. Moreover, their 
policies were very conservative, which reflected the 
attitude of most the people in the district, 
regardless of race and there was little support for 
the more radical Pangu Parti by either Europeans or 
indigenous people.
The All People's Party (APP) was formed by Jim 
McKinnon in July 1967. It was modelled on the 
Australian Liberal Party and was opposed to immediate 
self-government. About the same time the Territory 
Country Party was also formed in Madang. It called 
for a special committee of Australian and Territorian 
officials to represent Papua New Guinea in the 
Australian federal parliament and its political 
platform was mainly concerned with rural 
development(Times-Courier n.d.rl). However, by the 
time of the elections that party had disappeared.
The only candidate who claimed an alliance with the 
Pangu Parti was James Meangarum, who was recontesting 
the seat of Bogia.
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Although political party policies had little 
effect on the outcome of the elections, the existence 
of the APP in the Madang district created loose 
associations between many of the candidates which 
went some distance in correcting the communication 
difficulties and presented the Madang electorate with 
some very clear choices. McKinnon, who was standing 
for and ultimately won the seat of Middle Ramu, was 
able to attract the support of three other 
candidates, Bruce Jephcott in the Regional, John 
Barang in Bogia and Saramuir Sinamaiba in Mabuso.
The other candidates for the regional seat also 
sought suitable running mates. Jason Garrett, the 
eventual winner of the Regional electorate, was able 
to attract Robin Saretofa in Bogia, Walai Toba in 
Middle Ramu, Angmai Bilas in Mabuso, John Middleton 
in Sumkar and John Poe in Rai Coast. However, it
was the third group which proved to be the most 
contentious in the election. Edward Whitaker, 
running in the Regional electorate, teamed up with 
Bato Bultin, who was running in the Mabuso 
electorate, Wadau Marun in Sumkar, (Yali's 
brother-in-law) and Yali on the Rai coast. This last 
association was one of political opportunism and 
irresponsibility, for Whitaker, wrongly as it turned 
out, thought that Yali would be able to deliver a 
large bloc of cargoist votes from that electorate. 
This entire group quickly become coupled with the
cargo movement.
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Each group was organized so that the various 
members of the team could help each other. This 
enabled the Regional candidates to tour the open 
electorate with the open candidate while providing 
the latter with motorized transport (Harding and 
Lawrence 1971:184)/ allowing both candidates to make 
themselves known to as many people as possible. 
Notwithstanding this mutual help, the group members 
tended to act as independents and developed 
individual polices; but in the end the campaign in 
the Madang district was hijacked by one central 
issue: cargo.
Karkar was the area least affected by the cargo 
issue, partly because, after its brief revival in the 
early 1960s/ the local cargo movement had been 
discredited/ and partly because Yali had never had 
influence on the island. Suguman Matibri/ probably 
aware of the disappointment of the electorate in his 
performance/ and more interested in his business 
ventures than in politics/ did not run again. When 
John Middleton/ a local planter who had lived on 
Karkar all of his life, made it known that he was 
willing to run for the seat/ other Karkars were 
disinclined to oppose him and the Karkar Council 
unanimously accepted his offer. Middleton also had 
the support of the Lutheran church and the 
administration for his candidature, but not all 
Karkars were happy with the idea and some thought
175.
that a Takia or Waskia would be able to understand 
the local problems better than a European. However/ 
most thought that Middleton was a better proposition 
to represent them because as a European, he 
automatically possessed knowledge which they did 
not. He could understand the new system. Once the 
Council decided to back Middleton as the sole 
representative from the island, his support on Karkar 
was assured; the councillors used their wide 
influence to control the votes, for when they were 
able to achieve consensus among the various clan 
leaders, the rest of the village would 
follow (McSwain 1970:152). Indeed, Middleton polled 
so decisively that counting did not even go to 
preferences.
While it might be argued that the voters of the 
Sumkar electorate had regressed politically by 
replacing a New Guinean with a European, in effect 
they were in agreement with the electors in the rest 
of the district. In all the electorates, those who 
won were perceived to have European skills which, it 
was thought, were the skills necessary for economic 
progress. The idea of achieving wealth through cargo 
cult rituals was rejected at the polls.
At the time of the elections, however, it was 
assumed, by the administration in particular and 
Europeans in general, that the cultists were much
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more popular and politically powerful than in fact 
they were. This misconception was due, in part, to 
the fact that of the cultists ' strongholds lay close 
to Madang Town and their vociferous support of Yali 
gave a false impression of their numbers. But while 
there was no cargoist candidate in the Mabuso 
electorate, of which the township was a part, the 
Yali supporters frustrated the administration, since 
they insisted that they would vote for the cargo 
leader regardless of the electoral rules which the 
administration had drawn up. The administration 
consequently had to try to re-educate these voters 
and explain that, should they continue to support 
Yali by casting a vote for him even though he was not 
a candidate for that particular electorate, their 
votes would be null and void.
In the end the seat was won by Angmai Bilas. 
Angmai could best be described as a 'new man'. He
came from Riwo vilage and had achieved personal 
success both in his own society and with Europeans.
He had been a cooperatives inspector, vice-president 
of the Ambenob Council (representing his village of 
Riwo), chairman of the Stevedoring Committee of the 
Madang Workers' Association and was a member of the 
Madang District Business Advisory Council. Angmai 
was a forceful speaker and politically astute 
(Lawrence and Harding 1971:176). His alliance with 
Jason Garrett gave him access to Garrett's plane and
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a trip to Bundi; as the only Mabuso candidate to 
visit Bundi, he was able to persuade the Bundi 
council to support his election.
Running against Angmai was Bato Bultin. Bultin 
made a mistake in aligning himself with Edward 
Whitaker because Whitaker's decision to team up with 
cargoists not only embarrassed Bultin but also cost 
him votes. While Bultin made it clear that he 
favoured more orthodox methods of economic progress, 
the alliance hurt his chances of election because 
many votes which should have been cast for him were 
in fact cast for Yali, and thus were invalid, and he 
lost many other votes because of his perceived 
connection with the cargoists (ibid :188).
In view of the prevailing opinion that Yali had 
great support in the Rai Coast, it is perhaps 
surprising that John Poe was able to defeat him so 
comfortably, especially in view of the fact that Poe 
was actually from Papua. Poe was another of the new 
breed, a man who had acquired European skills and 
this won him the election. Poe was a former public 
servant who had worked in Saidor since 1963 and was a 
member of the Rai Coast council. He spoke Tokpisin, 
Police Motu and English and had a knowledge of how 
the administration worked, and he advocated economic 
progress through the development of cash crops and 
road building (ibid:179). Yali's platform called for
the administration to give what it had promised
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during the war, better payments for cash crops and a 
seat in the Assembly so he could free the cargo 
dieties. The established forces railed against 
Yali. As well as the opposing candidates, the Rai 
Coast Council spoke against him, as did both the 
Lutheran and Catholic missions, although the 
Astrolabe Council, which was dominated by cargoists 
continued to support him. Yali's counterattack was 
weak. He did not really understand the techniques 
which were needed in the new representative system of 
government and assumed he had more support than he 
had. He tended to preach to those who were already 
converted and had little appreciation of the 
electoral boundaries (ibid : 18 1 ) .
The election exercise itself may have been 
stimulating for the European observers and for those 
involved, but the low voter turnout indicated that 
the people of the Madang district did not find 
politics quite so fascinating. The average turnout 
for the Madang electorates was 58 per cent, which was 
below the national average of 63 per cent. The Rai 
Coast had a turnout of only 35 per cent, although 
Lawrence disputes this figure (ibid :194; Report of 
Chief Electoral Officer 1968, pp 41-46). Lawrence 
put this low turnout down to several factors. He 
suggested that there was a high percentage of invalid 
absentee votes. He also thought that many people did
not vote at all because they were unable to vote for
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Yali, although such an argument did not explain the low 
turnout in the Rai Coast electorate where Yali was a 
candidate.
Apathy was also a factor in the low voter 
turnout. The House of Assembly elections in 1964 had 
produced few changes and electors rarely saw their 
representatives. The administration did little to 
encourage enthusiasm or participation in these new 
elections and there was little political education. 
Field officers were not sent to explain what was 
going on, as they had done in the 1964 elections. 
Pamphlets were distributed to people who were often 
illiterate. Councillors were expected to explain to 
the villagers what was happening, but often did not 
understand the election processes themselves. Radio 
broadcasts helped only those with radios, and there 
were few sets away from the coast. Candidates met 
with relatively few of their constituents. Few 
candidates campaigned on foot, preferring to go where 
plane and truck would take them, thus limiting the 
villages visited to those near airstrips and 
roads. Polling booths were scarce, indeed there were 
only eight inland ones for the whole district. As 
Lawrence pointed out, with such poor organization the 
wonder is that over half the people voted at 
all (ibid : 195). When people did manage to vote, 
many of their votes were declared to be invalid; the 
voting system was too complex. Preferential voting
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required numbered preferences; frequently voters 
marked their papers with ticks or crosses, thus 
invalidating their vote, and many thought that 
preferential voting indicated disloyalty to their 
first choice (McSwain 1970:152).
Because of the difficulties candidates had in 
getting around their electorates, they tended to 
enlist the help of the local councillors to campaign 
on their behalf. In some places that help was so 
effective that it almost guaranteed a positive 
election result. This was certainly true on Karkar, 
where the councillors not only discouraged anyone 
else on the island from standing but were able to 
secure a winning number of votes for their candidate 
by securing the support of clan leaders. It was also 
true of the Bundi Council. Once Angmai had gained 
their support, he was able to leave them to campaign 
for him. On the Rai Coast the majority of the 
councillors supported and worked for the election of 
John Poe. In Ambenob, the Council stood behaind 
Angmai, which was annoying for Buto, since he ws also 
a member of that Council. However, as Louise Morauta 
pointed out, in the areas covering the latter two 
councils, the prevalence of cargo beliefs, meant that 
votes were not as easily delivered to the 
council-favoured candidates as they were in other 
areas. Indeed, Morauta presented evidence which 
indicated that cargo cultists distinguished between
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local and national elections and voted accordingly.
In the local elections, they tended to vote 
pragmatically for the person who was most likely to 
deliver benefits to the village, regardless of the 
beliefs of that candidate on the issue of cargo. In 
the national elections, however, they were not 
pragmatic and voted for Yali's platform, ignoring the 
opinion of their local councillor (Morauta 1974:160).
Thus, on Karkar, where the cargo question was not an 
issue, voting, under the persuasive powers of the 
councillors was along clan and tribal lines (McSwain 
1970:152). In the areas affected by the cargo 
movement, the impact of the issue was so great that 
voting cut across traditional lines and villages and 
clans became divided along ideological lines. 
However, regardless of the voting patterns, there was 
a common tendency: the winners were those with the
skills which the electors thought could best serve 
them in a European political environment.
In 1968, in the Madang district, the idea of 
immediate self-government was not welcomed by most 
people. Even Yali, who wanted immediate independence 
as a way of returning to traditional times, was 
forced to modify his stand when he realized that it 
was not a popular one (Harding and Lawrence 
1971:181). In part, the reason for the objections to 
immediate self-government had to do with the people's 
lack of understanding of what was actually meant by
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the term. Few understood that actual political 
control of the Territory was centred in Canberra; to 
most people the Australian control was more personal 
and involved government officials and planters. It 
was assumed that independence would mean the removal 
of all white people. Thus, while the people on 
Karkar, for example, ultimately wanted 
self-government because they thought it would give 
them equal status with Europeans, they did not want 
it immediately because it was thought that they 
needed to learn a lot more from Australian 
businessmen and have access to more education before 
they would be prepared for self-government (McSwain 
1970:155). Such views were similar to those held by 
the Ambenob Council and the Rai Coast Council.
Moreover, the Karkars also thought that
eself-govern^mpt would leave them unprotected and 
vulnerable to invasion from Indonesia, which was not 
entirely unreasonable considering the unheavals which 
were occurring in West Irian at the time. Even as 
late as 1968, the Karkar councillors told a visiting 
UN delegation that Australia should not be pushing 
independence too quickly (ibid :168). And in 1970, 
when the Select Committee on Constitution Development 
came to the island it received very little support 
(ibid:195).
By the time of the next House of Assembly 
elections in 1972, however, opposition to both
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self-government and political parties had modified. 
The mood of the country had changed, helped by the 
changing political views in Canberra, and the 
question was no longer whether there should be 
self-government, but rather when would the inevitable 
happen. In Madang, there was little agitation for 
immediate self-government, especially in the rural 
areas. This conservative attitude was reflected in 
the fact that although the general change of mood in 
the country resulted were only nine Europeans 
returned to the House of Assembly in the 1972 
elections, two of these came from Madang.
The only change to the electoral arrangements in 
the district was the division of the old electorate 
of Mabuso into the seats of Usino-Bundi in the south 
and Madang in the north. However, having two seats, 
with virtually the same name—  Madang Regional and 
Madang Open electorate-created an unnecessary 
confusion in the minds of the electors. Only three 
sitting members-- John Poe, Angmai Bilas and John 
Middleton, chose to seek re-election, and all were 
successful. Bruce Jephcott was able to win the 
Regional seat when Jason Garrett did not re-contest 
it. None of the three Regional candidates did a 
great deal of campainging although Jephcott did far 
more than his opponents and he was known from his 
unsuccessful campaign four years before. Jephcott was 
a member of the People's Progress Party (PPP) and
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campaigned along party lines, saying that 
self-government should only come when the people 
demanded it; but generally he did not stress his 
links with the party. One of his opponents was Shong 
Babob, a Madang who did little campaigning, relying 
on his record as a well-educated Lutheran and the 
only Madang running for the Regional seat, to gain 
victory. However, his qualifications obviously did 
not impress the Madang voters. The third candidate 
was Jerry Kaon from Manus. There was little to 
suggest that his Manus origins acted against his 
chances and he appears to have failed because he was 
a member of the Pangu Parti and his views on 
self-goverment were probably too inflexible for the 
conservative villagers (Lawrence 1967:76).
In all the seats, except the Regional, the number 
of candidates rose, as did their educational 
qualifications. Whereas in the 1968 elections many 
of those who stood were men with more traditional 
qualifications and many were local government 
councillors, in the 1972 elections the demonstratable 
possession of European skills became much more 
important as a qualification for candidature. The 
majority of candidates had some formal education and 
many teachers and public servants stood for election 
The exception to this pattern was in the new Usino- 
Bundi Open electorate, where the majority of candidates 
were councillors with few formal educational
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qualifications (General Information, Chief Electoral 
Office 1972:34-39)
An examination of the candidates for the new seat 
of Madang illustrate these changes. Six candidates 
ran for the election. One, Philip Hancock, was an 
Australian, but he did virtually no campaigning and 
remained an unknown quantity among the electors 
(Morauta 1976:107). The other candidates had 
qualifications which showed that they had interacted 
closely with the European world. Hon Pipoi, for 
example, had started his career as a Lutheran 
Mission schoolteacher ending up as a member of the 
Tusbab High School board of governors, although he 
had given up education to open a trade store. He, 
like Angmai, was also a member of the Ambenob 
Council. Another member of the Tusbab board of 
governors was Kaukesa Kewa Kamo and he too, had 
trained as a Lutheran Mission teacher before joining 
the Department of Public Works as a carpenter. Askim 
Siming trained with the Lutheran Mission as a health 
worker, and in that capacity he had travelled 
overseas, but after some twenty years of serving the 
church in this capacity he resigned to become a 
cattle farmer. Even the youngest candidate, Job 
Sogasog, who was twenty-five, was able to show that 
he was qualified to operate in a European world. He, 
like the previous candidates, had been Lutheran
educated, but rather than make his career within the
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church, had joined the Pacific Island Regiment and 
through them had been trained as a plant operator.
When he returned to Madang he was able find 
employment with the Department of Civil Aviation in 
that capacity (ibid;35).
There were, however only two candidates of 
consequence in the electorate, Job Sogasog and Angmai 
Bilas and their contest introduced the people of the 
electorate to party politics and clear political 
choices. Job was a Pangu Parti candidate. The party 
had established itself in the town, where it had, by 
1972, a strong organization, with a local committee 
and a number of members on the Town Council. The 
town had grown rapidly in the past few years and the 
questions of education and job opportunities were 
paramount to many of those who had moved there. The 
sharp contrast between the newly-arrived squatters 
and the affluent Europeans made the idea of 
self-government very appealing to those with very 
little, for it was assumed that as soon as 
self-government was granted the Europeans would leave 
and the migrants could attain their goods and their 
jobs. Job denounced such wild ideas, but, the ideas 
stayed and so did much of the support. Pangu also 
emphasised traditional ideas and values and this part 
of the platform attracted cargo cultist support 
(Morauta f976:103). It also gave Angmai a clear 
point of debate.
I
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Angmai had done well in the previous Assembly.
He had become Minister for Trade and Industry and had 
supported large-scale development in the region, as 
well as building roads in the local area. He had 
joined the United Party and although he advocated 
self-government he thought it should come later 
rather than sooner. He also remained implacably 
opposed to the cargo cultists. Because the Pangu 
Parti's organization was superior to that of the 
United Party, Job and his supporters were able to 
get to more villages than Angmai; nevertheless, 
voting appeared to follow much the same pattern as it 
had in the previous elections. Although Job and Pangu 
gained support for their policies from the town and 
from the cultists, this was not enough to defeat 
Angmai and the conservative Christian vote in the 
surrounding villages.
On the Rai Coast, Yali decided that he would not 
stand again, but nominated one of his lieutenants,
Dui Yangsai, to do so in his place. After a great 
deal of indecisiveness, Yali decided to support the 
Pangu Parti because of its advocacy of traditional 
ways. However, his support was repudiated by the 
party and Michael Somare stated publically in Madang 
that Pangu would have nothing to do with cargoists 
(Lawrence 1976:85). John Poe, representing the PPP, 
recontested the seat. He could point to his 
achievements, mainly the development of some roads in
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the area, and he was again supported by the majority 
of the Rai Coast Council. Although his vote was down 
on the previous election, because of the larger 
number of candidates standing, Poe won quite 
decisively (ibid 1976:89).
In the Bogia Open, the election was won very 
easily by Stanis To Liman, a Tolai, who was not only 
the head teacher of the administration school on 
Manam Island, but had also had worked as an 
interpreter in the Legislative Council and later in 
the House of Assembly. Like the people of the Rai 
coast, the voters of Bogia were prepared to vote for 
an outsider if that person appeared to be equipped 
with the knowledge which would enable him to 
understand and master the new political situation.
In Sumkar, John Middleton again won on the first 
count. His nearest rival was the Pangu candidate, 
Kare Maor, from Waskia. Clearly, however, the people 
of the electorate remained conservative. In 
Usino-Bundi, Marcus Kawo outpolled his rivals because 
he was the only one of the candidates in the 
electorate who conducted a campaign outside his 
immediate his local area. In the Middle Ramu 
electorate the electoral race had been very close. 
None of the contenders were well educated, except a 
European who contested the seat although he was not 
well known in the area, having spent most of his 
working life in Papua New Guinea in the East Sepik
189 .
region. The eventual winner was Kui Baiyang, who had 
worked with Jim McKinnon as his interpreter.
A disappointing feature of the election was the 
further decline in voting numbers and the number of voters on 
the electoral roll who participated in the election 
dropped to 49 per cent throughout the region.
The Regional Electorate had the lowest voter turnout 
in the country (Report of the Chief Electoral 
Officer, 1973:33) and the Madang Open electorate 
had a participation rate of only 38 per 
cent (ibid:28). The administration had tried to make 
up for its tardiness in the previous elections by 
introducing an education programme which aimed at 
increasing general political awareness by sending 
patrols into villages to explain ideas about 
politics, economics, and how the House of Assembly 
operated. These patrols proved to be very popular.
However, the political situation in Papau New Guinea 
changed as it became evident that self-government 
would be the major issue of the forthcoming elections 
and there was little time to explain the implications 
of this. Moreover, parties, which had hitherto been 
treated with suspicion, now were now becoming a major 
force within Papua New Guinea politics and little 
explanation of what they were, or how they worked was 
available to the villagers. The the education 
process conducted by the administration was only 
partially completed by the time of the elections and
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it may well be that the rapid changes so confused 
people that they avoided the election altogether. 
Lawrence suggested other reasons for the lower 
participation rate, such as more people away from the 
district, the difficulty of absentee absentee, 
disenchantment with representatives, influenza in 
Usino-Bundi and disappointment at the failure of 
quick results to materialize from the previous 
elections (ibid:87).
The big losers in the election, however, were the 
cargo cultists. The previous election marked the 
zenith of their political influence. The decline was 
due, in part, to Yali's decision not to take a direct 
part in the election, for the charisma of the leader 
was a major element in the strength of the movement. 
Nor was Yali able to organize suitable candidates to 
stand for electorates other than the Rai coast. The 
failure of the cargoists to make a political stand 
may have accounted for the decline in voter 
participation in areas where the movement was still 
strong, although many cargoists voted for the Pangu 
candidates.
Another feature to emerge from the 1972 elections 
(in common with other parts of the country) was 
localization of the votes. This was especially 
evident in Usino-Bundi where most of the candidates 
received votes only from their own ethnic groups.
This trend was also evident on parts of the Rai
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Coast, where five candidates besides Poe and Dui 
stood for election, and although none did well/ 
because they gained votes only from their own local 
area, they reduced the margins of the front runners 
(ibid;89). In other parts of the district, the 
traditional politics of clans and villages did not 
play a large part in determining the election; party 
politics and church versus cargoist allegiance was 
far more significant. Because of this, many people 
in Madang were able to put ethnic differences aside 
and look to the larger issues (Morauta 1976:113).
The national election results in many parts of 
the Madang district suggest that the people of the 
district, although still seeking eguivalence with 
Europeans, were prepared to try new methods to 
achieve it. This choice involved the rejection of 
cargo cults by the majority of electors in favour 
of the election of representatives who were able to 
demonstrate European skills. The choice between old 
ways and new ways cut across clan and tribal lines. 
Paradoxically, the adoption of the new ways meant 
that immediate independence had to be rejected so 
that more skills could be learnt from Europeans.
Thus, while it might appear that the majority of 
electors in Madang were conservative and timid, it 
might egually be argued that they were, in fact, 
radical, flexible and pragmatic.
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CHAPTER NINE
A LEGACY OF NEGLECT
While political reforms advanced rapidly after 
1964, reforms in other areas, especially in education 
and economic development did not keep pace even after 
the impetus of the initiatives of the 1950s. This 
tardiness affected the people of the Madang region, 
in the urban and the rural districts. The 
infrastructure which should have been the foundation 
on which the district could evolve after independence 
did not develop and the Madang people were given few 
opportunities to interact with the wider world beyond 
their village and their district.
Because of the change in attitude of Australian 
voters after the war in the Pacific, the 
administration of the Territory now had far more 
funds available for development than it had in prewar 
days. One of the areas in need of urgent reform was 
the education system. Indeed, in the period prior to 
the war, education in the Madang district would have 
been non-existent without the effort of the 
missions. Even after the war the administration 
remained heavily reliant on the missions to deliver 
education to the villagers. However, the mission 
education system, especially that provided by the 
Lutherans, was often less than satisfactory.
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The Lutheran schools had been destroyed by the 
war. The cargo movement in the immediate post-war 
period had made it difficult to re-establish them and 
even when they had been re-established, the standard 
of education provided by the mission was 
questionable. Throughout the southern part of the 
district, the Lutherans continued to teach their 
pupils in the Graged language, rather than in 
English, or even tokpisin. As one patrol officer 
commented, the system hardly seemed appropriate for 
the development of the Territory (Johnson, Patrol 
Report Madang No. 12, 1954-55); it certainly seemed 
to be an unrealistic policy which would disadvantage 
any Maadang student wanting to enter a mainstream 
eductional programme. However, the Lutheran printing 
press at Nagada continued to churn out grammar books, 
dictionaries and other school literature in a 
language as foreign to most villagers as English 
(De'Ath 1981:75).
It was not only the inadequacy of the Lutheran 
education system which created problems for 
villagers,, but the terms by which they had to accept 
the Lutheran education system. The Lutherans were 
keen to set up new schools, especialy in those areas 
which had been affected by Yali's teachings, but 
their schools were not secular and villagers were 
expected to reciprocate the offer of education by 
giving up many of their magic rituals. Villagers
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were therefore left with a difficult choice. Many 
villagers could see a practical use for eduction, but 
knew that the mission's conditions would undermine 
their traditional way of life, including the 
production of food. Some villagers opted for a 
compromise and allowed some of their children to be 
educated, so that they could look after the village 
enterprises. Other children were kept away from 
school and learned traditional rituals so that normal 
village life could be maintained. Such a solution 
created a divided village (Lawrence 1953:572).
Initially, because of the lack of resources, the 
administration wanted to avoid the duplication of 
educational services and to retain mission schools in 
those areas where they were already established, on 
condition that 'the missions are able and willing, in 
due course, to conduct schools in their areas in 
lines proscribed by the Administration' (W.C. Groves, 
quoted in Smith 1975:27). Because the Lutheran 
schools continued to teach in Graged, the 
administration eventually refused to provide 
subsidies for them, and by the mid-1960s, these 
village schools ceased to exist (De'Ath 1981:75). In 
spite of the inadequacies of the Lutheran education 
programmes, the loss of the Lutheran village schools 
seriously disadvantaged many in the Madang district 
because the government schools designed to replace 
them were not set up quickly enough.
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The Catholic School system continued to expand in 
the district, in spite of the difficulties which were 
raised by the Church over the question of government 
funding when it was thought that such funding would 
compromise the autonomy of the schools. By 1970/ of 
the 17/090 children attending shool in the district 
(Smith 1975:70/ some 11,926 attended Catholic schools 
(De'Ath 1981:68).
Although the children of the Madang district had 
a better chance of acquiring an education than 
children from some areas, especially the newly 
opened-up highlands, nevertheless educational 
opportunities in the district were poor,compared in 
comparison with other areas which had a long history 
of colonization. While barely fifty per cent of 
primary-aged children were able to attend school in 
the Madang district, ninety-six per cent of children 
attended school in New Ireland and eighty-four per 
cent of children in New Britain were enrolled. 
Furthermore, there were few facilities in Madang for 
education beyond primary school (Smith 1970: 70)
There were were only five high schools, .two of them 
run by the Catholic Church to serve the entire 
district, and there was no national high 
school. There was, however, a teachers' college just 
outside the town.
Although for a short time, in the 1950s, Madang 
town flourished as a port town serving the developing
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highlands, generally, the district remained an 
economic backwater in the period leading to 
independence. While it is true that the Australian 
government was far more generous in fostering 
economic development in the Territory in the post-war 
days, and expenditure on infra-structure depended 
very much on the distribution of natural resources. 
Thus funds were diverted from Madang to areas which 
were thought to have greater economic potential.
This policy meant that the roads which the UN had 
deemed necessary for the economic develpment of the 
district were not forthcoming. In consequence, 
large-scale European investment did not materialize, 
nor did indigenous cash cropping.
In the 1950s, economic optimism was high in 
Madang town. By 1953, copra production had regained 
its pre-war levels and agricultural exports had 
reached £1,000.000 (Madang Government Station Report 
1953-54). Such was the optimism about copra, that 
W.R.Carpenter had established a desiccated coconut 
factory on Biliau Island in the Madang Harbour 
(Pacific Islands Monthly, June 1950:39)., The airport 
and harbour, serviced the rapidly developng highlands 
region. However, from 1960, when the highway to the 
highlands was opened and commodities and services 
began to be redirected through the port of Lae,
Madang stagnated. In 1962 the tonnages which passed 
through Lae and Madang ports, respectively, were:
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99,100 and 86,868 (TPNG Report 1961-62:259). Five 
years later, the respective tonnages were: 230,523 
and 123,717 (TPNG Report 1966-67:327). By 1971 the 
respective figures were 544,046 and 133,924 (TPNG 
Report 1970-71:329).
Madang, however, remained a service town and the 
administrative centre for the district. Some 
industry also developed in the town. W.D. Wills 
established a cigarette factory in the 1960. In 
1968 a Japanese company, Jant, was granted a timber 
lease and the company commenced operations, clear 
felling the Trans-Gogol area, for both logs and wood 
chips. Wewak Timbers, a fledgling tourist industry 
and a soft drink factory also developed at this time.
While these industries provided some employment 
opportunities, they could not employ all those who 
came into the town looking for work and a large pool 
of unemployed people began to develop, for Madang, 
like the other large towns of the Territory, began to 
act as a magnet for those seeking a change from 
village life. After the indenture system was 
overhauled, villagers still left their villages to 
find work, but now, instead of looking for work on 
plantations (although this sector remained the 
largest employer of labour), many began to look for 
opportunities within the towns. There was a variety 
of reasons for this; the attraction of life in the 
towns compared with life in the villages; the need
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for paid employment to pay taxes; the presence of 
better eductional opportunities for their children 
and so on. Often, rather than returning home, these 
migrants stayed in the urban areas, like those in 
Madang, making a new home for themselves (De'Ath 
1982:83). Those who came to Madang in the 
pre-independence years were not just people from the 
district itself; they came from other areas, 
especially the highlands and the Sepik. Their 
presence created new difficulties for the town's 
original inhabitants because the newcomers camped on 
their land. Many Sepiks settled first on Biliau 
Island until the islanders took the matter up with 
the administration and demanded their land back. To 
solve the problem, the administration created one of 
the first no-covenant schemes in the country, at 
Sisiak, just beyond the town's boundaries (Curtain 
1978:69). However, many of the new urban dwellers 
simply set up shanty settlements on land that did not 
belong to them.
In spite of the economic setbacks, the town 
continued to attract migrants and the population grew 
steadily; by 1971 Madang was the third largest urban 
centre in the Territory, with a population of 15,361 
(Miskaram 1981:78). However, the local people were 
not the main beneficiaries of that growth. Economic 
power and prestige stayed in the hands of the 
non-indigenous population. The average wage for an
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urban worker in 1963 was only $ 6.75 a week and 
included accommodation, although skilled workers 
could earn as much as $20 a week (Stevenson 
1968:118). These wages compared very poorly with 
those of the Europeans and many workers in Madang 
felt a sense of injustice and resentment at the 
inequality of the system. Skilled workers, in 
particular, argued that they did the same job and had 
the same responsibilities as Europeans, but were paid 
only a fraction of the European wage (ibid:124).
There were few ways in which workers could deal with 
this problem. Many unskilled workers simply moved 
from job to job, looking for better pay. Others 
joined trade unions.
Trade unions were permitted by the 
administration from 1960. While the administration 
did not actually foster them, it was prepared to 
assist in setting them up. In this way 
the administration thought that it would be able to 
control the unions through the Department of Labour 
and the assumption proved to be correct. In 
1962 laws were passed which gave the right of, free 
association to unions and drew up guidelines for 
conciliation and arbitration in the case of 
disputes. The right to strike was granted, but only 
if a secret ballot was first carried out, supervised 
by the Department of Industry. Even though the 
strike provisions were very restrictive, there was an
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outcry from the planters over the liberalization of 
working conditions and to appease this still powerful 
faction the right to strike was denied to plantation 
workers (ibid:113).
Among the trade unions which formed in the larger 
urban areas was the Madang Workers Association. The 
leadership of this union came from an educated 
minority, but the majority of it members were 
illiterate and usually unskilled workers. It was 
unfortunate that the Madang Workers Association was 
unable to attract more skilled workers, but the 
latter preferred to join their own specific unions, 
such as the Teachers Union. It was also unfortunate, 
but hardly surprising, that the expectations of the 
members were far greater than the results which their 
representatives were able to achieve for them. Many 
thought that by merely joining the trade union their 
demands for prestigious European goods would be met; 
at one stage, in 1966, there were requests for a $40 
weekly wage (ibid:129).
The frustration of not being able to obtain 
meaningful gains sometimes led to illegal wild cat 
strikes. These strikes revealed the true 
powerlessness of the unskilled Madang worker. In 
1964 a wild cat strike was called by workers at 
Madang Contractors over longstanding wage and working 
condition grievances. As a result of the strike most 
of the unskilled workers were dismissed as well as
201 .
many of the skilled ones. In 1965/ sixty workers 
stopped work at the cigarette factory. They were 
dismissed immediately and new workers hired to 
replace them (ibid:129). It was, therefore, 
virtually impossible for the union to negotiate for 
more than the smallest benefits because there was 
such an oversupply of unskilled workers. Most 
workers found this unsatisfactory and union numbers 
declined.
While the indigenous people in the town were 
unable to gain economic power, their counterparts in 
the rural areas were even more disadvantaged; some 
areas in the district, even in the 1950s, had little 
or no contact with the administration. The Adelbert 
Ranges were still a wild region which was difficult 
to control. There were no tokpisin speakers, which 
made communidiction very difficult. In an attempt to 
bring the area under control, the administration 
brought a group of villagers to Madang town to see 
for themselves the 'wonders of civilization'. 
Apparently the exercise was a success because one of 
the villagers 'has become a staunch government man 
and will be a great help in furthering government 
influence throughout the region' (Bell, Patrol 
Report, Madang, No. 7, 1952-53).
There were areas of the district which had never 
before had any contact with the administration and, 
indeed, had avoided contact with outside influences
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altogether. The people of the Guam River area, for 
example, avoided all contact with Europeans, even to 
the extent of refusing to use the government health 
facilities at Bogia and Annaberg (Taylor, Patrol 
Report, Madang Nov. 1951-Jan . 1952 ) .
There were very few sources of income for the 
rural villager. Plantation workers were very poorly 
paid, earning as little as $40 a year. The 
justification put forward by the planters for such 
low wages was that the cost of living for the rural 
worker was much less than that of his urban 
counterpart since the rural worker had access to 
gardens and could grow his own food. In spite of 
the seemingly poor rewards, the plantation worker did 
have better access to the cash economy than his 
village counterpart. Indigenous cash cropping had 
almost failed in the district. In 1967, the 
estimated production of cocoa and copra by villagers 
was only 167 tons and 1,730 tons, respectively. In 
East New Britain, production in the same period was 
3,720 tons of cocoa and 11,054 tons of copra (Finney 
1970:32). , The Rai Coast coffee industry became 
moribund. There was a move, led by Bruce Jephcott in 
1962, to introduce cattle production into the Ramu 
Valley and along the fertile areas of the Rai Coast. 
However, the marketing of the cattle proved difficult 
and by independence more than three-quarters of the 
beef cattle in the Madang district were bred by
Europeans, while for the village farmer cattle 
frequently became a status symbol rather than a 
source of income (King 1981:56).
The lack of development was due to several 
factors, many of which have been discussed above in 
chapter six. However, those problems which were 
evident in the early stages of cash cropping, 
especially the problems associated with getting the 
crops to market, were not solved in the succeeding 
decades. The development of the coffee industry in 
the highlands, which was perceived as more profitable 
crop for Europeans as well as Papua New Guineans, had 
diverted investment away from the coastal regions.
As a result,the network of roads which had been 
visualized for the district failed to materialize and 
this made it difficult for the village producers to 
get their goods to the market. One of the 
attractions of the Jant clear-felling operation was 
the promise of the roads which the development would 
bring in the Trans-Gogol region. A comparison of 
accessibility of roads to villagers in various 
districts indicated the disadvantage under which the 
Madang village producer laboured:
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District Estimated percentage of
people living near roads.
East New Britain 70
Eastern Highlands 50
Chimbu 40
Western Highlands 35
Madang 20
Manus
(Finney:3 1 ).
10
Of course some districts had even poorer road 
services than Madang; however, this does not negate 
the fact that the administration was seen as 
unwilling to support its promotion of cash cropping 
in the Madang district by providing an infrastructure 
to enable it to work. It is little wonder that 
Madang villagers of the Madang district lost any 
initial enthusiasm they had to acquire an income 
through cash cropping. Consequently the income from 
cash cropping in the Madang district remained far 
lower than in other districts.
Di s t r i c t Per C a pita Income
East New Br i t a i n 29.07 $
Ea s t e r n  H i g h l a n d s 8.53 $
C h i m b u 4.96 $
W e s t e r n  H i g h l a n d s 4.78 $
M a n u s 4.78 $
M a d a n g  
(ibid :33).
1.68 $
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The administration tried to improve the health of 
the villagers with the introduction of aid posts. The 
scheme, which was introduced in 1946, was an 
ingenious outreach programme designed to provide 
primary health care to villages through trained local 
people. By independence, Madang was better served 
than most districts. The missions were also major 
providers of health care in the district. Yagaum 
hospital, set up the Lutherans just outside Madang 
town, was a two hundred bed hospital (De'Ath 
1981:75). The Lutherans also provided a hospital on 
Karkar, while the Catholics provided a hospital at 
Alexishafen.
Other welfare programmes were introduced. Womens 
Clubs were formed throughout the Territory with the 
aim of raising village living standards through 
instruction in hygiene, nutrition, cooking, 
sewing and infant welfare, as well as being a focus 
for sport and social activities. Fifteen of these 
clubs were formed in Madang. While the importance of 
the role of women in raising village living standards 
was rightfully acknowledged by the administration, 
without substantial infrastructure to give them 
greater economic opportunities and provide more 
access to education as well as initiatives which 
would encourage women to have a greater say in 
politics, such organizations had only limited
effectiveness.
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After ninety years of colonization, the colonizers 
had bequeathed the people of the Madang district very 
little in the way infra-structure on which to develop 
an independent society. No wonder the majority of 
people in the district wanted more development 
before they were left to fend for themselves.
Certainly the truncation of development in Madang 
re-enforces Howlett's argument that the combination 
of indigenous socio-economic characteristics and 
development policies meant that change in Papua New 
Guinea 'is in a terminal stage' and that 
modernization is unlikely to occur (Howlett 
1973:273). The legacy of neglect made for an 
uncertain future for Madang which would be reliant 
on the equitable distribution of wealth from the 
new national government and continuing aid from
Australia.
CONCLUSION
Independence Day, on 15 September 1975, brought down 
the curtain on ninety years of colonization in the Madang 
district. The effects of colonization within the 
district had not been uniform. At one extreme, the 
people of the north coast had found the colonization 
process to be an unpleasant and sometimes violent 
experience and the issue of land loss was still an 
unresolved source of discontent. At the other end of the 
spectrum, in the more remote areas, where the contact 
between the colonizers and villagers had been limited, 
colonization had been a more benign event. Between the 
two extremes lay confusion, frustration and 
misunderstanding.
Much of the confusion which confronted the Madang 
villager was created by the colonial policies. Prior to 
World War II, the policies were designed solely for 
colonial profit, so that while the Madang people were 
involved with the changes which the policies brought, 
they were the victims of changes, and not the 
beneficiaries. The policies of the German New Guinea 
Company were violent and exploitative. Its successor, 
the German Imperial Administration, under Hahl, 
implemented policies which were less exploitive and more 
systematic, but, they, likewise, were designed for the 
benefit of settlers and any attempt to involve the 
villagers in the political or economic processes of the
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colony was an authoritarian action rather than a genuine 
attempt at inclusiveness. The breathtaking incompetence 
of the ANMEF's regressive policies did nothing to foster 
a?: improved race relations and, were, thankfully, short 
lived. However, even the policies of the mandated 
administration, although far more humane than those of 
its predecessor were frequently muddled and incompatible. 
Village life was to be preserved. The administration, 
however, continued to impose labour laws, collect head 
tax and alienate village land and so disrupt village 
life and the villagers were excluded from the policy 
making processes. Thus, although many villagers came 
into contact with the European way of life in this 
pre-World War II period, such contact was only 
superficial.
Because of the exclusivity of the Euroepean rule, 
villagers were confronted with two interrelated problems 
which they were unable to resolve and which formed the 
crux of their difficulties with the colonial process and 
their relations with the colonists. The first of these 
problems was the inability of villagers to achieve 
equivalence with Europeans in terms of status and 
political power. The second problem was the continuing 
failure of villagers to be able to access the source of 
European wealth, to which they believed they were rightly 
entitled. Because the colonists were either ignorant or 
indifferent to these concerns they could, therefore, 
provide no solution, and so the only option open to the
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Madang people to try to resolve these problems, was to do 
so in their own terms, with the result that cargo 
movements began to develop in the district in the period 
prior to World War II.
The role and importance of cargo cults has been 
central to previous studies of the impact of colonization 
in Madang. It has been generally agreed by the 
anthropologists who have studied the region, (Lawrence, 
McSwain, Morauta, Burridge and Hannemann in particular), 
that the people of the Madang sea-board are deeply 
religious. Lawrence, after thirty years working in the 
area, has summed up their attitude thus:
The people of southern Madang Province are 
deeply religious... they are essentially 
r. pragmatic about their beliefs: as they do not
genuinely conceive supernatural realm within 
the cosmos, they believe that gods and spirits 
inhabit the terrestrial world around them and 
are as real as human being 
themselves... religion of some kind is an 
essential ingredient and a paramount 
intellectual interest in their daily life. It 
shapes their activities and governs their 
thinking (Lawrence 1988:15).
Therefore, it has been argued, that because the people 
were so deeply religious, their problems could only be 
solved in religious terms and according to Lawrence 
'Cargoism is a logical modern continuum of traditional
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religion' (Lawrence 1982:6) Hence the right religious 
ritual had to be found which would manipulate the deities 
into revealing the access to cargo. Moreover/ it has 
been argued, that although the rituals might change over 
time, or may not be in evidence at all, the underlying 
philosophy behind the rituals remained (McSwain 
1977: 182) .
An alternative to seeking this correct ritual, was to 
try to find a 'tame white man' who would reveal the 
secret to the access to cargo. Because of the nature of 
the colonial experience, the white men who showed most 
willingness to interact on a more intimate basis with the 
village people were the missionaries. However, the 
missionaries did not understand what their role was 
perceived to be and so relations between the villagers 
and the missionaries frequently soured as these white men 
remained untamed. Thus, the attitude of the Madang 
people towards their colonizers, in the period before the 
war in the Pacific, was characterized by ambivalence. On 
the one hand the villagers resented their exclusion from 
cargo, status and power which would gain them equivalence 
with their colonizers, but, on the other, they also 
needed to cultivate amenable Europeans in an effort to 
have them reveal the source of the cargo. This 
ambivalence helps to explain why there was relatively 
little violence in the district during this period even 
though many of the Madang people were treated extremely
poorly.
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After World War II/ more options were available to 
the people of the district to improve their political 
status and economic prospects as the new administration 
introduced a variety of innovative policies. 
Unfortunately/ many of these policies appear to have 
been little more than 'bright ideas' with not enough 
thought given to their impact/ practicability or 
suitability for the villagers who were to implement them. 
Often programmes were instituted before sufficient 
infrastructure had been put into place or training had 
been implemented. Thus while the policies did provide an 
option to the cargo cults for villagers to initiate 
change, they did little to increase villagers' 
comprehension of the world beyond the village and 
misunderstandings continued to arise.
The continued existence of cargo cults in this 
period, despite the administration's initiatives, 
indicated that many Madang people continued to retain 
their old beliefs and Lawrence and McSwain are of the 
opinion that there was virtually no change at all in 
people's ideas (Lawrence 1982:59:McSwain 1977:169). They 
argue that the adoption of administrative policy by 
villagers was only a change in tactic rather than a 
change in philosophy and that while there might not be 
overt cargoist actions, cargoist thinking remained 
strong. Both anthropologists, however, use a very broad 
brush to paint the picture of cargoist thinking in the 
postwar period, providing examples such as a student's
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denial of the theory of evolution, (Lawrence 1964:203) 
and a villager's problem with the source of the Karkar 
money supply (McSwain 1977:179). It could equally be 
argued, however, that many people did in fact reject 
cargoism and embrace the new ideas but those ideas were 
greatly misunderstood and it is probable that many of 
those who rejected cargoism had no moüH; greater 
understanding of the complex world beyond the village 
than did the cargoists. The correlation between the 
existence of cargo cults and the ability to understand 
new concepts can also be questioned in another way.
Despite the minimal prewar contact and little, or no 
history of cargoism in the mountainous district around 
Bundi, villagers there demonstrated no greater 
comprehension of the economic and political changes than 
did villagers on the coast.
Evidence suggests that people did take advantage of the 
opportunities presented by the administration's changes 
in policy to seek wealth in areas other than cargoism.
Gulu and Irakau were two example of Madangs who even in 
the 1950s, were willing to try other methods. Later 
leaders, such as Angmai Bilas also rejected cargoism as a 
vehicle for change. The most emphatic rejection of 
cargoism, however, came in the national elections of 
1968, where as Louise Morauta has demonstrated, the 
coastal people understood that there was a clear 
ideological choice to be made between cargoism and the
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administration's initiatives and the majority chose to 
take the new directions. The rejection of Yali at the 
polls showed that many people thought that cargoism could 
no longer supply the answers to the changes which they 
were seeking, but the new initiatives introduced by the 
postwar administration, although promising to give the 
Madang people new ways of acguire status, wealth and 
political power, failed to provide villagers with 
sufficient infrastructure and skills to make the promises 
a reality.
Because of the difficulties presented by many of the 
new policies and the inadequate understanding that most 
Madangs possessed of the way in which European economics 
and politics worked, some Madangs took a pragmatic 
approach to the implementation of the changes and 
enlisted the help of those whom they perceived to have 
more appropriate skills. Thus, when local councils 
stumbled, Madangs accepted multiracial councils. 
Ethnically based voting patterns gave way to voting 
patterns which promised to deliver the man with the best 
skills to deal with the new situation of national 
government elections. When bisnis ventures became 
difficult, European expertise was sought to improve them. 
The pragmatic responses of the Madangs suggests a lack 
confidence in their ability to cope with the new 
situations and the continued preference which the Madang 
people show for non-Madang representation in the National 
Parliament indicates that this may still be the case.
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The inability of the Madang people to understand the 
wider world with which they were now involved, together 
with their reliance on the skills of others whom they 
percfeeve to be more valuable than their own, further 
suggests that the Madang people could be open to 
exploitation in the future.
Thus, while it can perhaps be argued that the 
colonization process in Madang was less traumatic than in 
other parts of the world, even for those who suffered 
land loss, the process, nevertheless, did not equip the 
people with the skills, knowledge and understanding for 
them to be able to take their place confidently in the 
wider world.
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